The state as a facilitator in the illicit global political economy : Guinea-Bissau and the global cocaine trade by Zeidler, Andreas
 i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree 
Master of Arts International Studies at the University of Stellenbosch  
Supervisor: Ms. Derica Lambrechts 
Co-supervisor: Prof. Anthony Leysens 
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
Department of Political Science 
March 2011  
by  
Andreas Zeidler 
THE STATE AS A FACILITATOR 
IN THE ILLICIT GLOBAL PO-
LITICAL ECONOMY: 
GUINEA-BISSAU AND THE 
GLOBAL COCAINE TRADE 
 
 i 
 
Declaration 
 
“By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained 
therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author hereof, that reproduction and pub-
lication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party rights and that I 
have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification. 
 
Date: 01/11/2010” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Copyright © 2011 University of Stellenbosch 
All rights reserved 
 
 ii 
 
Abstract 
 
This research study aims to approach illicit market activity, particularly transnational organ-
ised crime, from a political-economy point of view. The study of illicit market activity is 
characterised by various and often ambiguous concepts and approaches. The benefits of a 
political-economy approach include the provision of an alternative view of the illicit, combin-
ing aspects from these various approaches. The study of the Global Political Economy (GPE) 
examines the relationship between authority, mostly in the form of states, and markets. This 
thesis looks at the relationship between the state and illicit markets. It does so by using the 
concept Illicit Global Political Economy (IGPE), which is defined as concerning the social, 
political and economic arrangements affecting the global systems of illicit production, ex-
change and distribution, and the mix of values reflected therein. States, illicit markets and 
criminal actors are considered here as interdependent and interrelated parts of the IGPE spe-
cifically, and the overall GPE. Within this relationship several „roles‟ of the state are identi-
fied: the state as a creator and regulator of the illicit, through its legislative and executive au-
thorities; the state as a locale of the illicit, as home, host, transhipment or service state for 
transnational criminal activities; the state as a victim of the illicit, for example, through the 
inherent nature of crime denying the state´s jurisdiction over its territory and also through the 
use of violence or corruption by criminals; and the state as a facilitator for illicit activity, 
meaning that certain characteristics of states can enable illicit activity. This thesis is primarily 
concerned with the last role of the state. It is argued that certain characteristics of states, par-
ticularly weak and transitional states, enable the state´s exploitation by criminal actors. In the 
framework provided by Phil Williams (2002) seven of these characteristics are referred to as 
capacity gaps, which can result in functional holes, possibly enabling illicit activity. The pri-
mary research question of this thesis is, consequently: Is the role of the state as a facilitator in 
the IGPE enabled by the existence of capacity gaps and functional holes? 
 The West African state of Guinea-Bissau has been chosen as a case study for its role 
as a transhipment state in the global cocaine trade. In the first part of the analytical process of 
this thesis, the global cocaine trade and its historical development are described and analysed 
for the social, political and economic arrangements affecting it. This highlights the im-
portance of taking into account these arrangements for a full understanding of the illicit. Addi-
tionally, an analysis of the political-economy of Guinea-Bissau provides the necessary back-
ground for understanding the second part of this thesis´ approach. Here, the state of Guinea-
Bissau is examined firstly for the existence of capacity gaps and functional holes. If they are 
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found to exist, whether and how they are being used by cocaine traffickers is examined. It was 
found that six out of seven capacity gaps exist in Guinea-Bissau, most of which are being 
used by the cocaine traffickers. The involvement of the military in the drug trade in combina-
tion with its apparent extra-judicial standing is found to be of particular importance for the 
cocaine traffickers. This analysis allows for the research question to be answered positively. 
Moreover, the thesis can be considered to generally affirm the usefulness of a political-
economy approach to analysing the illicit and affirms specifically the usefulness of the con-
cept of the IGPE.  
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Opsomming 
Hierdie navorsingstudie poog om onwettige markaktiwiteite, spesifiek transnasionale 
georganiseerde misdaad, uit ‟n politiek-ekonomiese standpunt te benader. Die studie van die 
onwettige word gekarakteriseer deur verskeie en dikwels dubbelsinnige konsepte en 
benaderings. Die voordele van ‟n politiek-ekonomiese benadering sluit die voorsiening van ‟n 
alternatiewe beskouing van die onwettige dus ‟n kombinasie van aspekte van die verskillende 
benaderings. Die studie van Globale Politieke Ekonomie (GPE) fokus op die verhouding 
tussen gesag, meestal in die vorm van die state en markte. Hierdie tesis fokus op die 
verhouding tussen die staat en onwettige markte. Dit word gedoen deur gebruik te maak van 
die konsep Onwettige Globale Politieke Ekonomie (OGPE), wat gedefinieer kan word as die 
sosiale, politieke en ekonomiese reëlings wat die globale sisteem van onwettige produksie, 
wisseling en dustribusie affekteer, en die vermenging van waardes wat daardeur gereflekteer 
word. State, markte en kriminele akteurs word hier beskou as afhanklike en onderliggende 
dele van die OGPE, spesifiek, en die algehele GPE. Binne hierdie verhouding kan daar 
verskeie „rolle‟ van die staat geïdentifiseer word: die staat as skepper en reguleerder van die 
onwettige deur die wetgewende en uitvoerende gesag; die staat as lokaliteit van die onwettige, 
as tuiste, gasheer, oorskeping of diens staat vir transnasionale georganiseerde 
misdaadaktiwiteite; die staat as slagoffer van die onwettige, byvoorbeeld deur die inherente 
natuur van misdaad wat die staat se jurisdiksie oor sy grense ontneem asook deur die gebruik 
van geweld of korrupsie deur kriminele; en die staat as fasiliteerder vir onwettige aktiwiteite, 
wat beteken dat sekere eienskappe van die staat onwettige aktiwiteite moontlik maak. Hierdie 
tesis fokus spesifiek op laasgenoemde rol van die staat. Daar word geargumenteer dat sekere 
eienskappe van state, meer spesifiek swak en oorgangstate, dit makliker maak vir kriminele 
akteurs om die staat uit te buit. In die raamwerk wat voorgestel word deur Phil Williams 
(2002) word daar sewe van hierdie eienskappe geïdentifiseer en verwys na as 
kapasiteitsopeninge wat funksionele gapings kan veroorsaak, en so onwettinge aktiwiteite 
moontlik maak. Die primêre navorsingsvraag van hierdie tesis is gevolglik: Word die rol van 
die staat as fasiliteerder in die OGPE moontlik gemaak deur die teenwoordigheid van 
kapasiteitsopeninge en funksionele gapings?  
 Die Wes-Afrika staat Guinee-Bissau dien as gevallestudie vir sy rol as oorskeep staat 
in globale handel in kokaïen. In die eerste gedeelte van die analitiese proses van hierdie tesis, 
word globale handel in kokaïen en die historiese ontwikkeling daarvan beskryf en geanaliseer 
vir die sosiale, politieke en ekonomiese reëlings wat ‟n impak daarop het. Dit bring die 
belangrikheid van die inagneming van hierdie reëlings, indien die onwettige verstaan wil 
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word, na vore. ‟n Addisonele analiese van die politieke ekonomie van Guinee-Bissau verskaf 
die nodige agtergrond- informasie om die tweede gedeelte van hierdie tesis se benadering te 
verstaan. Hier die staat Guinee-Bissau word eerstens ondersoek vir die teenwoordigheid van 
kapasiteitsopeninge en funksionele gapings, en tweedens hoe dit gebruik word deur kokaïen 
smokkelaars. Die studie vind dat ses vanuit die sewe kapasiteitsopeninge wel in Guinee-
Bissau voorkom en gebruik word deur smokkelaars. Die wederregtelike rol van die landmag, 
wat gewoonlik die smokkelaars ondersteun, is vir die smokkelaars baie belangrik. Hierdie 
analiese laat dit toe dat die navorsingsvraag positief beantwoord word. Verder, in hierdie tesis 
word die bruikbaarheid van ‟n politiek-ekonomiese aanslag tot die onwettige en die spesifieke 
teoretiese fondasies daarvan bevestig.   
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
“Ladies and Gentlemen, Guinea-Bissau is under siege. The threat posed by drug traffickers 
is so great that the state is on the verge of collapse”  
(Costa, 2007). 
 
1.1 Background 
 
These are the words of the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) Antonio Maria Costa, spoken at the International Conference on Drug 
Trafficking in Guinea-Bissau, held in Lisbon on 19 December 2007. According to the 
UNODC, Guinea-Bissau “has become the hub of a new cocaine trafficking route from South 
America via West Africa to supply growing demand in Europe” (Costa, 2007). The alarm 
raised by the UNODC is based on the rapidly increasing number and volume of seizures of 
cocaine in West Africa (see figure 1). The UNODC sees these only as the tip of the iceberg 
and “indicative of a dramatic increase in the underlying traffic” (UNODC, 2007a: 7). One 
quarter of the cocaine for Europe is estimated to have transited through West Africa (WA), 
(UNODC, 2007a: 10). 
 
 
Figure 1: Annual cocaine seizures in West Africa, 2000-2007 (UNODC, 2008: 8) 
 
An UNODC report on transnational organised crime (TOC) in WA from 2005 draws atten-
tion to the growing concern of officials over the increasing role of the region in the cocaine 
trade and its implications (UNODC, 2005: 21). While most other countries in the region 
have seized more than 100 kg of cocaine in either 2006 or 2007, Guinea-Bissau has done so 
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in both years, which can be seen as an indicator for a specific utilisation of the country by 
traffickers. Moreover, there is evidence that Latin-American traffickers have relocated to 
WA, indicating a longer-term investment (UNODC, 2007a: 10-11).  
Guinea-Bissau is furthermore one of the poorest countries in the world, located in 
one of the poorest and most unstable regions of the world. The GDP of Guinea-Bissau in 
2006 was only $304 million, about the worth of six tons of cocaine, and the national budget 
of US$125 million, equivalent to about two and a half tons of cocaine at wholesale level 
(Costa, 2007). “The greatest danger posed by cocaine is its extreme value compared to that 
of local economies” (UNODC, 2010a: 17), as the drug money is “perverting the economy 
and rotting society” (Costa, 2007). Traffickers can offer officials more than they would earn 
in a lifetime, giving them enormous leverage over the state. This could have a catastrophic 
effect on the already compromised rule of law in Guinea-Bissau, as well as put further strain 
on the state-society relationship (Costa, 2007).  
The urgency of Costa´s address in 2007 specifically regarding Guinea-Bissau is 
based on the country´s particular vulnerabilities, such as political instability, rampant pov-
erty and lack of rule of law. These same vulnerabilities are being exacerbated and perpetuat-
ed by its role as a transit point. Drug traffickers have infiltrated the highest state structures, 
especially the military. “[G]iven the evidence of corruption and the relative sizes of the con-
traband and the economy, virtually every political conflict has criminal undertones” 
(UNODC, 2010a: 18). While the traffickers themselves seem not to use violence, the threat 
to stability, local and regional, emanates more from rivalry between local beneficiaries for 
the access to funds. The biggest fear articulated by the UNODC is the creation of pseudo-
states under the control of criminals, with no international accountability - a first African 
narco-state. These can pose a threat to international security by becoming safe havens, for 
example, for terrorists (UNODC, 2010a: 1, 15-18).  
While the 2010 report shows that the trafficking through Guinea-Bissau and WA 
seems to have declined or moved, for example to Mali, possibly due to international atten-
tion and action, it has not stopped (UNODC, 2010a: 16). The UNODC (2009) points out that 
even developed and stable states struggle to control organised crime and even more so TOC, 
as it requires coordinated action between several states and international organisations 
(UNODC, 2009: 9). 
The following literature review will cover literature concerning the theoretical con-
text within which the events in Guinea-Bissau can be examined and analysed. This will be 
expanded on in Chapter II. The consequent sections of this chapter will then motivate the 
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relevance of this research, discuss the research question and objectives, and develop a suita-
ble research design and methodology.  
 
1.2 Literature Review 
 
The situation laid out above allows for a variety of different theoretical approaches from 
several disciplines, such as: Criminology, Sociology, Economics, Political Science and In-
ternational Relations (IR). Criminological approaches, for example, might seek to under-
stand the organisational structures and operational parameters of organised criminal groups, 
in order to enhance crime-combating and give policy advice.1 IR scholars too have become 
more interested in TOC since the early 1990s, when it was perceived as a rapidly growing 
phenomenon and was increasingly believed to be a major danger to national security and 
consequently, a foreign policy concern, as noted by former US president Bill Clinton and 
former UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Mittelman, 1999: np). The UN has 
adopted several conventions, from the 1988 „Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics, 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances‟ and the 1994 „Conference on Organized Transnational 
Crime‟, to the 2000 „UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime‟ (Madsen, 
2009: 102). Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001, the nexus between organised crime 
and terrorism has received additional attention (Madsen, 2009: 62; Shelley et al, 2005: 5). 
The aim of this research is, however, to locate and explain the situation in Guinea-
Bissau within the wider context of the Global Political Economy (GPE).2 Similarly, the 
UNODC (2009a) states that “most illicit activity occurring in West Africa is caused by ex-
ternal market forces” (UNODC, 2009: 1). 
 
1.2.1 The Global Political Economy and Transnational Organised Crime 
As a field of study, (G)PE´s main underlying assumption simply put, is that economics can-
not be sufficiently understood without politics and vice versa. “It concerns the social, politi-
cal and economic arrangements affecting the global systems of production, exchange and 
distribution, and the mix of values reflected therein” (Strange, 1989: 18). State and non-state 
actors “participate in the production, trade, and marketing of goods and services as well as in 
an array of financial practices” (Friman/Andreas, 1999: 1). It is fundamental to the study of 
GPE to answer “how power has been used to shape the political economy and the way in 
which it distributes costs and benefits, risks and opportunities” (Strange, 1989: 24). Susan 
                                                 
1 See for example: Von Lampe, 2003. 
2 In this thesis the term Global is used rather than International Political Economy (IPE), as it emphasizes that 
its analysis is not limited to states as actors, but that non-state transnational actors also play an important role. 
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Strange (1989) suggests several steps for the analysis of a particular authority-market rela-
tionship, which will help to structure this thesis.  
Several authors within the field of GPE have written on crime, organised crime and 
TOC in the context of the GPE. James Mittelman (1999) writes on the globalisation of or-
ganised crime, linking the surge of TOC in the 1990s to the general trends and developments 
of globalisation that characterise the GPE, often following the same logic (Mittelman, 1999). 
The development of a global economy, made possible by technological advances, accompa-
nied by increased mobility and the politics of liberalisation and deregulation, has provided a 
whole new range of opportunities for criminals and opened up space within which they can 
operate. Similar arguments are made by Friman and Andreas (1999) in their book entitled 
“The Illicit Global Political Economy and State Power” and by Andreas (2004) in his article 
“Illicit International Political Economy: The Clandestine Side of Globalization”.  
Subsequently, this thesis will argue that TOC has to be understood within the context 
of the GPE.   
 
1.2.2 Transnational Organised Crime and the Illicit Global Political Economy 
The term TOC is widely used in UN resolutions, literature of different academic fields, by 
journalists and by law-enforcement agencies. However, there is no consensus on a defini-
tion. Hobbs (1998), Edward and Gill (2002a,b), Williams (2002), Andreas (2004) and Mad-
sen (2009) all criticise the term for several reasons and offer different solutions. Williams 
(2002) for example, offers the alternative definition of TOC as criminal business that crosses 
borders (Williams, 2002: 164). Andreas (2004) prefers to use the concept Illicit International 
Political Economy (IIPE), which he broadly defines as the relationship between states and 
illegal international markets. In an earlier book published with Friman (1999), they use the 
concept Illicit Global Economy (IGE), which “consists of the system of transnational eco-
nomic activities that are criminalized by states in importing or exporting countries” (Fri-
man/Andreas, 1999: 1). Edward and Gill (2002) also suggest a political-economy approach 
to the subject.  
These approaches add several important analytical dimensions to understanding TOC 
and the situation in Guinea-Bissau. They emphasise the state as a crucial actor with multiple 
roles, as creator of the illicitness of a certain market, as enforcer, but also as victim. They 
also allow for a wider analysis of the context and development in which certain illicit activi-
ties happen, rather than focusing on the TOC groups only. However, the author of this thesis 
believes it is necessary to further expand on the concepts used by Andreas and Friman 
(1999) and Andreas (2004). The term Illicit Global Political Economy (IGPE) seems more 
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appropriate than IIPE or IGE, as it emphasises that the study is not limited to states as actors, 
but that non-state transnational actors, like TOC, also play an important role, and includes 
political aspects. (Friman/Andreas, 1999: 6) This will be further discussed in the second 
chapter. Following Susan Strange´s (1989) definition of IPE it will be argued that the IGPE 
concerns the social, political and economic arrangements affecting the global systems of 
illicit production, exchange and distribution, and the mix of values reflected therein.  
Consequently, it will be argued that TOC forms part of the IGPE, responding to mar-
ket demands and changes within the social, economic and political arrangements of the IG-
PE, which in turn represents the GPE´s illicit dimension and is therefore affected by it and 
vice versa.  
 
1.2.3 The Illicit Global Political Economy, TOC and the State 
The discussion about the GPE and globalisation includes the debate about the role of the 
state in the contemporary GPE and its debateable retreat. However, the discussion on the 
retreat of the state does not directly form part of this thesis. Nevertheless, it is relevant inas-
much as the authors cited above argue that TOC, as part of the IGPE, takes advantage of 
certain gaps and characteristics of states, and can replace some of its functions. Several au-
thors argue that the state´s vulnerability to TOC is related to a general retreat of the state, 
due to globalisation, deregulation, or a more selective, proactive retreat in certain areas, dif-
fering from state to state, as a response to various factors, among others, globalisation (Fri-
man/Andreas, 1999: 4). 
 The relationship between states, TOC and the IGPE is very complex and is often 
described as paradoxical in several of its aspects. While states are arguably not the only ac-
tors in the GPE and IGPE alike, they define what a criminal activity is on the one hand, but 
on the other hand they are also the ones who are supposedly threatened by TOC. Susan 
Strange (1996) argues in her book The Retreat of the State that the mafia can be seen as an 
example of a non-state authority, just like Transnational Companies (TNC). Other than 
TNCs, mafias, or in this case TOCs, constitute a rival or counter-authority, to the state 
(Strange, 1996: 92- 93). The criminalisation of a product or service by one or more states is 
what creates an illicit market in the first place and tougher law-enforcement on the one hand 
increases the risks for criminals. But on the other hand it increases the price and thereby the 
profit for TOC. Friman and Andreas (1999) furthermore argue that when a certain activity is 
criminalised, the state essentially withdraws from regulating the market, a function that will 
be taken over by non-state actors such as organised crime groups, through taxing, quality 
control, contract enforcement and other means. In a similar fashion, TOC is a threat to the 
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state and tries to circumvent its controls, but also needs the state, as profitability is created 
by the provision of a product or service across borders to a better market. TOC operates in 
the gap between the state´s ability to criminalise a certain activity and the ability to enforce 
it, in the form of police and security forces, thereby exploiting the state´s weaknesses (Fri-
man/Andreas, 1999: 9-10). Williams (2002) links the rise of TOC in the 1990s to the weak-
ness of many states, which facilitates opportunities for criminal activity. Transitional states 
are particularly vulnerable to TOC (Williams, 2002: 170). The characteristics of transitional 
states, and of weak states, in general provide for capacity gaps leading to functional holes, 
for example, a lack of capacity to control a state´s borders leads to weak interdiction of ille-
gal products, which can be exploited by TOC (Williams, 2002: 173). 
According to Williams (2002), a major problem in the debate about the retreat of the 
state is caused by differing interpretations of what constitutes a state, thereby hindering a 
more meaningful analysis of the relationship between the IGPE, TOC, and the state. In order 
to overcome this obstacle he identifies four main interpretations used in the debate, which 
lead authors to different conclusions. Based on these different definitions, Williams (2002) 
develops a categorisation of how TOC threatens and exploits states (Williams, 2002: 163). 
   Williams also notes that from the perspective of TOC there are four categories of 
states: “home, host, transhipment, and service” (Williams, 2002: 168). Transhipment states, 
like Guinea-Bissau “suffer from the violation of their sovereignty and are particularly vul-
nerable to operational corruption” (Williams, 2002: 169). 
 Several authors, e.g. Bayart et al (1999) and Reno (2000), specifically address the 
state in Africa in relation to illicit activities and argue that in many states in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) the capacity to administer, control and implement has diminished as result of 
the “combined effects of economic crisis, neo-liberal programmes of structural adjustment 
and the loss of legitimacy of political institutions” (Bayart et al, 1999: 19). Additionally, 
they argue that a close relationship between political power, economic accumulation and 
illicit activities has developed in many cases in SSA (Bayart et al, 1999: xvi, 19; Reno, 
2000: 434). 
 From this brief overview it can be gathered that there is a need to further discuss the 
relationships between the state, the IGPE and TOC in order to achieve a more meaningful 
analysis of Guinea-Bissau´s role in the global cocaine trade. 
 
 
 
 
  
 7 
 
1.3 Research Problem 
 
1.3.1 Relevance of the Research 
The dramatic appeals by the UNDOC are evidence of the pressing nature and the serious-
ness of the situation. As shown in the literature review and in the introduction, the possible 
consequences of cocaine trafficking for Guinea-Bissau are dramatic. Similar developments 
are possible or even under way in neighbouring states, as international attention to Guinea-
Bissau seems to have already shifted some of the trafficking flow to other countries in the 
region. This firstly highlights the need for an analysis of these events in a wider context in 
order to fully understand the historical roots, causes and processes that preceded the trans-
formation of Guinea-Bissau into a major cocaine-trafficking hub. Secondly, it illustrates the 
necessity of analysing Guinea-Bissau´s role in the IGPE and why it is used as a transhipment 
state.  
Andreas (2004) additionally points out that the illicit dimension of the GPE is largely 
being overlooked. He emphasizes that the field could greatly benefit from bringing the clan-
destine side of globalisation “more centrally into IPE” (Andreas, 2004: 641). Firstly, be-
cause studying the mechanisms and implications of change in the IGPE and its connections 
to the licit dimension, can contribute to the general understanding of the GPE, the relation-
ship between states and global markets and the theoretical underpinnings of the field. An 
analysis of the changes that led to the surge of TOC, its modus operandi, its arrival and im-
pact in Guinea-Bissau promises to achieve this. Mittelman (1999) makes a similar argument 
saying that “in terms of global governance and globalization, organized crime is an under-
studied issue” (Mittelman, 1999: np). Secondly, the overview of the literature given above 
shows the existence of a variety of different definitions and approaches to the illicit. Thus, 
situating the events in Guinea-Bissau in the wider context of the GPE will provide a deeper 
insight into its illicit dimensions, the relationship between markets (illicit or not) and states. 
 
1.3.2 Research Question and Rationale 
The brief literature review suggests that the IGPE-State relationship is very complex and 
consists of a multitude of actors with multiple roles. Additionally, the space for this study is 
limited. Hence, this thesis will focus on only one aspect of the IGPE-State relationship. Con-
sequently, the primary research question of this thesis is: 
Is the role of the state as a facilitator in the IGPE enabled by the existence of ca-
pacity gaps and functional holes?     
The underlying rationale of this research is to examine the relationship between the IGPE 
and the state, which will not only contribute to the field of GPE in general, but also provide 
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a frame of reference for the anticipation and possible prevention of similar developments 
and global trends. For this purpose, it is necessary to also analyse the wider context of the 
nature, dynamics and mechanisms in the IGPE. This is however not to suggest a one-sided 
systemic causality between the IGPE and the state. It will be emphasized that the character-
istics and development of the particular state are equally important.  
The IGPE is, for the purpose of this research, defined as the social, political and eco-
nomic arrangements affecting the global systems of illicit production, exchange and distri-
bution, and the mix of values reflected therein, as argued earlier. The wider context refers to 
the changing nature, dynamics and patterns that define the current state of the IGPE and its 
components, like TOC, as well as its historical development. The events, developments in 
Guinea-Bissau and the state´s characteristics, as briefly laid out in the first section of this 
chapter, will serve as a case study. Capacity gaps and functional holes refer to the concepts 
used in Williams´ (2002) analytical framework, describing certain vulnerabilities of states. 
The approach will be two-fold. The first part of this approach will treat the IGPE in a 
theoretical and descriptive fashion, acknowledging its importance, and will contribute to 
achieving the underlying rationale of this study. The historical background to the develop-
ment in Guinea-Bissau, explaining what has contributed to the weakness of the state will be 
treated alike. Hence, in the first part of the approach taken here, the development of the con-
temporary global cocaine market, as part of the IGPE, its social, political and economic ar-
rangements, as well as those of Guinea-Bissau and its history, will be “mapped”, in a de-
scriptive effort. In this „mapping‟ the analytical steps suggested by Susan Strange (1989) 
will be used in order to achieve a structured and methodological analysis. This part will 
draw on literature discussed above, on the globalisation of organised crime, the IGPE, on 
TOC, the global cocaine trade, as well as on states in Africa, and Guinea-Bissau in particu-
lar. The purpose of this part is to provide the context and background within which the find-
ings of the second part have to be understood.  
The second and main part of this study will attempt to answer the primary research 
question. For this purpose the analytical framework developed by Williams (2002) will be 
used, firstly to examine whether the capacity gaps and functional holes identified by Wil-
liams (2002) exist in Guinea-Bissau, and secondly to analyse how these are used by cocaine 
traffickers. Accordingly, two supplementary research questions are formulated: 
(1) Do capacity gaps and functional holes exist in Guinea-Bissau? 
If a capacity gap and resultant functional holes are found to exist in Guinea-Bissau it will be 
asked: 
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(2) How are the capacity gaps and functional holes used by cocaine traffickers in or-
der to advance their activities in Guinea-Bissau? 
 
 
1.3 Research Design and Methodology 
 
The approach chosen in this thesis is a qualitative single-case study. A qualitative rather than 
a quantitative approach is more appropriate for the purpose of this research, as it enables the 
researcher to achieve a more in-depth understanding of social dynamics and a focus on pro-
cess rather than the outcome (Babbie/Mouton, 2008: 270). 
 The case study approach was chosen because it helps to connect the micro-level 
(Neuman, 2006: 41), in this case the events in Guinea-Bissau, to the macro-level, the 
(I)GPE. As this thesis is a single-case study, there are two main pitfalls to be aware of: se-
lection bias and over-generalisation of results. In order to minimise or avoid these, the selec-
tion of the case study, as well as the within-case methods used, are of critical importance. 
Guinea-Bissau represents a so-called „most-likely‟ case for this study, as it is a transhipment 
state for the global cocaine trade and some of its characteristics, such as a weak rule of law, 
seem well suited for illicit activities. While most-likely cases are not the strongest possible 
test for theories, general theory-testing is not the purpose of this research. It is more what 
George and Bennett (2005: 76, 78) call “building-block studies of particular types or sub-
types of a phenomenon. [...] Each block – a study of each subtype – fills a “space” in the 
overall theory. [...] each building block is itself a contribution to theory.”3 This is especially 
helpful for the field of GPE/IPE, as it does not stand for one single theory or theoretical 
framework, beyond its underlying assumption, as pointed out before. While authors like 
Susan Strange have argued for GPE to transcend the disciplinary border between Political 
Science, IR, and Economics, it remains a multidisciplinary field. Different authors choose a 
different point of entry and level of analysis (O´Brien/Williams, 2007: 14, 27). Therefore, 
the primary research question represents a building-block for the theoretical understanding 
of the illicit in the GPE. While this research does not strictly follow one specific theory, it 
will build on the theoretical framework and analytical tools suggested by Susan Strange 
(1989) for GPE and use Williams´ (2002) theoretical and analytical framework, which will 
be discussed further in Chapter II.  
 This study will make use of mostly secondary data, as primary data is hard to obtain 
due to the clandestine nature of the subject. This will be further elaborated in the section on 
                                                 
3 Italic in original. 
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limitations and delimitations. The sources of secondary data used here are academic writ-
ings, journalistic accounts of events, documents published by institutions such as the 
UNODC and, when available, those published by the state of Guinea-Bissau.  
 
1.4.1 Variables, Unit of analysis, Level of Analysis and Concepts 
The independent variable in this research is the IGPE, as part of the overall GPE, including 
its components, specifically the global cocaine trade. Accordingly, the dependent variable is 
the role of the state in the IGPE, in this case Guinea-Bissau, while the capacity gaps and 
functional holes of the state of Guinea-Bissau represent intervening variables. 
The unit of analysis is the state of Guinea-Bissau.  
The level of analysis however will vary during the different stages of the analysis. It 
will start out at a macro, global level, analysing the IGPE and then “zoom in” on the cocaine 
trafficking in Guinea-Bissau, in order to capture as many aspects as possible.  
  
1.4.2 Limitations and Delimitations of the Research 
Limitations to the research conducted in this study arise from two main sources. Firstly, the 
clandestine nature inherent to illicit flows allows only “guesstimates” (Andreas, 2004: 646) 
on the extent of cocaine trafficking, derived from the number of seizures, as well as journal-
istic or other public allegations of corruption or other involvement of officials. Secondly, in 
regions or countries where the capabilities of states and law-enforcement are low, like in 
WA, reliable official data is even harder to obtain (UNODC, 2005: iii). Additionally, the 
majority of the literature and information on the cocaine trade in Guinea-Bissau comes from 
the UNODC and academic as well as journalistic treatment of the subject also relies heavily 
on UNODC sources. Andreas (2004) calls the lack of reliable data the Achilles heel for re-
search in the field (Andreas, 2004: 646). Thirdly, this study is limited by the fact that the 
majority of the literature on Guinea-Bissau and official government documents are written 
in Portuguese (Galli, 1990: xix). The use of predominantly secondary data contributes fur-
ther to the limitations of this study, as do limited time and the restricted length of this thesis.  
 This study is delimited geographically to the area of the state of Guinea-Bissau. Fur-
thermore, the analytical second part of the two-fold approach taken in this thesis only looks 
at the relationship of the IGPE with the state as defined and discussed by Williams (2002) 
and does not include societal aspects, which are however acknowledged and described in the 
first part. Additionally, only the TOC cocaine trafficking will be considered as an example 
of the illicit market activity. Furthermore, only literature published before October 2010 will 
be taken into account. 
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1.4 Outline of the Remainder of the Study 
 
The aim of the second chapter of this thesis is to further discuss the concepts and variables, 
as well as their operationalisation, and will therefore go into more detail on the underlying 
theories and theoretical frameworks, briefly discussed in the literature review. The analytical 
tools, which will help to perform a structured and logical analysis, will then be discussed. 
Chapter III, the contextualisation, constitutes the first part of the approach of this study. The 
characteristics of the political economy of the global cocaine market, its dynamics, historical 
development and the relationship between market and authority will be identified, as will be 
the political economy of the unit of analysis, the state of Guinea-Bissau, and its historical 
development. Chapter IV will then attempt an analysis to answer the primary research ques-
tion. Finally, Chapter V will summarise the findings in a conclusion, tie together the results 
of the first, descriptive, part with those of the second part of the study and discuss the possi-
ble implications of these findings.  
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Chapter II: Theoretical Foundation, Framework, Concepts and Analytical 
Tools 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss critically and clarify the theoretical foundation of 
this study and conceptualise and operationalise the key concepts introduced in the first chap-
ter accordingly where necessary. These are: the GPE, the IGPE, TOC, the state in the IGPE, 
and capacity gaps and functional holes. The section on the GPE will furthermore discuss 
analytical tools for this field, such as those suggested by Susan Strange (1989, 1996). Simi-
larly, the analytical framework provided by Williams (2002) will be discussed, as it will be 
used to answer the primary research questions as discussed in Chapter I. 
 
2.2 Defining the Illicit Global Political Economy  
 
In the first chapter it was briefly indicated that one of the main underpinnings of this thesis 
is to understand and analyse the developments in Guinea-Bissau within the wider context of 
the GPE. It was furthermore indicated that an argument would be made for understanding 
the IGPE as a dimension of the GPE, defined by its illicitness. This section will attempt to 
discuss the merits of this theoretical foundation for this thesis.  
When approaching the illicit on a global level, scholars use a variety of concepts, fo-
cusing on different aspects. Concepts like black, underground, or informal market focus 
more on the economic aspects. These concepts differ mainly in the range of activities they 
include. Their common ground is that “each set violates institutional rules […] ranging from 
legal to fiscal statutes to “macroeconomic accounting conventions”4” (Friman/Andreas, 
1999: 5). Another concept that is used often, particularly by the UNODC in their reports on 
the cocaine trade in Guinea-Bissau, is TOC. Due to this, it will be critically discussed in 
more detail in the following section.  
  
2.2.1 Transnational Organised Crime 
As stated in the introduction, the concept TOC has become widely used since the beginning 
of the 1990s, accompanied by the warning that it constitutes an increasing threat to the na-
tional security of states. Shelley (1995) describes it as a phenomenon “penetrating political 
institutions, undermining legitimate economic growth, threatening democracy and the rule 
                                                 
4 Quotation marks in original. 
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of law and contributing to the post-Soviet problem of the eruption of small, regionally con-
tained, ethnic violence” (Shelley, 1995: 488).  
Besides its widespread use there seems to be no consensus on what it entails. Andre-
as (2004) calls it a “frustratingly broad, vague, and fuzzy term, [which] is too often used as a 
poorly defined and all-encompassing umbrella category under which all sorts of perceived 
'transnational threats' are placed” (Andreas, 2004: 643).  
In order to achieve a meaningful discussion of this concept it is helpful to start by 
disassembling it into the three terms it contains, discussing them individually and then look-
ing at how they are put together to form the final concept. At the beginning of this undertak-
ing stands crime, which is then split up into several sub-categories, one of which is organ-
ised crime, and then further divided into transnational and non-transnational organised 
crime.  
 
2.2.1.1 Crime 
At the beginning of each crime stands the creation of a law that imposes a prohibition on the 
particular activity, product or service within a particular jurisdiction.5 The terms crimino-
genesis and criminalisation refer to this process. Bayart et al (1999) define criminal as: 
“political, social and economic practices which are the object of a „primary crimi-
nalization‟6either by the laws and other texts of the states which are under discussion 
or, more particularly, in international law” (Bayart et al, 1999: 15).  
 
Hence, definitions of what is criminal are relative and change over time, for example, the 
prohibition of slavery (Bayart et al, 1999: 13). Additionally, the process of criminalisation 
needs to be understood in relation to “political strategies, wider social and economic chang-
es and international developments which confer on them a new meaning” (Bayart et al, 
1999: 16). Moreover, international prohibition regimes are mostly dominated by Western 
conceptions of what is criminal. Furthermore, criminalisation has direct practical conse-
quences, for example, the need for policies and prohibition regimes on the one hand, and an 
increased value of the now illegal product or service, motivating criminals to take higher 
risks, on the other. 
 Law-enforcement practitioners have responded to the myriad possible crimes by 
compartmentalising and setting up specialised units to deal with (perceived) different crime 
                                                 
5 One could go even further back to say that at the beginning of a crime stands the creation of some kind of 
jurisdiction. 
6 As opposed to secondary criminalisation which is the “formal decision to prosecute the person or persons 
alleged to have committed a crime” (Bayart et al, 1999: 13).  
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types. These distinctions indicate different modi operandi, different activities or aims, dif-
ferent perpetrators, different victims, different markets and of course different consequences 
for perpetrators if caught.  
 
2.2.1.2 Organised Crime 
Organised crime as a separate concept has its roots in the US of the nineteenth century. 
While the term suggests a focus on the behavioural aspect of organisation, the US govern-
ment as well as academics instead focused on racial and ethnic aspects, or a perceived col-
lective identity. This was probably due to the perceived prevalence of crime groups of Ital-
ian (and Irish) origin in the early twentieth century, which shaped the main-streaming of the 
term. As a result, the image of organised crime became that of a “closed ethnic group […], 
based on tribal and family relationships” (Madsen, 2009: 13), the so called “Sicilian syn-
drome”, or “Alien conspiracy” (Madsen, 2009: 13). The reliance on the Sicilian model of 
organised crime “has gravely impeded scholarship in relevant conceptualization of the sub-
ject-matter” (Madsen, 2009: 13).  
The concept of organised crime, as a part of TOC, is also one of the main points of 
criticism. The denotative meaning, what it says, of TOC is criticised, as the nucleus of the 
term, organised crime, is itself a contested concept, defined differently or not at all in differ-
ent countries and by different organisations (Interpol, 2010; Madsen, 2009: 9). 
Williams (2002) identifies three general approaches to a definition of organised 
crime: firstly, a simple list of characteristics, which include criminal purpose, a minimum 
number of people, some kind of organisational structure or hierarchy, use of violence and 
corruption, and  an enduring association; secondly, a list of primary characteristics which 
have to be met, and secondary characteristics some of which have to be met; and thirdly, 
definitions that try to capture the essence of organised crime. An example of the latter is the 
definition used by Interpol. The head of Interpol´s organised crime unit defines it as “any 
group having a corporate structure whose primary objective is to obtain money through ille-
gal activities, often surviving on fear and corruption” (Nesbitt, 1993; in Williams, 2002: 
164).7 According to the UN  
““Organized criminal group” shall mean a structured group of three or more per-
sons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing 
one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Conven-
tion, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit. 
[…] 
                                                 
7 For an extensive list of definitions of organised crime see Klaus von Lampe, Definitions of Organized Crime, 
www.organized-crime.de/OCDEF1.htm. 
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“Structured group” shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the immedi-
ate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles 
for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure” (UNODC, 
2004: 5). 
 
Williams (2002) suggests an alternative „neo-Clausewitzian‟ definition: “organized crime is 
simply the continuation of business by other means” (Williams, 2002: 164).  
Besides the ambiguous definitions of organised crime, the concept is also criticised 
for focusing the attention on the organisational aspect, which is often overstated. While ac-
tually “partly in response to intensified law enforcement pressure […] criminal organiza-
tions have flattened out, dispersed, and become more network-oriented” (Andreas, 2004: 
644). This decentralized nature of crime makes it harder to combat than one that is globally 
dominated by a small number of criminal organisations. Ellis (2009) particularly contrasts 
the structure of the Nigerian drug trade against the hierarchical structure of the classical ma-
fias, which is crucial to their success. It is characterised by a highly flexible modus operandi 
“as those involved constantly form and re-form their business relationships from a wide pool 
of acquaintances” (Ellis, 2009: 185). The participants in a criminal enterprise are recruited 
on an ad hoc basis for specific projects, which stands in stark contrast to the above cited UN 
definition of an organised criminal group. This project-based “adhocracy” (Ellis, 2009: 185) 
can further be seen as a competitive advantage in a modern business environment, and mir-
rors developments on the licit side of business.  
 Instead of using the organised aspect of crime for describing organised crime groups 
as closed groups, Madsen (2009) emphasises the “organizational talent and speed of execu-
tion […] since they illustrate the very real managerial capabilities of organized crime” 
(Madsen, 2009: 19)8. For Madsen (2009), it is the management effort that “is reflected in the 
“organized””9 of organised crime.10 In summary form: “highly efficient, intercultural, net-
worked cooperative capabilities comparable to the most efficient modern management tech-
niques” (Madsen, 2009: 20).  
 As stated above, the emphasis on the organisational aspect of some crimes has led to 
a specialisation and an administrative distinction in law-enforcement policy, practice and 
research. The premise on which this distinction is based is that the higher the level of organ-
isation of a criminal activity, the harder it is to control and therefore the more dangerous it 
                                                 
8 Italic in original. 
9 Quotation marks in original. 
10 Madsen (2009) uses the production and smuggling of counterfeit cigarettes as an example, emphasising the 
complex supply chain from (good enough quality) material, over transport between single production steps in 
often different countries, to final distribution and financial compensation of all those involved (Madsen, 2009: 
19-20). 
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is. Additionally, the high profits and the violent methods associated with organised crime 
give further credit to a specialised approach (Edward/Gill, 2002b: 208). However, as shown, 
the premise on which this reasoning is based is not generally accepted.  
The official narrative of organised crime as a discernable phenomenon with particu-
lar homogeneous patterns, as seen in the definition by the UN or Interpol, has also to be seen 
in connection with local and global politics. In this context, the definitions of organised 
crime and TOC are the result of political processes, reflecting the interests and motivation of 
the actors involved. This narrative will be more closely examined in the following section on 
TOC. The findings, however, also apply to „only‟ organised crime (Edward/Gill 2002a, b). 
 
2.2.1.3 Transnational Organised Crime 
Edward and Gill (2002a) analyse the official narration of TOC in a way that sheds some 
light on the political processes behind its definition. They trace the idea of a transnational 
organised crime problem 
“in the ofﬁcial narratives of the UN, G7/8 and the Council of Europe, to a number of 
factors: the collapse of the Soviet Union and the increasing cross-border mobility of 
criminal groups that this is thought to have produced (Williams 1997); the continu-
ing growth in transnational trafﬁcking of drugs;[…] In its most extreme form this is 
said to amount to the need for a „world war‟ (Clutterbuck 1990, 192) against a glob-
al „empire of evil‟ (Raine and Cilluffo 1994).” (Edward/Gill, 2002a: 253-254) 
 
Andreas (2004) calls TOC “in some respects simply a new and flashier (but less clear) term 
for a long-established clandestine transnational economic practice. Those who use it tend to 
emphasise the newness of the phenomenon and the growing nature of the threat” (Andreas, 
2004: 643).  
The proof for this increased threat of TOC is based on intelligence on criminal activi-
ty, surveillance of particular organisations, arrest rates, and estimated profit and turnover, on 
the volume of seized assets and produce. However, the methodologies used for these esti-
mates are being criticised, for example, the tendency to multiply seizures by 10% (Ed-
ward/Gill, 2002b: 206). An estimate used by the UN, which puts the value of the global drug 
trade at $500 billion was, for example, more or less an invention, admittedly used to grab 
public attention and became to be regarded as a „fact‟. Nevertheless, a much smaller esti-
mate of $100 billion would still make the global drug trade one of the biggest sectors in the 
overall global economy (Andreas, 2004: 646).  
The purported attributes of TOC have in many countries resulted in the targeting of 
high-profile „king-pins‟, those high up in the hierarchy of criminal organisations. Addition-
ally, this narrative of TOC is a justification of substantial investments in national and inter-
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national law-enforcement agencies and the “rationale for the development of „regional re-
gimes‟ of transnational law-enforcement” (Edward/Gill, 2002a: 256), as well as the expan-
sion of existing law-enforcement authorities. The end of the cold war and the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union are usually seen as being connected to the rise in TOC by opening up 
new markets, connecting formerly isolated areas to the global economy, rapid liberalisation 
and deregulation, among other factors. However, some critics argue that another dimension 
of this connection is that many of the Western international security regimes and organisa-
tions were robbed of their primary raison d`être, the communist SU, and used the perceived 
global threat of TOC to re-invent and re-legitimise themselves (Edward/Gill, 2002b: 205).11  
Similarly, the law-enforcement focus on king-pins has certain benefits for politicians 
and police officials, as high-profile arrests and discoveries of large quantities of, for exam-
ple, cocaine, can be publicly celebrated as a success, showing the population that something 
is being done, while at the same time it can be used to purport the existence of a particular 
threat and justify further investments (Edward/Gill, 2002a: 256). Edward and Gill (2002a, b) 
argue that this official narrative, or conceptualisation, of TOC has led to a pre-occupation 
with a law-enforcement, or law and order, approach to counter TOC. It is the “pre-
supposed” (Edward/Gill, 2002a: 258) outcome of the way TOC is conceptualised and nar-
rated in the official discourse. Against this background, it is difficult to get alternative narra-
tives and methods accepted by practitioners, even if one considers the law-enforcement suc-
cesses as a mere symbolic reassurance of the public and voters.  
Additionally, similar to organised crime, TOC is an ambiguously used term. Depend-
ing on the author or the organisation, it is used to describe different aspects, and is often 
used synonymously with three other terms, overlapping with them or delimiting them. These 
terms are transnational crime, international organized crime and multinational crime. Mad-
sen (2009) illustrates the conceptual collocation of the terms in a very concise way by using 
a Venn diagram (Figure 2). (1) contains transnational crimes which are violations of interna-
tional law but not organised, “for example, a parental dispute over custody of a child, where 
one parent “snatches” the child in one country and transfers it to another” (Madsen, 2009: 
8). (2) Slave trading within a country is an example of an organised crime violating interna-
tional law without crossing borders. (3) International drug trafficking is a crime that is or-
ganised, transnational, and violates international law. (4) “Crimes that are organized and 
                                                 
11 Madsen (2009) refers in this context to Max Weber´s discussion of institutional survival and auto-
multiplication, wherein it is argued that the “larger such bureaucratic machines (law-enforcement, university, 
etc.) become, the more unstoppable their institutional inertia and the more pronounced their capacity for self-
creation” (Madsen, 2009: 30). 
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transnational, but not violations of international law, for example the smuggling of genuine, 
but non-taxed tobacco product from country to another” (Madsen, 2009: 9). Hence, the dif-
ference between transnational and international crime is that transnational crimes involve at 
least two or more sovereign jurisdictions, have to be codified as such in the legislation, and 
can be criminalised in international law (like drug trafficking), while the opposite applies for 
international crime (Madsen, 2009: 7-9). 
 
Figure 2: Venn diagram: Transnational crime, organised crime, and international law.  (Madsen, 
2009:  8) 
 
The UN definition of TOC is broader, as according to the „UN convention on TOC‟ 
organised crime is transnational if: 
       “(a)  It is committed in more than one State; 
  (b)  It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning,       
direction or control takes place in another State; 
  (c)  It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group that en-
gages in criminal activities in more than one State; or 
(d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State” 
(UNODC, 2004: 6). 
 
In contrast to Madsen´s definition this essentially requires legislation against a specific ac-
tivity only in one country. In line with his earlier quoted definition of organised crime, Wil-
liams (2002) defines TOC as criminal business that crosses borders, either in the form of 
perpetrators, people, products, profits and even digital signals (Williams, 2002: 164). 
In order to distinguish „ordinary‟ from the organised transnational crimes the UN 
limits them in its definition of TOC to „serious crimes‟, which “shall mean conduct consti-
tuting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a 
more serious penalty” (UNODC, 2004: 5).  The activities which constitute TOC can be di-
vided into two categories: illicit traffic in illicit product; and illicit traffic in licit product. 
The latter is exemplified by cigarette smuggling, made profitable by high taxes. In the con-
text of this thesis, only the former will be discussed in more detail. “In today´s world and in 
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the context of transnational organized crime the most important illicit merchandise being 
trafficked is narcotic drugs” (Madsen, 2009: 26). Like all the other trafficking in this catego-
ry, it is defined by the introduction of international prohibition regimes. However, the intro-
duction of international prohibition regimes also tends to create a whole set of problems, 
from increased profits for criminals, micro-criminality for the procurement of, for example, 
drugs, social consequences, to the financing of terror (Madsen, 2009: 26). 
TOC is also criticised for its connotative meaning, that is, for what it does not say but 
implies. Some scholars allege that the term “carries the connotation of “foreign” and as such 
is xenophobic and racist, notwithstanding that the vast majority of organized criminals are 
indigenous to the country in which they operate” (Madsen, 2009: 9-10). “This criminology 
of the other” (Edward/Gill, 2002a: 252) sees TOC as a primarily external threat12, where 
“criminals are dangerous members of distinct racial or social „outsider‟ groups 
who are very different from „us‟, the law abiding, and must, for our protection, be 
excluded or taken out of circulation. […] The original state of organised crime is one 
of external, „alien‟, actors subverting otherwise orderly, law-abiding, subjects” (Ed-
ward/Gill, 2002a: 252-253).  
 
Edward and Gill (2002a/b) argue that this notion of TOC as an external threat or alien con-
spiracy is a reflection of the official narrative, wherein national security is defined against 
external threats, particularly dominant in the US and Europe, but also in other countries and 
regions. Moreover, it is politically preferable to explain crime as a foreign problem, while 
own citizens are seen as law-abiding. Organised crime and especially TOC are seen as dis-
connected from the civil part of society. “Crime is treated as an objective phenomenon rather 
than as the result of the interaction between forms of harmful behaviour and the way in 
which some become criminalised and others do not” (Edward/Gill, 2002a: 253). This defini-
tion is reflected in law-enforcement efforts aimed only at the supply-side of trade, like the 
war on (the external threat) drugs. 
 Aside from the criticism lodged against the vagueness, ambiguity, and bias character-
ising the concept TOC, some authors question outright the existence and relevance of TOC. 
Hobbs (1998), for example, questions the existence of any empirical evidence for the rele-
                                                 
12 An example of the official use of this notion is former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan´s foreword to the 
UN Convention against TOC:  
“They are terrorists, criminals, drug dealers, traffickers in people and others who undo the good 
works of civil society. They take advantage of the open borders, free markets and technological ad-
vances that bring so many benefits to the world‟s people. They thrive in countries with weak institu-
tions, and they show no scruple about resorting to intimidation or violence. Their ruthlessness is the 
very antithesis of all we regard as civil. They are powerful, representing entrenched interests and the 
clout of a global enterprise worth billions of dollars, but they are not invincible” (UNODC, 2004: iii). 
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vance of the transnational in understanding and combatting crime. In turn, he emphasises 
the importance of the local, as opposed to the global.  
“Trading relationships between coalitions of criminals of different national origins 
involves a coagulation of local interests. It is at the local level that organised crime 
manifests itself as a tangible process of activity” (Hobbs, 1998: 408).  
 
His assessment, while on the extreme end of criticism towards TOC, corresponds with the 
earlier criticism of the criminology of the other. 
 
2.2.1.4 Alternative Approaches to TOC 
An alternative approach is the “criminology of the self” (Edward/Gill, 2002a: 252), which 
understands organised crime as a response to a demand and indicates limitations encoun-
tered by states to exercise sovereign authority over their population (Edward/Gill, 2002b: 
207-208). Here the criminal is seen as a rational opportunist who acts within a specific so-
cial, political and economic context and interacts with the licit side of society (Edward/Gill, 
2002a: 251-254). Williams´ (2009) distinction between two ways to understand organised 
crime can be seen in a similar vein: 
“First, it can be understood as entities or criminal enterprises which see crime as a 
continuation of business by other means. Organized crime can also be understood as 
a set of activities which can be appropriated or utilized by a variety of different enti-
ties for their own narrow purposes. Terrorist organizations, insurgents, ethnic fac-
tions, sectarian groups, and militias can all use organized crime activities as a fund-
ing mechanism to support their political and military activities” (Williams, 2009: 
13). 
 
This alternative approach emphasises the interdependencies between the licit and illicit 
economy, as well as between different forms of crime. Criminals use legitimate markets for 
their purpose and officials use illegitimate markets for theirs, for example, for money laun-
dering, or getting rid of toxic waste. In order to transcend the problems related to categoris-
ing crime into distinct sub-types, Edward and Gill (2002b) argue for re-defining crime as 
enterprise, which corresponds with Williams´ (2002) definition of TOC as illicit business 
across borders. They suggest a focus on the markets of illicit exchange, “in terms of the reg-
ulators and traders in [these] discrete markets” (Edward/Gill, 2002b: 217). While such a 
political-economy approach might not serve the aims of criminal justice, such as identifying 
the crime and the criminal, it allows for a less restricted and dogmatic approach to crime 
(Edward/Gill, 2002b: 207-209; 217-219). 
Andreas (2004) summarises the criticism of TOC, saying that “how transnational, 
organized, and criminal a market activity is depends largely on the commodity involved and 
the associated legal and financial risks” (Andreas, 2004: 643). In combination with the pre-
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vious argument by Edward and Gill (2002a, b), and Hobbs‟ (1998) emphasis on the local 
manifestations of crime, this suggests an approach which analyses the political economy of a 
particular illicit market, in this case the global cocaine trade, and its local manifestation in 
Guinea-Bissau. The following section attempts to define such a political-economy approach 
on a global level. 
Before this can be done, a short comment on the further use of the term TOC is nec-
essary. As the first part of this chapter has shown, the term TOC is widely criticised and its 
definition ambiguous. It was consequently argued that an alternative approach be used. This 
does not mean however, that the literature and academic findings which refer to or use the 
term TOC should be disregarded. These are still of great relevance and will be used for the 
purpose of this thesis, bearing in mind the limitations discussed above. TOC, for the purpose 
of this thesis will be defined as illicit business that crosses borders. 
 
2.2.2 Bringing the Illicit into the Global Political Economy 
In order to achieve a more meaningful analysis of the illicit and as a consequence of the crit-
icisms and flaws of the concept TOC, Andreas (2004) also argues for a political-economy 
approach, by locating the study of the illicit on a global scale within the field of GPE. In an 
earlier work by him and Friman (1999), they use the concept Illicit Global Economy (IGE), 
defined as “the system of transnational economic activities that are criminalized by states in 
importing or exporting countries” (Friman/Andreas, 1999: 5). They narrow their scope by 
focusing on illicit activity which is of transnational nature and global in its scope (Fri-
man/Andreas, 1999: 5). While not evident in the name of their concept, this indicates that 
the authors recognize the importance of a political aspect as well. In his 2004 article Peter 
Andreas consequently uses the concept Illicit International Political Economy (IIPE). Based 
on the conventional definition of the IPE/GPE, Andreas (2004) defines the IIPE broadly as 
the “relationship between states and illegal international markets” (Andreas, 2004: 642). 
These two definitions are similar to the approach suggested by Edward and Gill (2002b), 
inasmuch as they emphasise the role of political authority in the process of criminogenesis 
and regulation, as well as the focus on the market. The earlier definition suggests that the 
system of criminalised transnational economic activities is disconnected from the non-
criminal, with the only connecting point being the criminalisation by the state. It has to be 
mentioned, however, that Friman and Andreas (1999) in the process of their further explana-
tion of the subject also refer to the interconnectedness of the licit and illicit. Andreas´ (2004) 
later definition places more emphasis on a relationship, indicating a constant interaction and 
interdependencies between the illicit economy and political authority in the form of the 
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state. The benefits and the need to bring the illicit into the GPE, of analysing it in a global 
context and applying a political-economy approach are also discussed by Mittelman (1999), 
and Le Pere and Vickers (forthcoming).  
Before discussing such an approach in more detail, it is first necessary to introduce 
the field of GPE briefly and what its study entails. Due to the limited space of this thesis, 
this will concentrate on Susan Strange´s notion and definition of the GPE and its study. It 
has to be noted, however, that there are several other definitions and notions thereof, which 
will be referred to, if prudent, for the purpose of this research.  
 
2.2.2.1 The Global Political Economy 
GPE, the field, is a very broad church, attracting scholars from a variety of disciplines. 
Therefore, it is characterised by contending paradigms, different schools of thought and 
competing approaches (O´Brien/Williams, 2007: 13-15). The one consensus of GPE schol-
ars is the claim that politics and economics cannot be separated and both have to be taken 
into account to understand developments in the GPE. Hence, GPE can also be defined as the 
study of the relationship between states and international markets (Andreas, 2004: 642). The 
first chapter referred briefly to Susan Strange´s definition of GPE as concerning “the social, 
political and economic arrangements affecting the global systems of production, exchange 
and distribution, and the mix of values reflected therein” (Strange, 1989: 18). This definition 
requires further explanation.  
 Susan Strange starts with the assumption that there are four “basic values which hu-
man beings seek to provide through social organization, i.e. wealth, security, freedom and 
justice” (Strange, 1989: 17). The priorities which societies attach to these values, as well as 
their proportions and combinations, differ from society to society, as do the social, political 
and economic arrangements reflecting them. A capitalist economy, for example, places a 
higher priority on wealth and freedom than a socialist command economy, which places a 
higher priority on order and justice. Consequently, the political and economic arrangements 
of a capitalist political economy reflect the high value of wealth and freedom through a less 
controlled, or free(r) market and a democratic system of governance. Accordingly, the high-
est priority of a criminal state would be wealth and its lowest priority justice. Strange de-
rives several questions from this definition which should be asked by a political economist: 
“What values […] do these arrangements rate the highest? And which do they rate the low-
est?” (Strange, 1989: 18) These questions are further supplemented by asking who benefits 
and who loses. She further emphasises that these arrangements are not to be seen as “divine-
ly ordained” (Strange, 1989: 18), but as “the result of human decisions taken in the context 
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of man-made institutions and sets of self-set rule and customs” (Strange, 1989: 18). It is 
therefore vital to look back on history to find the roots, or the causes, in order to understand 
today´s consequences and developments. 
 The notion of power is central to Strange´s understanding of GPE; “[i]t is power that 
determines the relationship between authority and market” (Strange, 1989: 23), as well as 
the specific mix of values. In order to analyse a political economy, be it the GPE or that of a 
country, it is fundamental to answer “how power has been used to shape the political econ-
omy and the way in which it distributes costs and benefits, risks and opportunities” (Strange, 
1989: 24). In Strange´s framework, power can be derived from wealth, force and ideas, and 
can be exercised in four structures of power: security, production, finance, and knowledge, 
ideas and beliefs. Control over one or more of these interrelated and interdependent struc-
tures enables the possessor… 
“… to change the range of choices open to others, without apparently putting pres-
sure directly on them to take one decision […] rather than others ]…[ the range of 
options open to others will be extended by giving them opportunities they would not 
otherwise have had” (Strange, 1989: 31). 
 
A change of the distribution of power in any of these structures can affect the others and 
change the mix of values and the relationship between authority and markets. A change in 
the knowledge and belief structure, for example, led to the prohibition of alcohol in the USA 
in the 1920s, which was abandoned when it became clear that the market forces, the demand 
for alcohol, was too strong to be controlled by the state authorities and led to a challenge of 
the state´s power in the security structure. This example is also a good illustration of how the 
dimension of the GPE under examination in this thesis, the illicit, is defined, or even created 
and the role power plays in the process of criminogenesis. 
 
2.2.3 The Illicit Global Political Economy 
Bearing in mind the earlier discussion of a political-economy approach to the illicit, four 
findings from this short overview of Susan Strange´s notion of GPE, can be deducted in or-
der to arrive at a definition of the IGPE. 
(1) The licit and the illicit should both be seen as dimensions of the overall GPE. 
While they are distinguished by the process of criminalisation, they are intertwined, they 
interact and even depend on each other. The relevance of understanding the relationship in 
this way is exemplified by the argument made by Mittelman (1999), Le Pere, Vickers 
(forthcoming), as well as Friman and Andreas (1999). They argue that the surge of illicit 
transnational activities witnessed in the 1990s, what Mittelman calls the globalisation of 
organised crime, has to be understood within the wider context of change within the GPE, 
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more precisely the general trends and developments of globalisation that characterise the 
contemporary GPE. While the illicit side of the GPE can be said to have existed as long as 
the licit, only the particular activities and methods have changed, for example “the size, 
structure and location of the trafficking organizations; the content of state laws and the in-
tensity of and form of their enforcement; and the nature and level of consumer demand” 
(Friman/Andreas, 1999: 1). They argue, however, that these traditional patterns of change 
cannot fully explain the rise in illicit transnational activities – globalisation can. It can brief-
ly be described as the deepening and spreading of the market, also called the internationali-
sation of production and of the state. This is made possible by the promotion of capitalist 
principles of free movement of goods, services and technology (deregulation), the incorpora-
tion of (almost) the whole world, in one way or another, into the GPE. This is complemented 
by tremendous advances in technology, from transportation to communication, facilitating 
this development (Cox, 1981: 104-110; Cox, 1987: 244-246). It is within this context that 
the surge of TOC is best explained. Firstly because, 
“global transportation and communications networks facilitate both licit and illicit 
economic exchange; [...] licit and illicit funds flow through the same global banking 
system and are sheltered in the same off-shore financial havens; the internet is a tool 
and site for both legitimate and illegitimate commerce” (Andreas, 2004: 644). 
 
The sheer amount of global cross-border flow is virtually impossible to control, which 
makes illicit produce and activities easier to hide. Additionally, the routes that illicit flow 
can take are expanded by the global nature of the licit economy (Friman/Andreas, 1999: 11). 
This is further exacerbated by the “neoliberal global consensus in favour of deregulation” 
(Mittelman, 1999: np), enforced by the markets (Mittelman, 1999: np). Moreover, the mag-
nitude of global migration is seen as a cause for the spread of organised crime, as criminal 
organisations often follow migration flows (Friman/Andreas, 1999: 11-12). 
 While organised crime exploits the increased opportunities described above, it also 
takes advantage of the „other side‟ of globalisation, where accelerated processes, technolo-
gy, hypercompetition and the retreat of the state from the provision of core functions, have 
led to uncertainty and insecurity; “new beneficiaries and victims, especially in the marginal-
ized zones of the global political economy” (Mittelman, 1999: np). Criminals step into the 
voids left by globalisation, for example by offering security and income, if the state fails to 
provide them. They offer “incentives to the marginalized segments of the population trying 
to cope with the adjustment costs of globalization” (Mittelman, 1999: np). 
 25 
 
(2) Consequently, if the overall GPE is defined as concerning the “social, political 
and economic arrangements affecting the global systems of production, exchange and distri-
bution, and the mix of values reflected therein” (Strange, 1989: 18), then logically,  
  
An advantage of this definition is that it does not generally separate the illicit from the licit, 
as the social, political and economic arrangements are seen as shared and their interconnect-
edness acknowledged. The different approaches to the illicit, briefly discussed above, in-
clude certain social, political and economic arrangements on a global, regional and local 
scale, each leaving out at least one of them.  
Social arrangements13, like unemployment and poverty in certain regions of the 
world, migration on a global scale, communication and mobility, and also demand for cer-
tain products or services, affect the development and patterns of illicit markets. Garth le Pere 
and Brendan Vickers (forthcoming), as well as Mittelman (1999), write about the social as-
pect to the IGPE. They speak about the uncivil society, the social underpinnings which pro-
vide fertile ground for illegal activities and criminality to flourish. Their use of the term un-
civil society is however very different to the earlier criticised notion of uncivil, which per-
petuates the perception of crime as an alien and disconnected threat. High unemployment, 
poverty, underdevelopment, grievances, particularly in the youth, existing corruption and 
high levels of violence, are all conditions under which “recourse to criminal activities, in-
cluding forms of organized crime, often becomes a rational survival strategy in the face of 
extremely limited life opportunities” (Le Pere/Vickers, forthcoming: 8). These conditions 
are often found in weak or transitional states, of which many states in Africa are prime ex-
amples.  
The political arrangements are of crucial, even primary, importance, as the illicit is 
defined and thereby created by law, from trade regulations and tax provisions, to prohibi-
tions and international prohibition regimes. Furthermore, the historical fluidity of these laws 
and thereby of the parameters of the illicit, as well as the extent to which they are interna-
tionally shared, has to be emphasised (Friman/Andreas, 1999: 5-6). The IGPE exists within 
the gap between the criminalisation by a political authority and the authority´s capacity to 
enforce this criminalisation; it is “defined by and depends on the state” (Friman/Andreas, 
                                                 
13 The term arrangements should not be understood as only referring to deliberate and actively enforced ar-
rangements, but also their, maybe unwanted, consequences and overall effect. 
the IGPE concerns those social, political and economic arrangements affecting 
the global systems of illicit production, exchange and distribution, and the mix 
of values reflected therein.  
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1999: 10).The political arrangements furthermore include the efforts and (in-) ability to en-
force these laws. Moreover, illicit markets react to the laws and enforcement measures by 
evading them, for example, by changing methods, products, or even actively challenging 
them, violently or otherwise, e.g. through corruption. This in turn can result in further 
changes of primary political arrangements, that is laws to close loopholes, or new prohibi-
tion regimes, as well as secondary changes to the methods or scale of law-enforcement. Po-
litical arrangements can furthermore be argued to include the general characteristics of a 
state, its structure and its institutions, as well as the characteristics of international coopera-
tion and organisations, influencing illicit activities. 
The economic arrangements include aspects such as the price of a certain product or 
service, the possible profit of supplying it in a certain area of the GPE; a global division of 
labour for the production, distribution and exchange of illicit product/services. In turn, these 
economic arrangements for illicit production also often negatively affect the licit dimension. 
These effects include, for example, business risks ranging from theft, including copyright 
violations, to the negative effects of corruption, protection rackets, and a high level of vio-
lence. 
 Clearly, these arrangements are interrelated and overlapping and cannot be under-
stood in isolation. They affect the why, where, what, how, and by whom an illicit product or 
service is produced, exchanged, distributed and consumed; a global division of labour, so to 
speak (Mittelman, 1999: np). 
(3) The analysis of the relationship between political authority, e.g. the state as regu-
lator, and the illicit market should focus on the particular market activity, in this case the 
global cocaine trade, and its local manifestation and implications, here Guinea-Bissau. This 
is also reflected in Susan Strange´s suggestion for the first step in the analysis of a particular 
authority-market relationship, which is to identify the market and its characteristics, or its 
geography, the authorities involved and the balance of power over outcomes between politi-
cal authority and the market (Strange, 1989: 230-231). 
(4) It is fundamental to understand how the social, political and economic arrange-
ments, and therefore the particular authority-market relationship, were shaped. This in-
cludes, on the one hand, the global cocaine trade, and on the other hand, equally important, 
the characteristics of the local political economy, Guinea-Bissau.  
After having arrived at a definition of the IGPE, the second half of this chapter will 
discuss the relationship between states and illicit markets in general and aims to provide a 
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framework which will allow the analysis of Guinea-Bissau´s relationship with the global 
cocaine trade. 
 
2.3 The Illicit Global Political Economy and the State 
 
So far, the discussions have indicated that the relationship between the IGPE and the state is 
multidimensional and multidirectional. This section identifies four general aspects of this 
relationship. One sub-section also looks at the role of non-state actors in the IGPE. 
 
2.3.1 The State as Creator, Regulator and Actor in the IGPE 
Firstly, the state is the creator of the IGPE through its legislative authority. It is also its regu-
lator, through its authority to enforce its laws, ultimately based on the monopoly on the le-
gitimate use of force. Friman and Andreas (1999: 10) refer to the former as the state´s meta-
political authority to criminalise and the latter as the state´s control capabilities, both of 
which are interrelated dimensions of state power. “States claim metapolitical authority: the 
right to decide what is political and, as such, subject to state coercion” (Friman/Andreas, 
1999: 9). This is shaped by negotiations within and between states, as well as non-state ac-
tors. There is however a difference between the ability to criminalise a certain activity and 
the ability to enforce it by using police and security forces. It is in this gap that the illicit 
markets exist (Friman/Andreas, 1999: 9-10). As mentioned briefly in the first chapter and 
touched upon in the section on the GPE, the surge of illicit transnational activity has to be 
understood in connection with the processes of globalisation. The ongoing debate on the 
retreat of the state forms part of this argument, as it is argued that as a result of, or in reac-
tion to, globalisation, the gap between the metapolitical authority and the state´s control ca-
pacities has widened, leaving more space for criminals. Additionally, differences in the 
„size‟ and nature of this gap from state to state shape the patterns of the IGPE, from the 
routes traffickers take, and the organisational and operational parameters and tools used, to 
the costs and benefits endured by the actors. Hence, states can be described as actors within 
the IGPE. In terms of Susan Strange´s (1989) framework: 
“In the international political economy of modern times, the security structure is built 
around the institution of the state. The state claims political authority and the monopoly 
of legitimate violence. But the state does not exist in isolation” (Strange, 1989: 45).  
 
It exists among other states and non-state actors. 
 
2.3.2 Non-state Actors in the Illicit Global Political Economy 
Strange argues “that the security structure is jeopardized not by the existence of counter-
societies [like criminal organisations] in themselves but only when one authority challenges 
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the domain or rights of another and when that challenge is accepted. Then violence is apt to 
ensue” (Strange, 1989: 49). A vivid example of this is the current situation in Mexico, where 
the army has been brought in to fight drug cartels, which started an unprecedented wave of 
violence. Since 2006, the war between the government and criminal gangs, as well as be-
tween rival gangs, has resulted in over 28,000 deaths (BBC, 2010a). In line with the discus-
sion of TOC, it is important to note that TOC should not be considered as a single actor, but 
rather a multitude of criminal actors, making up particular criminal enterprises and net-
works, in this case the cocaine exporting networks. Some non-state actors, like the mafia or 
other criminal networks, derive some of their structural power from their ability to provide 
security for others in exchange for payment (taxation) or loyalty, where the state cannot or 
does not want to. They further derive power from control over the means of production of 
certain products, like cocaine. Through their structural power, these criminal networks can 
change the range of choices available to others. They can offer security, employment and 
access to financial resources. They can even take over some of the state´s functions, from 
dispute mediation to legislative and judicial functions, taxation and law enforcement (Fri-
man/Andreas, 1999: 10). Following this argument, criminal organisations can be seen as a 
source of authority, as they can have the power to allocate values and a power over out-
comes, of who gets what, when, where and how (Strange, 1996: 38-39, 45-46). In an often 
quoted passage Charles Tilly (1985) noted that 
“the state was simply the most efficient and effective form of organized crime. In ef-
fect, the state legitimized organized crime by transforming extortion into taxation, 
brute force into authority, and rule by fear into rule by consent of the governed” 
(Williams, 2002: 178). 
 
Criminals are not the only relevant non-state actors in the IGPE. So-called global 
moral entrepreneurs, for example, Non-governmental Organisations (NGO) who promote 
the de-criminalisation of certain activities like „soft drugs‟, also play an important role in the 
IGPE (Andreas, 2004: 645). At a local level civil society organisations, from neighbourhood 
watches to human rights advocacy groups can be considered actors in the IGPE. Similar 
arguments can be made for the media, global and local, as well as legitimate economic en-
trepreneurs, like TNCs, whose operations can be used by criminals and vice versa. The 
common denominator of most of these actors is that they exist at the intersection between 
the licit and the illicit. Furthermore, the importance of non-state actors in the overall GPE is 
especially emphasised by those who proclaim a retreat of state and consequently a reduced 
importance of the state as the primary actor in the GPE (see for example Strange, 1996). 
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2.3.3 The State as the Locale of Illicit Activity 
Consequently, the state is also the locale of illicit market activities. Its citizens are part of the 
market as buyers, sellers, enforcers, enablers and victims. From the perspective of TOC 
there are four categories of states: “home, host, transhipment, and service” (Williams, 2002: 
168). The home country, “the location from which criminal organizations operate their 
transnational businesses”14 (Williams, 2002: 168), is the most important and requires a low-
risk environment. The host state is the destination of the product or activity and is chosen for 
profitability, determined by demand and purchasing power of potential clients. The more 
lucrative a market, the higher the level of risk criminal organisations are willing to accept. 
Host or market countries are normally not as fundamentally challenged as others. However, 
the reason Williams (2002) gives for this, that “ethnic-based criminal organizations are not 
rooted in local or national power structures” (Williams, 2002: 168), has to be treated careful-
ly in the light of the „Sicilian syndrome‟. This thesis´ case study, Guinea-Bissau, falls into 
the category of transhipment state. Often products pass through at least one transhipment 
state before reaching the end market. Transhipment states are chosen for their geographical 
location en route to the market state and their proximity to major transit routes, for their ac-
cess to the market state, e.g. shared borders, international transport hubs, or even cultural 
and historic ties, and for the ease of transit. Ease of transit is “largely a function of state ca-
pacity for interdiction. Such states suffer from the violation of their sovereignty and are par-
ticularly vulnerable to operational corruption” (Williams, 2002: 169). Service states describe 
states that have a particular sector that is helpful for TOC operations, e.g. the financial sector 
in off-shore banking havens, which “can be exploited by criminal organizations to move, 
hide, and protect the proceeds of their illegal activities” (Williams, 2002: 169). While this 
classification is helpful in many regards, it is “complicated by the fact that some states fulfil 
several roles simultaneously” (Williams, 2002: 169). Williams (2002) describes it as ironic 
that criminals exploit the sovereignty of some states, particularly home states as sanctuaries 
and service states as banks, for defensive purposes, while “their trafficking activities are 
grossly violating the sovereignty of others” (Williams, 2002: 169). Conflicting jurisdictions 
also make law-enforcement more complicated (Shelley, 1999: 25) . 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 It has to be noted that Williams can be criticised here for overemphasising the organisational aspect, as 
shown in the earlier discussion. Alternatively, the home country could be seen as the country of origin of a 
certain product or activity. 
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2.3.4 The State as „Victim‟ in the Illicit Global Political Economy 
The state is also a „victim‟ in the IGPE. This „role‟ was highlighted by the literature intro-
duced in the first chapter, warning of TOC as one of the biggest threats to states and their 
security, which emerged in the 1990s.  
“The globalization of organized crime weakens the very basis of government and 
constrains its capacity. […] Transnational and subnational criminal groups contest 
the rationale of the state, especially in terms of its legitimate control over violence 
and the maintenance of justice” (Mittelman, 1999: np).  
 
It furthermore constitutes a problem for the maintenance of state-social control, which is 
defined by Migdal (1988) as “the successful subordination of people´s own inclinations of 
social behavior or behavior sought by other social organizations in favor of the behavior 
prescribed by the state” (Migdal, 1988: 22; in Mittelman, 1999: np). In this sense organised 
crime can be seen as an alternative form of social organisation challenging the state´s au-
thority and power to impose its standards, while also providing alternative systems for 
commerce, banking and conflict resolution. Moreover, the connection between TOC and 
conflicts, for example, through the proliferation of illegal arms, contributes to increased lev-
els of violence. Mittelman argues that criminals do not try to take over the state like revolu-
tionaries (Mittelman, 1999: np). This is contested by those who warn of the connection be-
tween organised crime and terrorism in particular, and generally by the notion of seeing 
TOC as enterprise, wherein  
“[o]rganized crime can also be understood as a set of activities which can be ap-
propriated or utilized by a variety of different entities for their own narrow purposes. 
Terrorist organizations, insurgents, ethnic factions, sectarian groups, and militias 
can all use organized crime activities as a funding mechanism to support their politi-
cal and military activities” (Williams, 2009: 13). 
 
Additionally, Mittelman notes that increased criminal activity puts a financial strain on 
states´ budgets, as it results in the need for the state to divert valuable resources to law-
enforcement, while accompanying activities such as tax evasion and money laundering put a 
further strain on financial resources. Furthermore, he warns of the corruption of civil socie-
ty, which is complemented by a contagion effect: “contempt for the law catalyzes attitudes 
and other activities, contravening one law can make it easier to transgress others” (Mittel-
man, 1999: np). Overall, the legitimacy of the state is threatened (Mittelman, 1999: np). 
 Shelley (1999) attempts a more structured approach to the threat states face from 
TOC, based on the description of TOC as „the new authoritarianism‟, replacing traditional 
state-based forms of authoritarianism and based on the demise of the nation-state. Authori-
tarianism is characterised by an absence of the rule of law, an execution of law subordinated 
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to the interests of the ruling elite, human rights abuses, limited rights and freedoms, violent 
coercion of the citizens, censorship, control of the media and its use for ideological mobili-
sation, and state paternalism as a form of social control and welfare. “Nonstate-based au-
thoritarianism, like its state-based counterpart, affects all aspects of society, including eco-
nomic relations, political structures, legal institutions, citizen-state relations, and human 
rights” (Shelley, 1999: 31). The ruling structures of states are infiltrated, especially on a re-
gional and local level, and where the original government is unable or unwilling to protect 
the citizens‟ interests. The citizen-state relations are undermined by corruption and the infil-
tration of institutions, both building on and resulting in a decreased ability of the state to 
protect its citizens. Ideological control is assumed by the intimidation of the media, even the 
acquisition of media houses and lawsuits. Additionally, as mentioned before, TOC can as-
sume state responsibilities, like welfare. Furthermore, TOC groups can gain control over 
large parts of the economy, by exploiting privatisation processes, intimidation of workers, 
unions, protection rackets and guaranteeing business transactions. Finally, weaknesses in the 
legal system and privatisation of security are exploited and further undermined by corrup-
tion or the use of violence. While these effects are strongest in the home states of TOC, they 
are exported with the globalisation of their activities (Shelley, 1999: 25-36).  
A somewhat similar approach is taken by Williams (2002). He argues that differing 
interpretations and conceptualisations of the state are an impediment to the debate on the 
retreat of the state and consequently to the analysis of the relationship between the state and 
TOC. In order to identify how the state becomes a victim in the IGPE, he first identifies the 
four main interpretations of what constitutes a state: firstly, the state as a “sovereign territo-
rial entity controlling the area under its jurisdiction and who and what enters” (Williams, 
2002: 163); secondly, the state as a system of rules, norms and laws, where the state has 
both authority over and obligations toward the citizenry; thirdly, the state “as a set of institu-
tions and people who act on its behalf” (Williams, 2002: 163); fourthly, the state “as a set of 
functions” (Williams, 2002: 163), e.g. the guarantor of security, managing economic activity 
and providing economic and social welfare (Williams, 2002: 164). These interpretations of 
the state are then put in juxtaposition with three major aspects of organised crime (see table 
1): firstly, organised crime structures, “which embody a concentration of illegal power in 
society that can significantly influence political, economic, and social life” (Williams, 2002: 
165). This ranges from organised crime as an only marginal problem with little influence, to 
states where it has successfully embedded itself in the social, economic and political life, 
and to cases where “organized crime and the state develop a deeply symbiotic and collusive 
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relationship” (Williams, 2002: 165). Secondly, the particular illicit market activity and its 
consequences, such as drug trafficking and increased drug consumption, or arms trafficking 
and increased level and quality of violence. And thirdly,  
“organized crime strategies and processes designed to manage the risks posed by 
governments and law enforcement agencies. […] One of its most potent risk man-
agement tools is corruption, which is intended to neutralize the control powers of 
states but can also undermine their power and authority” (Williams, 2002: 165).  
 
The smuggling of cocaine, for example, fundamentally challenges the sovereign right of any 
country to determine what and who crosses its border. It also challenges the system of rules 
of that state, of what is allowed and what is not. Violence, against civilians, institutions, 
businesses and competitors, is probably the most dramatic manifestation of the power held 
by criminal organisations, as well as an attack on the state´s monopoly on the use of force, 
it´s system of rules, laws and one of the state´s core functions, to protect its citizens. The 
wealth available to criminal organisations is one of the major sources of its power and the 
threat it constitutes to the state.  
 
Table 1: Organised crime and the state (Williams, 2002: 166) 
Aspects of or-
ganised crime 
Sovereign entity System of rules 
Institutions and 
people 
Functions 
Activities                
such as various 
forms of traf-
ficking 
Smuggling 
Work with illegal 
power structure 
Undermine and 
exploit prohibi-
tion of goods and 
services 
Challenge and 
justification for 
resources for 
social control and 
criminal justice 
Challenge to law 
and order 
Power 
manifested in 
violence 
Challenge state 
monopoly of co-
ercive power and 
create no-go 
zones 
Replace rule of 
law with rule of 
violence 
Intimidate judici-
ary and law en-
forcement and 
ensure low penal-
ties or acquittals 
for organised 
crime figures 
Extortion threat-
ens business and 
property suppos-
edly protected by 
the state 
Risk 
management 
strategies, espe-
cially corruption 
Operational cor-
ruption to protect 
trafficking activi-
ties 
Organised crime 
buys immunity 
from system of 
rule through cor-
ruption of law 
enforcement and 
judiciary 
Corrosion of in-
stitutions such as 
police, judiciary, 
and the military 
as well as finan-
cial institutions 
Corruption un-
dermines good 
governance and 
democratic pro-
cedures 
 
Of the strategies used by organised criminal groups Williams (2002) emphasises corruption 
and the threat it constitutes for the state and society. He distinguishes between operational 
and systemic corruption. Operational corruption is used to ensure a smooth trafficking flow 
by neutralising border controls. Systemic corruption, used “to neutralize the punitive powers 
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of the state” (Williams, 2002: 176), is particularly serious for the state as it has a politically 
corrosive effect. It can lead to the establishment of a political-criminal nexus, which can 
manifest itself in three possible ways: firstly, the capture of the state by organised criminal 
groups; secondly, a complete symbiosis of politicians and criminals is possible, wherein the 
state is not only a passive beneficiary but an active partner; some more overt than others; 
and thirdly, a the criminal state, where the state controls and directs the illicit activities (Wil-
liams, 2002: 177).15 In all these instances organised criminal activities are an enterprise; “a 
set of activities which can be appropriated or utilized by a variety of different entities for 
their own narrow purposes” (Williams, 2009: 13). If the state is captured by criminals, it 
might still carry out some of its traditional functions, but will not do much to close the ca-
pacity gaps and functional holes exploited by criminals (Williams, 2002: 176-178, 180). 
High levels of corruption in the government are contagious and reduce its legitimacy and 
damage the relationship between the government and the citizens. It furthermore has nega-
tive implications for the legitimate economic sector of states, by discouraging domestic and 
foreign investment, as well as aid donors (Madsen, 2009: 21-22). But corruption does not 
only target state institutions. The private sector is also targeted in order to infiltrate and as-
sume control over legitimate business as cover, or to ensure cooperation of financial institu-
tions.16  
 Hence, the state can be seen as the victim of the IGPE, inasmuch as it is exploited 
and threatened by patterns of global illicit market patterns. 
 It has been indicated throughout this thesis so far that not every state is susceptible to 
transnational illicit activity in the same way and that some states are more strongly affected 
by these activities than others. The next section will consequently discuss why this is and 
how it is used for the purpose of transnational criminal business, dealing directly with the 
research question of this thesis: How are criminal actors within the IGPE able to use the 
state? 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Williams (2002: 177) uses the example of Russia, for the first, which he considers a captured state, where 
criminals provide the muscle, support and protection for politicians and businesses, businessmen provide the 
access to resources and the legitimate economy, while politicians provide the legitimacy and the cloak for 
criminal activities. Examples for the second are Japan during the cold war and Italy between 1950 and 1980. 
An example for the third are the criminal enterprises run by the military in Nigeria in the 1980s and 1990s. 
16 An overview of targets and objectives of corruption as described by Williams (2002: 175) can be found in 
Appendix 2. 
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2.3.5 The State as Facilitator of the Illicit  
The state does not only create, regulate and provide the locale for the illicit, it also facilitates 
the illicit, firstly of course by providing the legal and geographical frame. But it can also 
play the role of a facilitator by providing a favourable environment for illicit activity as will 
be argued below. 
“It became increasingly clear throughout the 1980s and the 1990s that the rise of 
transnational organized crime was inextricably connected with the weakness of many 
states in the international system (Williams, 2002: 169-170). 
 
Consequently, the (perceived) surge of illicit transnational activities and TOC in the 1990s is 
argued to be linked to the general decline of the nation-state and the rise of non-state actors 
in the processes of globalisation. As mentioned before, characteristics of the contemporary 
GPE, like freer global flow of goods, interconnectedness, technological advances and also 
the political side of globalisation, like the global neo-liberal consensus for deregulation, and 
privatisation, have left states less autonomous, impeding their sovereignty, and made bor-
ders more porous. Mittelman (1999) argues that all states are somehow “tacit partners in 
market relations” (Mittelman, 1999: np), differing only in the extent and their particular po-
sition in the globalisation matrix. He identifies a tendency toward a courtesan role of the 
state: facilitating global market forces instead of providing for the needs of its citizens. Most 
states are in some way and to some extent in this role. Only very powerful states, like the 
US, can steer the processes, but even these are less autonomous than before (Mittelman, 
1999: np). This notion of a general retreat of the state is not shared by all. While most au-
thors agree that states are no longer the only relevant actors in international politics and that 
they have become more restricted in their capacities and abilities, the extent to which this 
development is reversible, is strongly contested. Others do not see such a strong retreat of 
the state, but say that the “global division of labor and expanding power of global produc-
tion and finance have increased the accountability of states to global markets and nonstate 
entities” (Friman/Andreas, 1999: 4). Friman and Andreas (1999) suggest a more nuanced 
view, wherein the retreat of the state is seen as more selective in nature, rather than general, 
and the state reasserts its dominance and persists in relation to the global economy. Addi-
tionally, the effects of globalisation on states, their responses (retreat or reassertion) vary 
from state to state, depending on their characteristics and position in the GPE. Friman and 
Andreas (1999) argue that the debate over the retreat of the state lacks sufficient historical 
perspective and a historical baseline against which to adequately assess state power and its 
fluidity. 
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Similarly, Williams (2002) points out that state weakness and its link with organised 
crime is not a new phenomenon. This is exemplified by the rise of the Italian mafia in the 
nineteenth century, which was facilitated by the state´s inability to provide protection and 
arbitration for businesses; a vacuum filled by the mafia. Likewise,  
“during the 1970s and 1980s, the weakness of the Colombian state and its lack of 
control over territory nominally under its jurisdiction was a major factor in explain-
ing the rise of Colombia as the corporate headquarters of the South American co-
caine industry” (Williams, 2002: 170). 
 
The collapse of the SU, the consequent emergence of new states and the resultant upsurge of 
criminal organisation is an even more extreme example, which further indicates that transi-
tional states in particular are vulnerable to TOC. They are characterised “by the collapse and 
reestablishment of state structures” (Williams, 2002: 170), major political, economic and 
social paradigm shifts and often “a reorientation of relationships with the outside world” 
(Williams, 2002: 170). The resulting weaknesses and vulnerabilities of these states are easily 
and readily exploited by TOC (Williams, 2002: 169-170). Hence, these weaknesses cannot 
generally be blamed on external globalisation processes and their effects. However, pre-
existing misrule and corruption, and other aspects of state weakness, can make it harder to 
deal with and be exacerbated by change in the GPE, as well as hinder the combating of illicit 
activities (Le Pere/Vickers, forthcoming: 6). “Whatever the short- or long-term causes of 
weakness, however, weak states tend to share certain characteristics” (Williams, 2002: 170): 
low level of state legitimacy; weak border controls; ineffective rule of law; personal interests 
being put ahead of public interest by institutions and their representatives; low levels of 
business regulation and protection; lack of social control through effective and fair criminal 
justice systems; ineffective and inefficient functioning, for example a lack of provision for 
the citizens and inability to protect the citizens. “These weaknesses provide a greenhouse 
effect for organized crime” (Williams, 2002: 170), which “tends to develop in response to a 
particular combination of opportunities on the one side and pressures and incentives on the 
other” (Williams, 2002: 171). Williams (2002) translates these weaknesses into a set of sev-
en capacity gaps, meaning areas where the state is incapable, due to a variety of reasons, to 
fulfil certain basic functions. Hence, these capacity gaps lead to particular functional holes.  
“Capacity gaps and functional holes are exploited by criminal organizations in one 
of two ways – either by filling them and, in effect, substituting or compensating for 
the state, or by exploiting the room for maneuver that they provide” (Williams, 2002: 
171). 
  
For example, lack of capacity for social control, possibly due to a lack of funds, leads to an 
ineffective criminal justice system, allowing criminal organisations to operate with near im-
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punity. These capacity gaps and functional holes will be described in more detail in Chapter 
IV, before applying them to the case study. Table 2 illustrates the capacity gaps, functional 
holes and their implications for organised crime.  
 
Table 2: Capacity gaps, functional holes, and transnational organised crime (Williams, 2002: 171) 
Capacity gaps  Functional holes Implications for organised crime 
Social control Ineffective criminal 
justice system Organised crime operates with impunity 
Social welfare Lack of provision for 
citizens 
Migration to illegal economy 
Organised crime recruitment 
Paternalism substitute for state 
Business regulation Lack of regulatory 
framework 
Organised crime as arbitrator, protector and 
debt collector 
Oversight and accountabil-
ity 
Lack of control and 
transparency 
Opportunity for extensive use of corruption 
Hijacking of privatisation processes 
Border control Weak interdiction ca-
pability 
Use state for transhipment of various ille-
gal products 
Legitimacy Lack of authority and 
affiliation 
Build on patron-client links and other rela-
tionships that are more important than loy-
alty to the state 
Electoral norms and pat-
terns Campaign financing 
Opportunity to influence election outcomes 
and cut deals with politicians 
 
Where these gaps and holes are not big enough or are beginning to close, organised crime 
can still use one of the tools in its repertoire, for example, corruption or violence, to pry or 
keep them open.  
 Although Williams (2002) exempts the causes for state weaknesses from his analysis 
of how these are used by organised crime, the political-economy approach taken in this the-
sis cannot and should not do this. The causes and their historical and geographic context are 
a crucial part of any analysis aiming to achieve a meaningful understanding of the relation-
ship between the IGPE and the state, its social, political and economic arrangements, as well 
as the events in Guinea-Bissau in particular. In the context of state weakness and its link to 
organised crime, “Africa must rank as the paradigm case of how state weakness has created 
and fostered an enabling environment for the emergence and growth of criminality and 
transnational crime” (Le Pere/Vickers, forthcoming: 6). Consequently, it is necessary to dis-
cuss the state in Africa in relation to the illicit in a separate section. However, the limited 
space of this thesis and the vast amount of literature on the subject, allow for only a brief 
discussion, but do not negate the existence of other lines of argumentation and opinion. 
 
2.3.5.1The State in Africa and the Illicit 
The characteristics of the socio-political environment in many African states, some would 
even say in most or all, provide “almost ideal conditions for the rapid penetration and spread 
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of transnational crime” (Le Pere/Vickers, forthcoming: 7). The social characteristics include 
that young adults (15-29) make up more than half of the adult population in more than thirty 
countries, many of which have experienced violence, conflict and migration (forced or oth-
erwise). Together with the high level of unemployment, inequality, poverty, HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, drought, famine, high level of human insecurity, high levels of politicised ethnic 
diversity, social fragmentation and exclusion of groups, it is not surprising that criminal ac-
tivity emerges as a rational survival strategy (Le Pere/Vickers, forthcoming: 7-10). The po-
litical systems are often characterised by and based on systems of patrimonialism rather than 
moral authority or public consensus. Under patrimonial rule, authority and its legitimacy are 
based on a system of patronage: the dependency of the client on the resources and services 
controlled by the patron, who in exchange derives his authority from support by the client. 
All patron-client relationships are personal, thereby blurring the line between public and 
private (Erdmann/Engel, 2006: 18). Le Pere and Vickers (forthcoming) also attest to an “in-
timate interdependence among state and private sector elite” (Le Pere/Vickers, forthcoming: 
9). In this context, the state has often only an instrumental role, and resources are used to 
enhance power, rather than on social welfare in African states. In such an environment, 
seeking political office is often one of the only ways to achieve some personal wealth. This 
personalisation of power and authority has severe implications for the functioning of the 
state, from effective bureaucracies, to the judicial system, social welfare, health and educa-
tion. It is simply easier to use public office (from president to an office clerk) for personal 
gain if it is the only available option for the citizens. Long-term state investment in elevating 
the economic conditions for citizens is therefore not always in the best interest of rulers (Re-
no, 2000: 439). The consequences for the economy can also be seen in the emergence of 
large parallel economies, which “have placed substantial resources outside the reach of the 
central state” (Le Pere/Vickers, forthcoming: 9), as well as in a dependency on the extrac-
tion and export of natural resources. In turn this also negatively affects the relationship be-
tween the citizens and the state, who have little trust and confidence in the state to provide 
for or protect them. Additionally, many states face further threats from internal and external 
conflicts, further undermining the state´s capacity to successfully resist illicit market forces. 
 While states in Africa are not necessarily more corrupt and more criminal than oth-
ers, “the interaction between the practice of power, war, economic accumulation and illicit 
activities of various types forms a particular political trajectory which can be fully appreci-
ated only if it is addressed in historical depth” (Bayart et al, 1999: xvi). However, “the com-
bination of positions of public office with positions of accumulation” (Bayart et al, 1999: 8), 
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in its most extreme forms also dubbed as kleptocracies, is not generally a new development. 
It has existed as a feature during colonial rule, in the national movements and the post-
colonial rule. Nevertheless, Bayart et al (1999) suggest that through the insertion of African 
states into the international system a new form of “politique du ventre” (politics of the belly) 
within an international context is developing. This is different or new in two respects: good 
governance is more important to donors now and certain practices are not tolerated anymore; 
profound changes in the international economy, for example, the globalisation of trade and 
market deregulation, or the rise of certain smuggling trades have taken place. Earlier, posi-
tions of public office were connected to positions of accumulation through their legitimacy 
in international circles, especially during the cold war, when kleptocrats like Mobutu of 
Zaire were legitimised and kept in power by their allies. Now, their relationship exists in the 
context of internationalisation and the growth of organised crime, an environment providing 
new opportunities for illegal activities. Politics of deregulation and privatisation of the state, 
as well as economic crises and loss of legitimacy have on the one hand diminished the ca-
pacities of most states in Africa. On the other hand, they have motivated and made room for 
alternative means for how “Africans manage to survive and stake their place in the mael-
strom of globalization” (Bayart et al, 1999: 116). As a result, Africa´s social systems are 
divided into the legal body (or a legal fiction) which is the partner of international organiza-
tions and aid donors, and “the real fabric of society” (Bayart et al, 1999: 20).  
Some states  
“are characterized by the existence of a hidden and collective structure of power 
which surrounds, and even controls, the official tenants of state power. Hidden pow-
er-brokers of this sort are able to use to their advantage the privatization of legiti-
mate means of coercion, and even use with impunity private and illegitimate organs 
of coercion in the form of paramilitary organizations or even criminal gangs” 
(Bayart et al,1999: 20-21). 
 
These use public enterprises, financial institutions, and regulatory bodies for their own prof-
it. The real power of the head of state varies; he or she might be the main beneficiary or just 
a front and be disposed of when necessary (Bayart et al, 1999: 20-23). 
William Reno (2000) uses the very similar notion of shadow states. He however con-
tests the view that these developed as a response to, or as a consequence of, changes in the 
global economy, but sees them as a form of personal rule (Reno, 2000: 434). While he does 
not agree with Bayart et al on the external causes, he recognises the global illicit markets as 
an important source of revenue for shadow states, together with extractive industries, replac-
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ing official development aid. This corresponds with Williams´ (2002) aforementioned notion 
of the political-criminal nexus.17 
 The heading of this section described the state as a facilitator of the illicit. On the one 
hand, this does not mean that every state deliberately and directly creates the conditions un-
der which crime thrives. It rather means that organised crime is enabled by conditions found 
within states. Whether these are directly created or perpetuated by the state or indirect con-
sequences of globalisation processes, geographic location, misrule, neo-liberal reforms, tran-
sition processes, conflict, or poverty, has to be determined on a case by case basis. On the 
other hand, neither does it imply a simply passive role of the state as a victim. A state can 
also develop into an accomplice and benefactor of the illicit. The author also hopes to have 
shown that particular regional, local and historical particularities in the social, political and 
economic arrangements play an important role in the relationship between the IGPE and a 
specific state, and that these have to be taken into account.  
 
2.3.6 Analytical Framework  
Following the discussion in the previous sections, the IGPE-State relationship can be de-
scribed as complex and manifested in multiple roles played by the state. However, this re-
search is primarily concerned with the role of the state as facilitator in the IGPE. The social, 
political and economic arrangements, as well as the other roles of the state are key to the 
understanding of the development of capacity gaps and functional holes and add to the coun-
try´s vulnerability and its usefulness to TOC groups. The relevance of these additional fac-
tors is reflected in the descriptive first part of the two-fold approach taken in this study in the 
third chapter. Nevertheless, it has to be strongly emphasised that these factors will not form 
part of the primary analysis of this thesis, which only considers the state as defined in Wil-
liams´ (2002) analytical framework.  
Consequently, the primary research question and the supplementary research ques-
tions of this thesis will be answered using the analytical framework by Williams (2002) for a 
structured step-by-step analysis of Guinea-Bissau´s role as a transhipment state. The possi-
ble existence of a hidden power structure will be incorporated into this framework as a com-
plementary indicator for the existence of capacity gaps and functional holes. In order to an-
swer the first supplementary research question, Guinea-Bissau will be examined for the ex-
istence of capacity gaps and resultant functional holes.18 If they exist, the second supplemen-
tary research question will be answered by analysing if and how they were or are being ex-
                                                 
17 See 2.3.4: p.33. 
18 See 2.3.5: p.36. 
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ploited by the drug-traffickers, using Williams´ (2002) framework as a guiding reference. In 
doing so, this thesis aims to provide a „building block‟ to the field of GPE and to possibly 
provide a frame of reference to anticipate and possibly prevent similar developments and 
trends. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter set out to critically discuss the theoretical concepts introduced in the first chap-
ter, to achieve a definition of the IGPE and to discuss the frameworks which will be used to 
examine the relationship between the IGPE and the state. The discussion of several theoreti-
cal concepts, particularly TOC, showed the need for alternative approaches, and a political-
economy approach, examining the market and political authority, was suggested. Conse-
quently, the IGPE was defined as concerning the social, political and economic arrange-
ments that affect the global systems of illicit production, exchange and distribution, and the 
mix of values reflected therein. The IGPE is to be seen as the illicit dimension of the overall 
GPE and as such is interconnected, interdependent and interactive with its licit dimension. 
The analysis of the particular market-authority relationship should start by identifying the 
market and its characteristics, or its geography, the authorities involved and the balance of 
power over outcomes between political authority and the market. Additionally, the im-
portance of analysing this configuration within its historical context was emphasised. The 
IGPE consists of a multitude of actors, states, criminals, for example, drug traffickers, inter-
national organisations, like Interpol and UNODC, as well as NGOs and individuals. The role 
of the state, as political authority, and its relationship with the IGPE was described as multi-
dimensional and multidirectional, as it is creator, regulator, actor, locale, victim, facilitator, 
accomplice and benefactor of the IGPE.19 For the purpose of this thesis only the latter role of 
the state will be assessed when analysing the case study. Seven capacity gaps and functional 
holes of states were identified, all of which can facilitate the utilisation of a state by criminal 
actors in the IGPE, such as cocaine traffickers. 
The following third chapter of this thesis will firstly examine the social, political and 
economic arrangements of the global cocaine trade and its historical development. Secondly, 
a historical background of Guinea-Bissau will be provided.  
 
 
 
                                                 
19 An illustration of the suggested structure and relationships of the IGPE can be found in Appendix 1: The 
GPE, IGPE and the state. 
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Chapter III: Case Study - The Global Cocaine Trade and Guinea-Bissau - 
Contextualisation 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter indicated that the first step in analysing the market-authority relation-
ship should be to „map‟ the market, its characteristics, its geography, the authorities in-
volved and the balance of power over outcomes between political authority and the market. 
Additionally, the importance of analysing this configuration within its historical context - 
how the particular social, political and economic arrangements were shaped - was empha-
sised. This chapter therefore represents the first part of the two-fold approach taken in this 
thesis. Hence, in the first section of this chapter, the global cocaine trade, its history, devel-
opment, actors and structure will be analysed. The second section will give an overview of 
Guinea-Bissau´s history and its contemporary political economy. Finally, the third section 
will bring the two together by providing a brief narrative on the emergence of Guinea-
Bissau as a transhipment state in the global cocaine trade. 
 
3.2 The Global Cocaine Trade 
 
“Erythroxylum coca20 is a peculiarly ordinary-looking shrub native to South Ameri-
ca. […] And yet coca has started wars, prompted invasions, embarrassed politicians, 
toppled governments, filled prisons, created billionaires and bankrupted countries, 
and both taken and possibly saved thousands of lives. And all this for one simple rea-
son: because Erythroxylum coca […] is the Earth´s leading source of cocaine” 
(Streatfeild, 2001: 1). 
 
3.2.1 History 
The term coca generally “refers to two distinct but closely related species of the genus 
Erythroxylum
21, with a number of varieties each” (Montagne, 1991: 280). It is a bush of var-
ying heights (up to three meters), ordinary-looking, as Streatfeild (2001) describes, and its 
leaves can be harvested three to six times a year for up to fifty years (Montagne, 1991: 280). 
The cultivation and use of the coca leaf is “historically concentrated in the Andean region 
[particularly Peru and Bolivia], emerging as early as 3000 B.C.” (UNODC, 2007b: 3) and 
had spread to Central America and the Caribbean by the time the Spanish explorers and 
conquerors arrived in the 16th century. Traditionally, the leaves are chewed or simply kept in 
the mouth for their effects, which include the prevention of altitude sickness, suppression of 
                                                 
20 Italic in original. 
21 Italic in original. 
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hunger and tiredness, and increased stamina and strength. They were also used for cultural 
and religious purposes and ceremonies. Besides pressure from the Catholic Church to ban 
the use of coca, as it associated it with indigenous religious beliefs and saw it as the work of 
the devil, the economic interests of the Spanish colonists prevailed. They had quickly dis-
covered that its use was allowing the indigenous workers they were exploiting to work hard-
er, requiring less food and therefore making it more profitable. Due to this, coca use and its 
cultivation became even more widespread. It furthermore became an important source of 
revenue for the colonists, who treated it like any other agricultural plant. But its cultivation 
and use stayed limited to South and Central America and hardly any international trade en-
sued, mainly because the leaf perishes easily and is therefore difficult to transport (UNODC, 
2007b: 5-6). This can be seen as an example of how a change in the distribution of power, 
first in the security structure, with the arrival of Spaniards, affects the other structures of 
power, particularly production, which in turn allows those in power to change the options 
available to others, in this case the indigenous population, for their own interests. Further-
more, it shows how power derived from the security and production structure prevailed over 
power derived from ideas and beliefs in the form of the Catholic Church.  
 The situation, however, changed dramatically when the cocaine alkaloid, the active 
element responsible for the leaf´s psychoactive effects, was discovered and extracted in its 
pure crystalline or powder form in 1860. This enabled industrial manufacture, first in Ger-
many, the Netherlands and Switzerland, and later in the US and in South America. Its culti-
vation also spread to some Asian countries, like Ceylon, Java and Taiwan. “The popularity 
of cocaine in Western societies increased dramatically following the publication of a paper 
by Sigmund Freud, who experimented with cocaine and wrote a widely-publicized paper 
entitled “Über Coca” in 1884” (UNODC, 2007b: 7), in which he outlined the beneficial 
properties of cocaine “presenting the drug as a medical panacea with practically no side ef-
fects or danger of addiction” (UNODC, 2007b: 7). The discovery of its use as a local anaes-
thetic in 1885 further increased the demand for it.22 Besides its use as an anaesthetic, cocaine 
became popular in a variety of patent medicines, as a palliative tonic for sinusitis and hay 
fever, among others, and also as an alleged cure for addictions to morphine, opium and al-
cohol. Furthermore, its recreational use was on the rise and it was sold mixed with wine, 
whiskey and soft drinks, the most famous of which is, of course, Coca-Cola (UNODC, 
2007b: 9). The increased production, especially on Java, which took over from Peru as the 
main producer in 1902, and refined processing techniques, resulted in a price collapse and 
                                                 
22 See Appendix 3: Coca leaf exports from Peru, 1877-1905. 
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the markets in Europe and the US were flooded with cocaine (Streatfeild, 2001: 130-131). In 
an effort to link this development with the theoretical foundations of the field of GPE dis-
cussed in the previous chapter, it can be argued that the development outlined above shows 
how the discovery of the cocaine alkaloid, a change in the knowledge structure, can have 
significant effects on the production structure. 
Casualty numbers from overdoses, medical and recreational, and long-term addiction 
began to rise sharply, and warnings were published in medical journals. “This might have 
led to the drug´s disappearance from the public consciousness but for one thing: everyone 
had noticed that cocaine was fun” (Streatfeild, 2001: 133). Meanwhile, cocaine had been 
replaced as a surgical anaesthetic by synthetics like Novocaine. This, however, had no effect 
on the still rising demand for cocaine, pointing to the recreational and non-surgical use of 
cocaine (Streatfeild, 2001: 133). The negative side effects of cocaine became more publi-
cised when it became more affordable and its use spread to urban areas and impoverished 
parts of society.23 While upper class users were described as unfortunate habitués, lower 
class users were described as addicts and drunks. Consequently, an apparent causal relation-
ship between cocaine and crime was established and became deeply engrained in Western 
societies. Especially the combination of drugs, crime and African-Americans, whether or not 
it existed, was spread widely by a racist media in the US and resulted, together with 
knowledge of health risk and side effects, in more and more states (in the US) restricting the 
use and sale of cocaine to medical reasons. This corresponds with the „criminality of the 
other‟ discussed in the previous chapter, although here the other is not the foreigner, but the 
African-American population and the lower class in general. However, the regulatory re-
gimes introduced in some US states were insufficient, as they were easily bypassed by doc-
tors and pharmacists. More effective, especially against the patent-cure industry, was the 
„Pure Food and Drug Act‟, passed in 1906, which forced manufacturers to list the ingredi-
ents of their product on its packaging. In 1914, the „Harrison Act‟ and several amendments 
limited the legal use of cocaine to surgical situations (Streatfeild, 2001: 130-134, 139; 
UNODC, 2007b: 9). These Acts can be described as the first step in the process of criminali-
sation, which will be further examined in the next section. Once again, this development 
shows how changes in knowledge, cocaine´s health risks, on the one hand, and belief, like 
drugs are „fun‟, on the other, affect other structures. Additionally, it can be argued that the 
particular social, political and economic arrangements of the time - racial discrimination, 
                                                 
23 In the beginning most habitual cocaine users, or habitués, were members of the upper classes of society, 
particularly doctors and pharmacists who were experimenting with the drug (UNODC, 2007b: 9). 
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class differences and engrained prejudices and fears - reflect the values and the distribution 
of power. 
 
3.2.2 The Criminalisation of Cocaine 
The trafficking of drugs on an international scale “arguably began during the 19th century 
with the smuggling of opium from India to China” (Montagne, 1991: 275). Inter- and intra-
state trafficking increased strongly during the patent medicine era at the end of the 19th cen-
tury. The first efforts to regulate and restrict drug use on an international level were taken at 
the Shanghai Opium Convention in 1909, leading to the International Opium Convention at 
The Hague in 1912, which focused on restricting the distribution of opium. The attention 
shifted from opium to cocaine in the early 1920s and the first efforts to control the interna-
tional distribution of cocaine were made at the Geneva Convention in 1925. However, major 
producing countries like Peru did not want to limit their production of coca and the global 
depression in 1929 hampered efforts to limited cocaine production further, as producer 
countries did not want to miss out on the revenue and consumer countries feared increased 
prices. Aside from these barriers to achieving international drug control (IDC), the ac-
ceptance for the conventions was growing and domestic law-enforcement was increased in 
many countries. The 1931 „Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the 
Distribution of Narcotic Drugs‟ was initially signed by forty-one countries and eventually 
ratified by sixty-seven countries, including the main exporters and importers. These efforts 
were successful in limiting and controlling the licit production, manufacture and distribution 
of these substances.24 But as a result an illicit market for these substances emerged. 
The UNODC (2007c) argues that the newly illicit markets for narcotics also provided 
organised criminal groups, particularly in the US, with a welcome alternative source of in-
come after the end of alcohol prohibition. As a response to these developments, the League 
of Nations convened a conference in 1936, which concluded with the „Convention for the 
Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs‟, which was the first international trea-
ty “explicitly on drug trafficking and the first to make certain drug offences international 
crimes” (UNODC, 2007b: 77). Article 2 (a) of the Convention outlaws  
“[t]he manufacture, conversion, extraction, preparation, possession, offering, offer-
ing for sale, distribution, purchase, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokage, 
despatch, despatch in transit, transport, importation and exportation of narcotic 
drugs, contrary to the provisions of the said Conventions” (quoted in UNODC, 
2007b: 77-78). 
 
                                                 
24 See Appendix 4: Licit Coca leaf exports from Java and Peru, 1913-1935. 
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This convention was also the first to explicitly deal with drug-related crimes committed 
abroad and extradition requirements. But it was only signed and ratified by thirteen coun-
tries and not by, amongst others, the US, Germany and Japan (UNODC, 2007b: 64-78). In 
1961 the „Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs‟ was adopted, superseding all previous con-
ventions. Henceforth, the cultivation of coca bushes was limited to scientific and pharma-
ceutical purposes. Furthermore, the chewing of coca leaves was declared drug abuse and its 
abolishment recommended (Montagne, 1991: 276). 
The social and cultural changes in the 1960s lead to an increased use of narcotics for 
recreational purposes, particularly in North America and Western Europe and, as a result, 
US President Nixon declared the „War on drugs‟ in 1971. Cocaine especially experienced a 
revival in this time and from 1971 the demand for illicit cocaine rose drastically, which is 
reflected in a dramatic increase in the illicit cultivation and manufacture of cocaine in Peru 
and Bolivia, the only countries authorized to grow coca for pharmaceutical purposes (see 
Figure 3). 
In 1984, the General Assembly of the UN adopted the „Declaration on the Control of 
Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse‟, declaring that the  
“illegal production of, illicit demand for, abuse of and illicit trafficking in drugs im-
pede economic and social progress, constitute a grave threat to the security and de-
velopment of many countries and people and should be combated by all moral, legal 
and institutional means, at the national, regional and international levels” (UNODC, 
2007b: 95). 
 
 
Figure 3: Global cocaine manufacture, legal and illegal, 1903-2007 (UNODC, 2007b: 139) 
 
Despite renewed efforts to curb drug use and trafficking, including a drastic increase in the 
resources spent on law-enforcement and supply-interdiction, the overall increase of drug use 
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continued and “illegal coca-leaf production and resulting cocaine manufacture in the Andean 
region set a new record each year” (UNODC, 2007b: 95). Concerned with the “rising trend 
in the illicit production of, demand for and trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances”, as well as the “increasing inroads into various social groups made by illicit traf-
fic” (UN, 1988: 1), the „Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances‟, was agreed on in 1988 and entered into force in 1990. It stated the con-
cern of the signatories with the “links between illicit traffic and other related organized 
criminal activities which undermine the legitimate economies and threaten the stability, se-
curity and sovereignty of States”, as well as the fact that “illicit traffic generates large finan-
cial profits and wealth enabling transnational criminal organizations to penetrate, contami-
nate and corrupt the structure of government, legitimate commercial and financial business, 
and society at all its levels” (UN, 1988: 1). The convention aimed to eliminate the root caus-
es of the global drug problem, including the demand and the enormous profits of illicit traf-
ficking, by stricter measures and far-reaching requirements on the signatories. Further 
measures included closing safe havens for drug traffickers by extradition provisions, in-
creased judicial cooperation and combating money-laundering, an essential part of the traf-
ficking process (UN, 1988: 1; UNODC, 2007b: 98-99). The process of criminalisation de-
scribed in this section corresponds closely with the theoretical framework discussed in the 
previous chapter.25 Firstly, it confirms that the criminogenesis needs to be understood within 
wider social, political and economic settings. Secondly, the driving force behind the crimi-
nalisation was (and still is) the Western conviction that cocaine should be criminalised. The-
se convictions could only be asserted in the form of an international prohibition regime due 
to Western dominance in the GPE. It furthermore corresponds with the state´s role as a crea-
tor and regulator of the IGPE26, as well as the relationship between the overall GPE and the 
IGPE.  
 
3.2.3 Effect of Criminalisation and Recent Developments 
The establishment of an IDC regime starting in 1912 had two major effects. Firstly, the licit 
production and trade in cocaine declined strongly, as shown before, and the UNODC lauds it 
as “one of the oldest consensus-based multilateral systems in existence” (UNODC, 2007b: 
1), predating the League of Nations, leading to internationally accepted principles and an 
increased awareness of the health and addiction risks of cocaine use. Secondly, however, it 
also led to “the emergence of a large and violent illicit drug industry, [which] has spared few 
                                                 
25 See particularly Chapter II p. 13-14. 
26 See 2.3.1: p. 27. 
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countries” (UNODC, 2007b: 2). The value of the global cocaine retail market in 2008 was 
estimated at US$ 88 billion, higher than the GDP of 123 out of 184 countries (UNODC, 
2010b: 69). Still, the UNODC (2007b: 140) points out that besides the drastic growth rates 
of illicit cocaine production, the annual growth rates are still lower than the growth of licit 
production at the end of the 19th century, which can be interpreted as a positive effect of the 
IDC system.  
 From WWI until the late 1990s nearly all the raw material, the coca bush, was grown 
in Peru and Bolivia, while Colombia emerged as the primary location for processing the 
leaves into cocaine paste and pure cocaine powder in clandestine laboratories. The spread of 
clandestine laboratories and cultivation areas to other countries in South America was also 
facilitated by the construction of the Pan-American Highway. By 1997 Colombia took over 
as the main coca cultivation area, which later partly shifted back to Peru and Bolivia due to 
increased eradication efforts. Estimates show an overall decline of coca cultivation by 28% 
for 2000-2009. However, in general, the global production of cocaine can be described as 
fairly stable over the last decade, with changes on country level in response to natural and 
law-enforcement pressures.27 28 Increased international cooperation and domestic law-
enforcement, particularly in South America have resulted in an increase of seizures, which 
in combination with the estimated decline of production, could mean that less cocaine is 
reaching the markets (UNODC, 2010b: 66- 68).29 30 Here, the role of the state as a locale for 
the IGPE is evident, as well as a shift from an actively enabling role to an increasingly regu-
lating role, particularly in South America. Moreover, it asserts the theoretical assumptions 
made in the previous chapter about the mutually interdependent relationship between the 
GPE and the IGPE, as it illustrates how the political arrangements on national and interna-
tional level affect the global systems of cocaine production, distribution and exchange. 
Costa Sorti and De Grauwe (2009) identify four further significant developments in 
the cocaine markets: (1) retail prices in the US and Europe have significantly declined over 
the last 25 years; while (2) farm-gate prices for coca leaves in Peru and Bolivia have nearly 
doubled, leading to increased producer prices; (3) a strong decline in the margin between the 
                                                 
27 See Appendices 6 and 7. 
28 The analysis of cocaine production is, however, complex and especially short-term estimates are therefore 
sometimes misleading. This is due to the variation of cocaine produced by the plant, depending on the plant, 
geographical and meteorological conditions, as well as increased productivity, because of improved farming, 
processing and refining techniques. Additionally, cultivation estimates are based on satellite and ground sur-
veys, assuming an area-leaf yield and coca leaf to cocaine transformation ratio. Furthermore, estimates based 
on seizures of cocaine assume pure cocaine, while the purity of seized shipments varies strongly. Therefore, 
long-term estimates, indicating a trend, are more reliable (UNODC, 2010b: 66). 
29 See Appendices 8 and 9. 
30 It is, however, also possible that the production of cocaine was underestimated, which would mean a stable 
to increasing supply to the markets (UNODC, 2010b: 66- 68). 
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price paid to the producer and the wholesale price in the importing country – also called 
intermediation margin, or export-import margin; and (4) a worldwide relatively stable preva-
lence of cocaine (Costa Sorti/De Grauwe, 2009: 489). This happened despite the aforemen-
tioned fairly stable production, intensified supply containment and the increased amounts of 
seized cocaine, which in combination should have resulted in increasing retail prices. The 
answer to why this has happened can be found in the structure and functioning of the mar-
ket, as well as external influences such as globalisation. This is relevant for this thesis as it 
allows further insight to the market-regulator relationship, the modus operandi of drug traf-
fickers, as well as the influences of the overall GPE in the form of globalisation processes.  
 
3.2.4 The Structure and Functioning of the Global Cocaine Markets 
Montagne (1991: 276) suggests a description of the supply side of the global cocaine mar-
kets, the drug trafficking, as four functional phases: (1) cultivation and production; (2) ex-
port (smuggling); (3) distribution in the consumer country; and (4) the processing of the 
proceeds. On the demand side it could be said to include the acquisition and use of the drug, 
and possibly acquiring the necessary funds to finance the consumption. While the produc-
tion side has already been covered in detail, it is phase two of the drug-trafficking that is of 
particular interest for this case study.  
 Cocaine is produced for two major markets, North America, with about 6.2 million 
users, and Europe, with about 4.5 million users, who together consume about two-thirds of 
cocaine consumed worldwide. The largest emerging market is South America. While the 
demand for cocaine in North America has been declining, the demand has been rising in 
Europe, as the number of users has doubled between 1998 and 2008. The main source of 
cocaine for Europe is still Colombia, but Venezuela is becoming increasingly important as a 
supplier. Cocaine for Europe is mostly transported by sea, often in sailing ships, but also on 
freighters and other motor vessels. Smaller quantities are also transported on commercial 
flights by so-called drug mules, who swallow condoms filled with cocaine. There are two 
main entry hubs to the European market: Spain and Portugal (South); and Netherlands and 
Belgium (North). The Southern hub is geographically and culturally close to Latin America, 
while Belgium and Netherlands have the biggest ports. “Trafficking of cocaine to Europe is, 
to a significant extent, organized by Colombian organized crime groups that forge alliances 
with various criminal groups operating in Europe” (UNODC, 2010b: 88). Other South 
American and Caribbean groups are involved to a lesser extent, as are North Africans and 
Balkans. West Africans act as retailers and small-scale importers and “the largest proportion 
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of non-Portuguese cocaine traffickers arrested in Portugal in 2008 were from Cape Verde 
(27%) and Guinea-Bissau (19%)” (UNODC, 2010b: 88).31  
 Two transit hubs in WA have emerged since about 2002. One is located around 
Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Cape Verde, the Gambia and Senegal; the other is in the Gulf of 
Guinea and Bight of Benin (Ghana, Nigeria). The emergence of WA as a major hub for drug 
trafficking in the early 2000s can be linked to two global developments: (1) a shift of the 
cocaine market from North America to Europe; and (2) increased interdiction along tradi-
tional routes (UNODC, 2007: 18). Cocaine is transported towards the West Afrcian coast in 
„mother ships‟ by Colombians and then offloaded into smaller vessels. Some cocaine is then 
carried onward via sea to Europe and some is left in WA as payment, which is then often 
trafficked by West African air couriers on own account to Europe (UNODC, 2010b: 83-
84).32 
The wholesale prices between the producer country and the consumer country rise 
rapidly, especially outside of South America.33 While the retail market price is determined 
by the import costs and “the producer market determines the supply of the drug for a given 
export price” (Costa Sorti/De Grauwe, 2009: 492), the price difference is determined by the 
intermediation costs. Costa Sorti and De Grauwe (2009) identify four intermediation costs. 
Firstly, the transport cost, which is a function of “the number of hours the trip from the ex-
porting country to the importing country lasts and its price” influenced, for example, by the 
introduction of low cost flights, or faster boats. Secondly, the cost of seizures, which the 
authors describe as a function of “the supply reduction policies of the countries involved and 
the associated resources invested in supply reduction policies” (Costa Sorti/De Grauwe, 
2009: 493). Thirdly, the cost of labour, where they assume a wage rate determined by the 
wage earned in the best alternative job plus risk premium (or shadow wage), which also de-
pends on supply reduction measures. The risk premium was reduced by globalisation, 
through a higher supply of labour and a higher number of lower-level traffickers willing to 
accept high risks for small payment. The fourth intermediation cost is the profit margin of 
the higher-level traffickers, as the “resources invested in the export-import business should 
earn a rate of return of alternative activities plus a risk premium” (Costa Sorti/De Grauwe, 
2009: 493). The UNODC estimates that of the proceeds of the European cocaine market, 
less than 1% goes to Andean coca farmers, about 1% to the processors and traffickers in 
Andean region, 25% to international traffickers between the Andes and entry points in Eu-
                                                 
31 See Appendix 16 
32 See Appendix 5 for a map of the main global cocaine flows. 
33 See Appendix 10 for Cocaine wholesale prices worldwide, 2008. 
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rope, 17% to traffickers between entry points and wholesalers in the final destination and 
56% to the high number of wholesale dealers in the final market (UNODC, 2010b: 87-88). 
The structure and functioning of the global cocaine market described here allow for several 
inferences in relation to the theoretical discussions of the previous chapter. Firstly, it shows 
the existence of a global division of labour, characterised by differences in the cost of la-
bour, risks and prices, which make the international trafficking the most profitable for the 
individuals involved. Secondly, it indicates the assertions made about the role of the state as 
a locale for the IGPE, ranging from home, transhipment, service, to market state.34 Thirdly, 
it highlights once more, the social, economic and political arrangements affecting the pro-
duction, exchange and distribution of cocaine.  
 
3.2.4.1 The Effect of Globalisation on the Global Cocaine Trade 
Costa Sorti and De Grauwe (2009) argue that it is mainly in the intermediation margin 
where the explanation for the earlier-mentioned relative retail price stability in the face of 
increased interdiction and containment efforts is to be found. They emphasise particularly 
three interconnected effects of globalisation on the market. Firstly, the market structure ef-
fect, meaning that globalisation tends to open markets in a very general way, increasing 
competition and therefore leading to a decrease between the retail and producer price. Sec-
ondly, the risk premium effect, wherein a larger supply of cheap labour with smaller risk 
averseness became available through the integration of more and more states into a GPE, 
resulting in a reduced risk premium and reduced intermediation margin. And thirdly, the 
efficiency effect, wherein lower transport, communication and information costs, enhanced 
technology and scientific knowledge, and also the general increase of trade allows for easier 
concealment of drug trade, lead to increased efficiency of intermediation and thereby low-
ered overall costs. These developments compensated for the increased interdiction risk as 
seen in the stable retail prices. However, the authors also acknowledge several alternative or 
contributing explanatory factors, such as the decreased purity of drug shipments and learn-
ing-by-doing effects on all levels of the supply chain increasing efficiency and reducing 
costs (Costa Sorti/De Grauwe, 2009: 493-494). This section contributes once more to the 
general purpose of this thesis, to examine the IGPE-State relationship, by highlighting the 
effects of change in the overall GPE on the IGPE, and thereby the state. Additionally, it sup-
ports the necessity to analyse them in relation to each other, as stressed in the second chap-
ter. Moreover, it corresponds with the argument made by, amongst others, Mittelman 
                                                 
34 See 2.3.3: p. 29-30. 
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(1999), who maintains that the surge of TOC in the 1990s could only be explained in the 
context of globalisation.35 
It was briefly mentioned above that a shift in the global cocaine trading routes has 
led to the establishment of two transit hubs in WA and that Guinea-Bissau emerged as one 
of the main centres of one of these hubs. Hence, before this development is analysed in the 
last section of this chapter, the next section will provide an historic background, as well as 
key facts about the country and its political economy. 
 
3.3 Guinea-Bissau 
 
3.3.1 Country Facts 
Due to the limited space of this thesis, the most relevant facts about Guinea-Bissau have 
been summarised in Table 3 below and a detailed map of Guinea-Bissau can be found in 
Appendix 11. It should be noted that, although not all of these facts are directly relevant for 
answering the research questions of this thesis, they are necessary in order to provide a cer-
tain background knowledge of Guinea-Bissau, which will further the understanding and 
analysis of the case study in Chapter IV. 
In the context of this thesis it has to be mentioned that Guinea-Bissau is a signatory 
of both the 1961 „UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs‟ and its amendments, as well as 
the 1988 „UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances‟ (UNODC, 2010c, d). This indicates that the government has, or claims to have, at 
least the metapolitical authority to determine what is legal and what is illegal. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Country Facts (data compiled from: BBC, 2010c; CIA Factbook, 2010; UNDP, 2009; 
UNODC, 2007: 14; UNODC, 2010c,d; World Bank, 2010) 
Official Name Size 
Geographical Posi-
tion 
Geography Capital 
Republic of 
Guinea-Bissau 
36,125 sq. km West African coast, 
between Senegal in 
the North and Guinea 
(Conakry) in the 
South 
350 km coastline, 
high number of small 
islands, mangrove 
swamps; low-lying 
inland, savannah 
(East) 
Bissau 
Population 
Population in ur-
ban areas 
Ethnic Groups Languages Religion 
1.6 million 30% Balanta (30%), Fula 
(20%), Manjaca 
(14%), Mandinga 
(13%), Papel (7%) 
Portuguese (official); 
Crioulo36 and African 
languages widely 
used 
Muslim 
(50%); Indig-
enous beliefs 
(40%); Chris-
tian (10%) 
                                                 
35 See 2.2.3: p. 24. 
36 A mix between Portuguese and indigenous languages. 
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Administra-
tion 
Executive Legislative Judiciary 
Military and 
Police 
9 Administra-
tive regions 
President (chief of 
state) Sanha, elect-
ed by popular vote 
for 5 years; Prime 
Minister (head of 
government) 
Gomes appointed 
by President 
National Assembly 
(Assembleia Nacion-
al Popular, ANP), 
elected for 4 years by 
popular vote 
Supreme Court, 9 
Regional Courts, 24 
Sectoral Courts 
5, 100 military 
in full service, 
4,500 police 
(2005) 
GDP GDP growth 
Major Economic 
sector 
Main exports 
Human De-
velopment 
Index 
US$ 430 mil-
lion (2009), 
GDP per capita 
US$ 273; one 
of the six poor-
est countries 
3.3% (2009) Agriculture (62% of 
GDP) 
Peanuts, cashew nuts 173 (out of 
182) 
 
3.3.2 History of Guinea-Bissau 
In line with the political-economy approach taken in this thesis, a brief overview of the his-
tory of Guinea-Bissau is necessary in order to understand the contemporary social, political 
and economic arrangements of the state. Nevertheless, the requirements for this research do 
not allow for an in-depth treatment of the country´s history. Therefore, a more detailed time-
line can be found in Appendix 12.  
Guinea-Bissau is a former Portuguese colony. It gained independence in 1974 after a 
thirteen year-long armed liberation struggle, started in 1959 by the Partido Africano da In-
dependência de Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau 
and Cape Verde, PAIGC). The PAIGC was formed in 1956 and was led by Amilcar Cabral, 
one of the few Cape Verdians and Guineans who had been allowed to study in Portugal. 
After initial peaceful demands and efforts for the independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape 
Verde, the PAIGC started a thirteen year armed struggle for independence. While the urban-
ised Guineans were more politicised and aware of the colonial suppression, the majority of 
the population lived in more or less decentralised rural areas. The core of the guerrilla fight-
ers was recruited from the urban areas and comprised sailors, workers and the like. But 
without the political mobilisation and support of the rural population any struggle would 
have been unsuccessful. By the time the fascist regime in Portugal broke down in 1974, the 
“situation was that of an independent state with part of its territory occupied” (Lopes, 1987: 
37). The PAIGC had declared Guinea-Bissau independent unilaterally on the 24 September 
1973, which was „officially‟ granted by Portugal one year later (Lopes, 1987: 30-38). How-
ever, Amilcar Cabral was assassinated in January 1973, allegedly by dissidents in his own 
party; others hold the Portuguese political police responsible (Temudo, 2008: 247-248). He 
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was succeeded by his half-brother Luis Cabral, who became the first President of the inde-
pendent Guinea-Bissau (Lobban/Karibe Mendy, 1997: 10). 
The period from 1974 to 1980 was characterised by growing grievances and dissatis-
faction in the majority rural population. Firstly, dissatisfaction grew in the army, 80% of 
which had been recruited from the Balanta ethnic group who were mostly peasants. Second-
ly, a demobilisation of the PAIGC, as newly-appointed government officials increasingly 
operated independently from party structures, led to grievances by party-members. Thirdly, 
resentments grew between the mainly Cape Verdian elite and officials on the one side, and 
Balanta and other ethnic groups on the other. These resentments have their roots in the colo-
nial era, as the Portuguese had brought mainly Cape Verdians to the mainland to occupy 
public offices and had given them several advantages. Together with a personal rivalry be-
tween President Cabral and his Prime Minister, former head of the armed forces and hero of 
the struggle, Vieira, these developments culminated in a military coup led by Vieira in 
1980.(Forrest, 1987: 97-105). 
Throughout the 1980s Vieira managed to consolidate his personal rule, nevertheless 
discontent among soldiers and the peasantry remained under the surface and he had to face 
several military coup attempts in 1982 and again in 1986 (Forrest, 1987: 105-115). In the 
late 1980s and early 1990s Vieira responded to international pressure and adopted several 
SAPs and the first multi-party democratic elections were held in 1994, which the PAIGC 
won and Vieira was elected President. Opposition grew in the form of new parties, particu-
larly the Balanta-based Party for Social Renovation (PRS) led by Kumba Yalá, but also from 
within the PAIGC, which split into two (Temudo, 2008: 249-250). 
In 1997, the High Chief of the Armed Forces, Ansumane Mané, who had recently 
been dismissed due to accusations of involvement in cross-border arms trade with Casa-
mance rebels, a separatist region in Senegal, attempted a coup two days after his dismissal 
and his being placed under house arrest. He had gathered support from a number of disgrun-
tled war veterans, formed a military junta, called for the resignation of the president and for 
democratic elections. Initially the fighting was limited to a small number of military bases 
near the capital, but when Vieira called Senegalese and Guinean (Conakry) troops for help, 
the military mutiny by some high-ranking officers against a democratic regime turned into a 
civil war (Rudebeck, 1998: 484). The foreign invasion for one showed Vieira´s isolation, but 
it also triggered growing support for the uprising in the rest of the military and the general 
population. The war remained mainly limited to the urban centres and the rural areas were 
only affected by refugees from the cities. Hence, aside from the Balanta who supported Ma-
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né because of their links with the military, the majority of other groups tried to maintain a 
non-aligned position. The war destroyed a large part of the country´s infrastructure and dis-
placed hundreds of thousands of people. It was ended by negotiations and with the help of 
the regional peace-keeping force Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
in 1999. Vieira agreed to go into exile in Portugal and the PRS and its candidate Kumba 
Yalá won the following elections in 2000 (Temudo, 2008: 251-252). 
After the elections fighting broke out again, this time between military factions sup-
porting either Yalá or Mané, when the latter declared himself leader of the armed forces. 
Mané was eventually killed in the fighting. Yalá himself was ousted by a bloodless military 
coup in 2003. He had dissolved the parliament in 2002 and ruled by decree until the coup. 
Renewed parliamentary elections in 2004, which were considered free and fair, saw the re-
turn of the PAIGC to the majority. The government was formed under Prime Minister Car-
los Gomes Junior. The presidential elections in 2005 were won by Vieira, who had returned 
from exile and stood as an independent candidate. Although the elections were judged to be 
free and fair internationally, the local sentiment suggests otherwise. Vieira consequently 
unsuccessfully tried to replace Gomes Junior with his long-term supporter Aristide Gomes. 
Legislative elections, originally scheduled for March were postponed to November 2008 due 
to a lack of funds and planning. They were further interrupted by an alleged coup attempt by 
the Head of the Navy Rear Admiral Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto. However, the final elec-
tions were considered free, fair and transparent, and were won by the PAIGC. In March 
2009 a bombing at the military headquarters killed the armed forces Chief of Staff, General 
Batista Tagme Na Wai and in an alleged revenge attack soldiers attacked the Presidential 
Palace and assassinated Vieira, who was replaced constitutionally by the speaker of parlia-
ment. During the run-up for the presidential election political violence escalated and a presi-
dential candidate and former minister were killed, allegedly while resisting arrest for a coup 
plot. Nevertheless, the elections themselves were peaceful, free and transparent, and were 
won by Sanha of the PAIGC who defeated former President Yala (Freedomhouse, 2010). On 
1 April 2010 the army mutinied again and Prime Minister Gomes and the army Chief of 
Staff Gen Jose Zamora Induta were detained. The mutiny was orchestrated by the former 
Head of the Navy Na Tchuto and Vice Chief of Staff General Antonio Indja. While Gomes 
was released after a week Zamora Induta is still being held and was replaced by Indja. Na 
Tchuto and Ibraima Papa Camara, the former Navy Chief, had returned from exile in the 
Gambia disguised as fishermen after their failed coup in 2008. As a consequence of the re-
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newed military mutiny and the remaining unresolved issues, the EU has recently announced 
its intention to end its mission to reform the country´s security forces (BBC, 2010b).  
 
3.3.3 Political-Economy of Contemporary Guinea-Bissau 
The above overview of Guinea-Bissau´s history and facts helps to identify several key char-
acteristics of contemporary Guinea-Bissau, which will be structured along the lines of the 
social, political and economic arrangements of a political economy.  
 Socially speaking, Guinea-Bissau is characterised firstly by the fact that the majority 
of its population lives in rural areas. The social organisation of the rural areas in turn is tra-
ditionally decentralised and locally based. The challenge that this form of social structure 
represents for any kind of political mobilisation or control was experienced by African slave 
raiders, the Portuguese, the PAIGC and most post-independence governments. Most rulers, 
foreign and local, acknowledged this, tried to come to terms with it or profit from it. There-
fore, local figures of authority, like village-elders and priests, were able to retain their au-
thority, particularly in traditional dispute settlement, under changing forms of national gov-
ernments and presidents (Galli, 1989: 371-375; Hawthorne, 2001: 1-2; 23-24; Lob-
ban/Karibe Mendy, 1997: 6). Besides the decisive role the peasantry has played in most po-
litical power struggles and conflicts, the majority of the population has been denied access to 
the higher levels of state power throughout history.  
“State leadership has been restricted to civilizados […]. The essential distinguishing 
characteristic between civilizados and nāo-civilizados is literacy. Literacy in the 
Portuguese language has made it possible for the civilizado to act as intermediary 
between the Portuguese and Africans. It is what gave the civilizado his social stand-
ing. Today literacy gives this group political as well as social standing. Moreover, 
the group´s political power is more than ever dependent on this intermediary func-
tion. To a large extent the state in Guinea-Bissau is financed by such foreign agen-
cies as the World Bank, USAID, SIDA and so on” (Galli, 1989: 374-375). 
 
As a result, government policies often neglect the rural areas and focus more on the needs of 
the elite and the urban centres. However, Galli (1989) rejects the dichotomy of a strong state 
and weak society in the Guinean context. She questions whether the Guinean peasants are by 
definition weak, even though they are obviously politically dominated. 
“They are strong in terms of their individual and collective abilities to survive and 
even accumulate in situations that are deliberately structured against them. The 
„strength‟ of the state lay precisely in its ability to undermine the very conditions of 
reproduction of Guinean peasants. However, in so weakening the capability of agri-
culture by neglect, the leadership progressively undermined its own position” (Galli, 
1989: 374). 
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Temudo (2008) similarly points out that patron-client relations between the elite and the 
rural population are weak and sometimes even reversed in the case of Guinea-Bissau. This is 
due to the fact that “through their social and political systems, through agriculture and local 
trade networks and through the use of their own health specialists, peasants remain, for most 
of their basic needs, relatively independent of the state” (Temudo, 2008: 258). The peasantry 
is thereby empowered vis-à-vis the elite, exemplified by its role in the armed struggle and 
civil war, as well as mobilisation campaigns and traditional ceremonies held by those aspir-
ing to political power. Galli (1989) makes the point that the political arrangements affecting 
production and distribution, made by the elites, have quite regularly throughout history un-
dermined the social basis of power, the traditional social and economic arrangements (Galli, 
1989: 374-375,379). As a consequence of these social settings, Guineans have also proven 
quite resilient against ethnic mobilisation since independence in the rural areas. Although 
resentment between Guineans and Cape Verdians, and between the Balanta and the Fula, 
due to their roles during colonialism and the armed struggle exists, a cohesion in the rural 
communities based on complex interdependencies and relations also exists. This cohesion 
can be regarded as the main distinguishing factor for the outcome of the civil war compared 
to the wars in Sierra-Leone and Liberia (Temudo, 2008: 260). 
 A second characteristic can be seen in the often extreme levels of poverty among the 
population. In 2006, 65.7% of the population lived in poverty and 21.6% in extreme poverty 
(Barry et al, 2006: 6). While the rural population is generally poorer than the urban popula-
tion, “most families cannot survive with one income source, making the most common fea-
ture of livelihoods the diversiﬁcation of strategies to make ends meet” (Gacitua-Mario et al, 
2006: 64). Nevertheless, rural to urban migration has increased, partly as a result of internal 
displacement of people due to the civil war. Between 1975 and 2002, the urban population 
increased from 16% to 44%, most of whom are slum-dwellers, working in the informal 
economy (Gacitua-Mario et al, 2006: 63). 
 Guinea-Bissau has been an electoral democracy with a multi-party system since 
1994, as mentioned before. All presidential and legislative elections since then have been 
considered free and fair, and the political parties are competitive (Freedom House, 2010). 
The PAIGC remains the most important political actor and has been in power throughout 
most of the post-independence period. It was, however, in opposition between 2000 and 
2003. Its president, Gomes, is now the Prime Minister and it won an absolute majority (65 
out of 100 seats) in the legislative elections in 2008. President Sanha is also a member of the 
PAIGC and was elected in 2009 in his third run for the presidency. He was also appointed 
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interim president after the civil war in 1999. The main opposition party is the PRS led by 
former President (2000-2003) Kumba Yalá. The PRS has a strong base in the Balanta ethnic 
group37 and holds 28 seats in the ANP. However, it has recently experienced internal divi-
sions and many leaders have left the party. The candidate who came in third in the 2009 
presidential elections is Henrique Rosa, an independent candidate, who was interim presi-
dent after the 2003 military coup (EU EOM, 2009: 10-11). Most constitutionally guaranteed 
rights and freedoms are generally respected, but the freedom of speech and press have been 
gravely violated on occasion, particularly in 2009 and during earlier military coups.38 Voic-
ing criticism of the military can lead to threats, harassment and violence. Nevertheless, 
Guinea-Bissau has one of the most pluralistic media landscapes in the region. Women´s 
rights are guaranteed in the constitution, but many face traditional and social discrimination, 
are not always allowed to own property, have less access to education, and female genital 
mutilation is widespread (EU EOM, 2009: 27, 32). 
 Despite free and fair elections, the country has experienced nearly constant political 
instability, reflected in the fact that every president since independence, aside from the ap-
pointed interim presidents, has either been ousted, or killed in a military coup and the mili-
tary intervenes regularly and heavily in the country´s political affairs. In addition to the con-
stant threat of a military coup, the government of Guinea-Bissau is restrained by its small 
budget of US$125 million (in 2006), of which nearly 80% came from foreign aid (Mazzitel-
li, 2007: 1087). The heavy reliance of the government on foreign aid and support also repre-
sents an important characteristic of the Guinea-Bissau´s political arrangements as the gov-
ernment is thereby limited in its available policy choices. Once again, this is an example of 
the influence of the GPE on the state.   
 The economic arrangements in Guinea-Bissau´s political-economy are further char-
acterised by a low level of industrialisation (CIA Factbook, 2010), subsistence agriculture, a 
large informal economy - 90% of the urban population is employed in the informal economy 
– and extremely low wages both in the formal and informal economy, resulting in a diversi-
fication of several income sources to make ends meet. The importance of established, tradi-
tional, informal local trade networks for the supply of basic foodstuffs should be emphasised 
here once more, as it goes to show the absence of official regulation of trade and the re-
course to these methods taken by the population in the light of the government´s inability to 
provide for its population (Gacitua-Mario et al, 2006: 64). 
                                                 
37 Although it lost in its most populated stronghold in the 2008 elections. 
38 Former Prime Minister Fadul and a journalist were beaten and tortured, and a presidential candidate was 
killed in the run-up to the elections (Freedom House, 2010). 
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3.4 The Emergence of Guinea-Bissau as a Transhipment State for the Global Cocaine 
Trade 
 
As indicated in the first chapter, the UNODC estimates the demand for cocaine in Europe to 
be between 135 and 145 tons a year (in 2007), one quarter of which is estimated to transit 
through WA (UNODC, 2007a: 10).39 Two previously discussed developments in the IGPE 
of the cocaine markets are linked to this development: (1) a shift of the cocaine market from 
North America to Europe; (2) increased interdiction along traditional routes (UNODC, 
2007a: 18). 
However, the “roots of West Africa´s emergence as a major transit point for a more 
broadly based trade in illegal drugs may be traced to the 1960s” (Ellis, 2009: 174) and falls 
together with the creation of mass markets for illegal narcotics in Europe. From small-scale 
trade in cannabis products and heroin in the 1950s, the narcotics trade grew to a much larger 
scale in the 1980s, possibly linked to the global economic crisis, rapid economic decline in 
WA, and consequently SAPs, leading to cuts in public expenditure and reduction of the 
number of public servants. Resulting financial difficulties were “undoubtedly an incentive 
for some to make money by any means possible” (Ellis, 2009: 178) and also led to emigra-
tion and growing West African diasporas in the US, Europe, Asia and also Latin America. 
While other West Africans were also involved in international drug trade, Ellis (2009) high-
lights the role and global activities of Nigerian networks, and to a lesser extent Ghanaians, in 
the drug trade (Ellis, 2009: 174-190). These patterns correspond with the assumption made 
in this thesis that the IGPE is strongly influenced by developments in the overall GPE.  
Until the late 1990s the drug smuggling in and via WA was mostly done by individu-
al couriers on commercial flights. From then on the number of reports of very large con-
signments of drugs by ship or commercial containers heading to WA grew strongly. In 2000, 
a ship carrying 2.3 tons of cocaine was reportedly intercepted by Cape Verdian authorities 
en route from the Caribbean and in 2003 a ship with 7.5 tons was intercepted between Cape 
Verde and Senegal en route to Spain. The numbers of seizures and the amounts of cocaine 
seized show that the year 2005 represents another major change in the scale of the traffick-
ing.40 The fact that South American traffickers have taken up residence in several West Af-
rican countries, including Guinea-Bissau, indicates a relocation of substantial parts of their 
business and a long-term engagement, as well as the comparative advantage of the region. 
The key local partners of the Latin Americans in the region are still Nigerians, with whom 
they have long-standing connections (Ellis, 2009: 190-194). The large cocaine consignments 
                                                 
39 See Appendix 13 for a map of the location of cocaine seizures in WA. 
40 See Figure 1, p.1. 
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arrive in WA on commercial fishing or freight „mother-ships‟. “These ships are met at sea 
by African vessels with African crews, often with a Latin American “controller”. […] The 
African vessels may continue northward or dock in West Africa, with the drugs to be trans-
ferred northward by other means” (UNODC, 2008: 11). Law-enforcement officials also re-
port a number of small aircraft modified for transatlantic flights carrying cocaine from South 
America to WA. From WA on, there seem to be two parallel flows of cocaine to Europe:  
“One, mainly involving large maritime and private air shipments, is owned and 
managed by South Americans. In exchange for logistic assistance with these ship-
ments, West Africans are paid in cocaine. This has created a second flow, as West 
Africans also traffic these drugs to Europe, usually via commercial air flights” 
(UNODC, 2008: 3). 
 
Additionally, seizures of stockpiles of cocaine on land indicate the relocation of parts of the 
wholesale market, controlled mainly by Colombians, to WA, which suggests a possible 
third, smaller flow of cocaine to Europe trafficked by individuals or networks other than 
those providing assistance to the Colombians, who buy at the local markets. Moreover, the 
UNODC (2008) also mentions the possibility that along with parts of the wholesale market, 
cocaine processing has moved to WA (UNODC, 2008: 12). The UNODC estimates that in 
2006 27% of the overall cocaine supply to Europe transited WA. This estimate is based on 
sporadic seizures of large shipments off the West African coast, in WA, en route from South 
America and in European waters, as well as more regular arrests of air couriers on commer-
cial flights (UNODC, 2009: 17). The value of the cocaine transiting WA in 2006 was an 
estimated US$ 1.8 billion at West African wholesale level and US$ 18 billion on European 
markets (Costa, 2007). Consequently, a ton of cocaine was worth about US$50 million at 
wholesale level (UNODC, 2007a: 10). 
Guinea-Bissau is only one amongst a number of West African countries that have 
emerged as transit points for cocaine trafficking. It seems, however, that it was particularly 
used by traffickers, as seizures in Guinea-Bissau were more than 100 kg in 2006 (674 kg) 
and 2007 (635 kg), while other countries have seized more than this amount only in one of 
those years (see Figure 4; UNODC, 2007a: 11).41 International law-enforcement officials 
were first able to confirm rumours of Guinea-Bissau´s usage by traffickers in 2005. Accord-
ing to reports, a ship had sunk off the coast of Guinea-Bissau and local fishermen had found 
packages of white powder in their nets. Not knowing what the substance was, they had tried 
using it as food seasoning and fertiliser. Shortly after however, a private plane with two Lat-
in Americans and a West African arrived, who tried to buy back the packages of what turned 
                                                 
41 It has to be emphasised here again that these indicators only show the amounts seized. Therefore, the possi-
bility exists that undetected shipments might paint a different picture. 
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out to be cocaine. They were subsequently arrested with large amounts of cash, but were 
released soon without reason. Shortly after this, another private jet allegedly landed in Spain 
with 100 kg cocaine traced to Guinea-Bissau (Worldpress, 2007). While Guinea-Bissau 
seems to be one of the major hubs for cocaine entering WA from South America, it lacks a 
regular commercial flight connection to Europe and makes it less suitable for couriering of 
cocaine. Therefore, drugs entering the country will often be re-routed to neighbouring coun-
tries like Senegal and Guinea (Conakry) with better international connectivity. This also 
explains the comparatively low number of Guineans arrested for cocaine trafficking on 
commercial flights to Europe. It is, however, noteworthy that Guinean (Bissau) nationals are 
the second largest group of foreigners (after Cape Verdians) to be arrested for drug traffick-
ing in Portugal (12% in 2007),42 suggesting an importance of cultural and historical ties in 
the cocaine market (UNODC, 2008: 23, 27). 
 
Figure 4: Kilograms of cocaine seized in West African countries in 2006 and 2007 (UNODC, 
2007a: 11) 
 
 After the number of seizures peaked in 2007, both maritime and airport seizures 
stopped at the end of 200843. Reasons for this might be: firstly, the increased international 
awareness making successful trafficking harder, thereby increasing the transport costs and 
risk premium; secondly, political turmoil affecting the trafficking networks, such as the 
coups in Guinea (Conakry) and Guinea-Bissau; and thirdly, the disappearance of seized co-
caine out of police custody without being returned to the Colombian „owners‟, who might 
                                                 
42 See Appendices 15-17. 
43 See Appendix 18. 
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have terminated their relations with the West Africans. However, it is possible that smaller 
scale trafficking continued undetected and the UNODC suggests that the trafficking might 
have been increasing again in WA from late 2009 on, using different regional routes, for 
example, via Mali and the Saharan desert (UNODC, 2010a: 16). 
 Apart from the above-mentioned two changes in the global cocaine markets, several 
other contributing factors to the choice of WA in general and Guinea-Bissau in particular, 
can be deduced from the description of WA´s insertion into the global cocaine market: first-
ly, the geographical location of WA en route between producers and consumers; secondly, 
geographical characteristics of Guinea-Bissau, with myriad small islands and mangrove 
swamps; thirdly, cultural and linguistic ties between the former colonies in the producing 
and transit countries, and the former colonial powers in the consumer countries; fourthly, the 
existence of regional organised crime networks and large West African diasporas in Europe; 
and fifthly, favourable political, social and economic conditions in the region. The political 
conditions, allowing TOC to use West African states as transit hubs, are the focus of this 
thesis and will be analysed in the following chapter on the case of Guinea-Bissau. Neverthe-
less, it has to be emphasised once more that these cannot be understood without the social, 
economic and historical characteristics of the region and Guinea-Bissau. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to firstly „map‟ the global cocaine market and its historical de-
velopment, bearing in mind the theoretical framework of the IGPE discussed in the previous 
chapter. Secondly, it was aimed at providing a contextualisation, or background, to the case 
study of Guinea-Bissau, as this state´s relationship with the IGPE will be analysed in the 
following chapter, before linking the global cocaine trade and Guinea-Bissau together by 
providing a short overview of the country´s emergence as a transhipment state. 
The description of the global cocaine trade and its development outlined the social, 
political and economic arrangements affecting the global systems of illicit production, ex-
change and distribution, and the mix of values reflected therein, their development over 
time, as well as the effect of changes in power structures on these arrangements. The social 
arrangements can be said to range from the increasing demand for cocaine, first in the late 
19th century and then again in the 1970s, to the availability of cheap and less risk-averse 
labour during the Spanish colonisation in South America and as a result of globalisation 
effects. Similarly, political arrangements were shown to include the interests of cocaine-
producing countries before and during its criminalisation, the motives to campaign for its 
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criminalisation, as well as the international prohibition regimes and local to global law-
enforcement measures. Thirdly, the economic arrangements contain elements such as prices 
and competition, as outlined above. These interacting arrangements were shown to influence 
the production, exchange and distribution of cocaine and reflect the changing values and 
underlying power structures. Additionally, the different roles of the state within the illicit 
global cocaine trade, as discussed in theory previously, were highlighted. Overall, this sec-
tion can therefore be seen as a confirmation of theoretical assumptions and claims made in 
the second chapter, and consequently affirms the usefulness of the concept IGPE as a viable 
alternative approach to TOC. 
The second part of this chapter showed that Guinea-Bissau is a transitional state, 
characterised by extreme poverty and political instability as well as geographically by a rug-
ged, island-rich coastline.  
The third part highlighted the effects of a change in the global cocaine markets on the 
development of WA and Guinea-Bissau into a transhipment hub, in combination with its 
geographic location, cultural linguistic connections and a long history of regional organised 
crime networks and large West African diasporas in Europe. 
The following fourth chapter of this thesis will now use Williams´ (2002) framework 
to answer the primary research question of this thesis. 
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Chapter IV: Case Study - Guinea-Bissau as a Facilitator of the Global Co-
caine Trade – Capacity Gaps, Functional Holes and their Exploitation 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will conduct the analysis of the state of Guinea-Bissau in order to answer the 
primary research question: 
Is the role of the state as a facilitator in the IGPE enabled by the existence of ca-
pacity gaps and functional holes? 
As pointed out in Chapter I and discussed in Chapter II, this analysis will be guided by the 
two supplementary research questions formulated and by using Williams´ (2002) frame-
work44: 
(1) Do capacity gaps and functional holes exist in Guinea-Bissau? 
(2) How are capacity gaps and functional holes in Guinea-Bissau used by cocaine 
traffickers in order to advance their activities? 
Hence, this chapter will follow the order of capacity gaps as outlined by Williams (2002). 
Each section will briefly discuss the underlying assumption of the individual capacity gap, 
before assessing and analysing their existence in Guinea-Bissau. Finally, it will be evaluated 
if and how these are enabling the state´s role as a facilitator for the global cocaine trade. 
 
4.2 Capacity Gaps and Functional Holes of Guinea-Bissau 
 
4.2.1 Social Control 
The first capacity gap on Williams´ list (2002), social control, and the resulting functional 
hole of an inefficient criminal justice system, is judged by Williams (2002) as being of “par-
ticular relevance to the development of organized crime” (Williams, 2002: 171). He defines 
social control in Durkheim´s sense as “regulatory mechanisms to restrain criminal behaviour 
through both formal sanctions and social norms” (Williams, 2002: 172). Consequently, so-
cial control includes the laws outlining what is criminal, mechanisms for controlling the 
compliance to the state´s laws, e.g. a police force, a judiciary determining the guilt and ap-
propriate correctional measures for a perpetrator, and lastly correctional facilities or other 
ways to enforce correctional measures determined by a court. According to Williams (2002) 
gaps in these state capacities are very common in transitional states and provide room for 
organised (and other) crime. While most states (including transitional) have laws criminalis-
ing the possession and sale of drugs, laws that are efficiently designed to deal with the side 
                                                 
44 See 2.3.5: p. 36. 
 64 
 
effects of organised crime, like racketeering, money laundering and corruption, do not al-
ways exist. If the appropriate laws exist, it becomes a matter of effective law-enforcement 
with appropriate training, equipment and manpower, all of which depend on the availability 
of resources, which are often scarce and otherwise used in states-in-transition. If efficient 
law-enforcement capabilities exist, it is up to the judiciary to ensure an efficient, effective, 
equitable and impartial prosecution of suspects. If the judiciary does not ensure these, it is 
possible that criminals walk free, or are able to use corruption to avoid conviction. Lastly, 
even if the judiciary is capable, correctional measures must be implemented, meaning the 
presence of secure prisons with enough and reliable personnel. Functional holes in any of 
these social control capabilities lower the risks for organised criminals to be detected, arrest-
ed, prosecuted and possibly incarcerated. If these holes are severe, criminals can operate 
with near impunity (Williams, 2002: 171-172). With regard to the writing of Bayart et al 
(1999) one aspect of the judicial system should be specifically mentioned, its equitability, 
meaning that the laws, their enforcement, prosecution and punishments, apply equally to all. 
This includes that holders of power cannot use legitimate means of coercion for private 
ends, at least not without punishment.  
 
4.2.1.1 Capacity Gap and Functional Holes 
It was mentioned in the section on limitations and delimitations that much of the literature 
on Guinea-Bissau is only available in Portuguese.45 Hence, the legal situation in the country 
is difficult to assess. According to the US Department of State “[p]enalties for possessing, 
using, or trafficking in illegal drugs in Guinea-Bissau are severe, and convicted offenders 
can expect long jail sentences and heavy fines” (US DoS, 2010). Additionally, there was no 
reference found in the literature available to the author of this thesis that Guinea-Bissau 
lacks the necessary legislation concerning drug trafficking. Moreover, the country is a signa-
tory to the „Single Convention of 1961‟ and the 1988 „UN Convention against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances‟.46 Therefore, it can be assumed that Guin-
ea-Bissau has the appropriate legislation.  
 The law-enforcement capability of the state is not generally hindered by a lack of 
personnel. A total of 4,500 police sets the ratio of 284 law-enforcement officers per 100,000 
citizens (2006), which is only slightly below the European average. Of these, 3,000 are gen-
darmes under the Ministry of Defence for rural areas and 1,500 are policemen under the 
Ministry of Interior. However, the police are badly and irregularly paid, have a history of ill-
                                                 
45 See 1.4.2: p.10. 
46 See 3.3.1: p.51. 
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discipline and are not well trained. Even the low wages put such a strain on the budget that 
the equipment and funding for investigations and operations is reduced to a minimum 
(UNODC, 2007a: 14-15). UNODC executive director Costa gives an account from his visit 
to the country in 2007: 
“The police lack not only computers, but even radios and phones. Even if these were 
available, there is no electricity to power them. At the main police station in Bissau, 
on door frames there are hand written signs - "narcotic squad", "homicide squad" 
etc. Inside I only saw old desks, a broken chair and an old manual typewriter, with-
out a ribbon. Officers have even no paper or pencils to take notes. A burned out car 
sits in the middle of the court-yard, cops forced to reach a crime scene by taxis. In a 
recent, widely publicized chase, a police car ran out of gas” (Costa, 2007). 
 
Additionally, some police missions are severely understaffed, such as the judicial police, 
which are supposed to deal with drug trafficking with sixty officers, one vehicle and often 
no fuel (UNODC, 2007a: 14). This is echoed in a 2005 survey on the most trusted institu-
tions in Guinea-Bissau, which shows that only 1.56% of respondents rank the police as the 
most trusted institution, while 4.7% rank it as the second most trusted institution47 and only 
27.40% would turn to the police in cases of conflict, where traditional authorities are most 
important (Gacitua-Mario et al, 2006: 35, 37). This situation is evidence of a severe func-
tional hole in the law-enforcement part of the criminal justice system and therefore indicates 
a gap in the state´s capability to maintain social order. Moreover, the judiciary also suffers 
from insufficient resources and a lack of trained personnel, hindering efficient, effective and 
fair prosecution and sentencing of suspected criminals. This is reflected in the low levels of 
trust of the population in the judiciary, as only 3.9% rank it as the most trusted institution 
(3.43% as second). The aggregate indicator for rule of law in 2008 shows that Guinea-
Bissau is among the five per cent worst-ranked countries (World Bank, 2009: 6). Even if 
criminals are convicted by a court, there are no prisons.48 The country´s only prison was 
destroyed during the civil war and the existing detention facilities are improvised. Costa 
(2007) describes the capital´s only detention facility as: “a private home with no toilets, an 
open fire in the front-yard as a kitchen, and improvised rusty bars on the windows” (Costa, 
2007). At night, when the police guarding the facilities go home, prisoners are more or less 
free to come and go as they want. Consequently, “judges expediently refrain from passing 
jail sentences on offenders who have been proven guilty, or shy away from handing down 
severe sentences on dangerous offenders who might easily take vengeance upon them” 
                                                 
47 The most trusted institutions where schools and health centers (Gacitua-Mario et al, 2006: 35). 
48 However, two new prison facilities have been (re-) established with the help of the UNODC in July 2010 
(BBC, 2010c/UNODC, 2010f). 
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(UNODC, 2007a: 16). As a consequence, Guinea-Bissau has by far the lowest inmate to 
population ratio in WA of 6:100,000 (average WA 38:100,000; UNODC, 2007a: 15-16). 
 This account of the state of Guinea-Bissau´s capacity to maintain the social order 
reveals a severe capacity gap and subsequent functional holes, most of which can be seen to 
be the result of insufficient funds available to the state and a general low government effi-
ciency.49 The functional holes identified here are: inefficient and ineffective law-
enforcement; inefficient and ineffective judiciary; and an inefficient and ineffective correc-
tional system. Additionally, the low and irregularly paid wages of those employed in the 
security sector and generally high levels of poverty open the door to corruption, which is the 
main tool of TOC. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Transparency International´s Cor-
ruption Perceptions Index (2009) ranks the country at 162 out of 180 countries, lower than 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. The results of the above-mentioned 2005 survey could 
also be interpreted as an indication of corruption, as trust in police and the percentage of 
those who would turn to the police in case of conflict are higher in the more affluent parts of 
the population (Gacitua-Mario, 2006: 35, 37). 
 Before analysing how cocaine traffickers exploit these functional holes, one aspect of 
the state´s capacity gap in social control that contributes strongly to the way in which co-
caine traffickers use Guinea-Bissau has to be briefly discussed - the military.  
Guinea-Bissau has one of the highest armed forces to citizen ratio in Africa. This is a 
legacy of the independence war and the civil war. In 1999 Guinea-Bissau had 17,000 uni-
formed military and police personnel with a military budget amounting to US$ 7.5 million in 
2003. "The army has a bloated officer corps: one officer for about four men. Normally, it's 
one officer for 10-20 men” (BBC, 2010b). The soldiers are, however, badly paid and under-
resourced. “Between 2003 and 2005, the army demobilized 7,782 persons and a military 
census recorded 5,100 personnel in full-time active service in May 2005. Relative to the size 
of its population, the country remains however one of the most militarized in West Africa” 
(UNODC, 2007a: 14). As shown in the previous chapter, the military frequently interferes in 
the politics of the country and has so far removed every president since independence from 
office. Several attempts to demobilise and reform the security sector were met with military 
coups throughout history. A security sector reform was started in 2007 with the support of 
the EU, which was, however, discontinued after the coup attempt in April 2010 (BBC, 
2010b). Overall, the military continues to be an important political actor and uses its power 
derived from the security structure, to speak in Susan Strange´s terms, to change the politi-
                                                 
49 World Bank governance indicators rank the governance efficiency of Guinea-Bissau in the lowest 10% of 
countries (World Bank, 2009: 4). 
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cal, social and economic arrangements in order to further its members´, particularly its lead-
ers´, aims. This interference can be explained by a variety of factors: grievances about low 
pay; lack of acknowledgement of its contribution to the rise of political leaders; reflection of 
ethnic and rural grievances (especially Balanta); and personal conflicts between military and 
political leaders. Military leaders have repeatedly used the loyalty of their soldiers to settle 
power struggles with the political leadership. The best examples of this are former President 
Vieira, who himself was a liberation war veteran, and former High Chief of the Armed 
Forces Mané. While after most successful military coups political power was quickly re-
turned to the constitutional institutions (Vieira and his 29 year rule after a coup being the 
exception), governments have been at the mercy of the military, which “sees itself as the 
guarantor of safety, and does not believe politicians have the ability to control the country” 
(BBC, 2010b). In doing so, the military seems to be operating with impunity, exemplified by 
the fact that one of the orchestrators of this year´s army mutiny, former Vice Chief, now 
Chief of Staff General Antonio Indja, is still in his new position and his predecessor still 
detained.50 
Criticising the military is dangerous and several journalists, judges, police and politi-
cians who have done so have been threatened, harassed, detained, tortured and killed. For 
example, in March 2009, former Prime Minister Jose Fadul was beaten and tortured for al-
legedly criticising the military (Freedom House, 2010). There are many more examples of 
the military´s transgression into politics and the apparent impunity to these actions. Howev-
er, as these are related to the cocaine trade they will be used in the following section to illus-
trate the cocaine traffickers´ use of Guinea-Bissau and its capacity gaps. Suffice it to say for 
now that the military´s interference in politics and the impunity of its actions add strongly to 
the state´s capacity gap in social control and impede the rule of law further. It represents an 
entity over which other state institutions have little to no control. In the terms of Bayart et al 
(1999) the military could be argued to constitute a hidden power structure, which, although 
not wanting to rule directly, uses the legitimate means of coercion at its disposal for private 
or personal means.  
 
4.2.1.2 Use of Capacity Gap and Functional Holes by Cocaine Traffickers 
According to Williams (2002), the implication of a gap in the state´s capacity to exercise 
social control for TOC is that criminals can operate with impunity. They can achieve this by 
exploiting the capacity gap in two ways: by using the room left by the gap to manoeuvre 
more freely; and by filling the gap the state has left.  
                                                 
50 See 3.3.2: p. 54; Appendix 12: Timeline of Guinea-Bissau. 
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 From the above description of the state of the law-enforcement it is safe to assume 
that the under-resourced, under-equipped and under-trained police of Guinea-Bissau leave 
ample room for drug traffickers to do their business undetected. This is amplified by the 
geographic characteristics of the country, as only a fraction of the over eighty small islands 
are occupied and swamps and rivers make the coastal areas nearly inaccessible by car. 
“There are also hundreds of landing strips for light aircraft, built by the Portuguese during 
the 13-year war for independence from 1961” (Telegraph, 2007). The first implication for 
the cocaine traffickers of the capacity gap is this low detection ability of the Guinean police, 
which is illustrated by the fact that most seizures in Guinea-Bissau or in connection to Guin-
ea-Bissau, were either made by international law-enforcement off the coast or resulted from 
tips from international law-enforcement (UNODC, 2007a: 7). One of the biggest seizures 
made by the police is evidence of the implications of the lack of equipment and resources of 
the police for the cocaine traffickers. In 2007, a convoy of vehicles carrying nearly three 
tons of cocaine was intercepted by police. But only 635 kg could be seized, as the police 
cars ran out of petrol while chasing the traffickers (Telegraph, 2007). Not only is the traf-
fickers´ risk of detection extremely low; even if detected they can easily avoid arrest due to 
the lack of equipment of the police. These risks for the traffickers are further mitigated by 
the use of corruption and the role of the military.  
 “The entire GDP of a small country like Guinea-Bissau was only US$ 304 million in 
2006, or the equivalent of six tons of cocaine at wholesale level in Europe” (UNODC, 
2007a: 10). In combination with the amount of cocaine estimated to be transiting through 
WA and in relation to the high poverty levels and low pay for the police, army and judiciary, 
this indicates how easy it is for well-funded Colombian cartels to buy impunity and coopera-
tion. Traffickers can offer officials more than they would earn in their whole life, giving 
them extreme leverage over the state. (Costa, 2007) “The cartels have purchased such impu-
nity that gangs of pony-tailed Colombians wander openly on the streets of the capital, Bis-
sau, drive luxury cars and carouse in restaurants” (Telegraph, 2007). The Telegraph also 
quotes a foreign diplomat, who said about the Colombians: "Often they don't even bother 
going armed when they are transporting drugs here - that is how confident they feel" (quoted 
in Telegraph, 2007). Two Colombians, at least one of whom is allegedly an official of the 
Colombian guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), were 
arrested in April 2007 while smuggling 674 kg of cocaine. However, they were both re-
leased on bail without legal reason and have since disappeared. The former head of the judi-
cial police, da Silva, claims that he was first reprimanded and then fired by the Interior Min-
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ister for his investigations into the case (Ellis, 2009: 192). When the cocaine seized in the 
previously mentioned drug bust was to be officially burned, several policemen allegedly 
tried to walk off with blocks of cocaine under their jackets (Telegraph, 2007). These exam-
ples show several implications of the functional holes identified above: firstly, the low pay-
ment of police and judiciary gives the wealthy traffickers huge leverage over them and al-
lows them to buy impunity; secondly, corruption seems to extend to the highest levels of 
government; and thirdly, a lack of separation of power allows members of the executive to 
exert influence over judicial matters.  Moreover, the derelict correctional system would al-
low even low-level local traffickers to simply walk out of „prison‟, not to mention higher-
level foreigners. This means that there is hardly any judicial risk for TOC in Guinea-Bissau. 
 Apart from the implications of the functional holes described so far, the biggest hole 
to manoeuvre is provided by the military. The involvement of the military, from regular sol-
diers to generals, in the cocaine trade seems to be extensive. Much, if not most, of the co-
caine entering Guinea-Bissau via private planes, enters through small military airstrips, 
where it is guarded by soldiers, who can also act as local couriers. The 635 kg cocaine 
seized in 2007 mentioned above, was seized from two military officers. After their arrest 
they came under military jurisdiction, but according to the UNODC (2007a: 15) there is no 
information regarding their prosecution. The 674 kg of cocaine seized in another bust myste-
riously disappeared after it had been transferred from the judicial police to a vault in the 
Ministry of Finance, where several men in army uniforms opened the vault to „count‟ the 
cocaine. This is not the only instance where cocaine seizures have „disappeared‟ or were re-
seized from the police by the military (UNODC, 2010a: 18). Threats against journalists, 
investigators, prosecutors, judges and government officials, including the attorney general 
and the justice minister, who report, investigate or allege military involvement in the cocaine 
trade, further testify to the existence of a connection and the involvement of high-ranking 
officers (UNODC, 2010a: 18). Behind most of these threats were allegedly the former navy 
chief Na Tchuto and armed forces Chief General Batista Tagme Na Wai, who were also 
repeatedly alleged to be linked to cocaine traffickers (Vincent, 2007). After his failed coup 
attempt in 2007, possibly in an effort to defend his position and access to funds through the 
cocaine trade, Na Tchuto fled the country to the Gambia, but returned in late 2009 to seek 
refuge at the UN Peace-Building Support Office. He then allegedly emerged from the UN 
building to join the 2010 army mutiny, which he orchestrated. Na Wai´s death in a bombing 
in 2009 led to the murder of President Vieira. While there is no clear evidence that these 
coup plots were related to the cocaine trade, “given evidence of corruption and the relative 
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sizes of the contraband and the economy, virtually every political conflict has criminal un-
dertones” (UNODC, 2010a: 18). In April 2010, the US Treasury Department announced that 
it had designated Na Tchuto and Ibraima Papa Camara, current Air Force Chief of Staff, “as 
drug kingpins due to their significant roles in international narcotics trafficking” (US Treas-
ury, 2010). As a consequence, all their US assets were frozen, it became illegal for US citi-
zens to do business with them and they were banned from travelling to the US (US Treasury, 
2010). 
 The military, its characteristics and the role it plays in post-independence Guinea-
Bissau has clearly provided South American traffickers with powerful local allies, who can 
operate outside the legal barriers of the country and can offer the traffickers access, logistics, 
intelligence, protection and impunity. Furthermore, this account of the military´s involve-
ment in the cocaine trade can be seen as a confirmation of the existence of a hidden power 
structure as per Bayart et al´s (1999) definition.51 
The importance of this capacity gap is also acknowledged by the international com-
munity, through its support in the building of prisons, provision of training for police, and 
financial and organisational support for a security sector reform (BBC, 2010b,c,d; UNODC, 
2010b,c). Overall, the capacity gap and functional holes identified in this section already 
provide more than ample room for cocaine traffickers in which manoeuvre and to fill, large-
ly by providing financial incentives the state cannot match.  
 
4.2.2 Social Welfare 
The second capacity gap identified by Williams (2002) concerns social welfare. A gap in 
this capacity results in a lack of provision for the citizens. “While other dimensions of 
weakness offer opportunities for criminal behavior, this type of weakness creates pressures 
and incentives for citizens to engage in criminal activities” (Williams, 2002: 173). Particu-
larly in a context where economic hardship affect large parts of a society “illicit means of 
advancement offer opportunities that are simply not available in the licit economy” (Wil-
liams, 2002: 173) and open a fresh low risk-averse labour pool for recruitment by TOC.52 
On the other hand, this functional hole can also be exploited by TOC using paternalism to 
earn the support and gratitude of the population by filling the hole left by the state (Wil-
liams, 2002: 173). 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 See 2.3.5.1 p. 38. 
52 See 3.2.4 p. 49. 
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4.2.2.1 Capacity Gap and Functional Holes 
As the third chapter has provided an extensive description of the socio-economic situation in 
Guinea-Bissau, only the key facts will be recounted here.53The vast majority of the popula-
tion lives in poverty and most families have to rely on several incomes and subsistence agri-
culture in order to meet their basic needs. Only a minority is employed in the formal econo-
my, mainly in the public sector, which consumes most of the state´s financial resources. Es-
pecially the rural population has often been neglected by the government. Mazzitelli, (2007) 
describes Guinea-Bissau as being in a “socio-economic situation of structural emergency. 
[...] The state is virtually incapable of providing any services to its citizens, including securi-
ty and justice” (Mazzitelli, 2007: 1087).  
In the absence of strong state institutions, the population has strengthened their local 
networks and has learned how to count on their own forces to search for solutions to 
their problems. Local institutions (from neighborhood associations to the local 
schools and the traditional authorities) therefore perform many functions (mutual 
help, leisure, collective security, conﬂict resolution, and so on), some of which could 
be handled by the state” (Gacitua-Mario et al, 2006: 25). 
 
Additionally, as pointed out in the third chapter, frustrations over neglect by the government 
have contributed to several of the military coups, or at least to the support given to the leader 
of a coup. Hence, the existence of a capacity gap in social welfare and the resultant func-
tional hole of a lack of provision for the citizens in Guinea-Bissau can be asserted.  
 
4.2.2.2 Use of Capacity Gap and Functional Holes by Cocaine Traffickers 
One aspect of how this capacity gap has been used by cocaine traffickers has already been 
discussed in the section on social control. The low and irregular pay of soldiers, police, the 
judiciary and the public sector in general has provided incentives for them to earn extra 
money by selling cocaine or helping the traffickers. Prime Minister Gomes makes this point 
as well: 
"How do they [international community] expect policemen who are not getting paid 
to hand in bags of drugs and receive nothing in return? How do they expect civilians 
to come forward with information when we can offer them no incentives and when 
people at all levels of society are profiting by facilitating the drug trade?" (quoted in 
Worldpress, 2007) 
 
While not much was found in the literature on the level of the direct involvement of „regu-
lar‟, meaning non-military, non-public sector, Guineans in the cocaine trade, it could be 
speculated that the high return on the risk of cocaine trafficking or selling of cocaine pro-
vides incentives to move from the informal to the illicit, or to at least turn a blind eye to il-
                                                 
53 See 3.3.3 p. 55-57. 
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licit activity.54 When local fishermen found packets of cocaine floating in the water and sub-
sequently sold them back to the traffickers, they made the catch of a lifetime.55 A local de-
scribes what they bought with their earnings: "Some bought new four-wheel drives, others 
bought fleets of taxis and moved into town to start businesses. I wish I'd found some too - I 
wouldn't be stuck here anymore" (quoted in Telegraph, 2007). Particularly for unemployed 
youth this constitutes a temptation, one indication for which is the rising number of local 
addicts to cheap crack cocaine (Telegraph, 2007). A more direct indicator of the use of this 
functional hole is the number of Guineans arrested for cocaine trafficking on commercial 
flights to Europe. While the number of Guinean couriers arrested is much smaller than in 
neighbouring countries, this is probably due to the country´s irregular flight connection to 
Europe. However, it shows that there are many Guineans who are desperate enough to take 
the high-risk assignment of couriering cocaine on commercial flights.56  
 There is so far no evidence that the drug traffickers use forms of paternalism to gain 
support, which could be because they simply do not need to. Additionally, they might be 
unable to do so, as local social networks have for a long time acted as a substitute for the 
state and proven resilient against almost every attempt to break, substitute or use them, from 
African and European slave traders, to colonialists and national-level politicians.  
 Therefore, the existence of a capacity gap and resultant functional holes in social 
welfare can be asserted. However, while they are certainly being exploited by the drug traf-
fickers, there would be even more potential for exploitation, if necessary for business. 
 
4.2.3 Business Regulation 
A capacity gap in business regulation refers to “the failure of some states to provide ade-
quate and appropriate regulatory frameworks for business” (Williams, 2002: 172), which 
includes protection of property rights, contract enforcement and arbitration of disputes. TOC 
can use these functional holes for several purposes: it enables entry into the licit business 
world for money-laundering and legitimate fronts, for example, for shipping; and it can pro-
vide criminals with extra revenue, through protection rackets and substituting other state 
functions (Williams, 2002: 172). 
 
4.2.3.1 Capacity Gap and Functional Holes 
Before looking at specific functional holes, it has to be emphasised once more that the ma-
jority of Guinea-Bissau´s economy is informal, which by definition exempts it from any 
                                                 
54 See 1.4.2: p. 10. 
55 See 3.4: p. 59. 
56 See Appendices 15-17 for nationalities arrested for cocaine trafficking in Europe. 
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state regulation of business. The existence of such a large informal sector, and therefore a 
legal grey area, could be argued to constitute a capacity gap in business regulation. Even the 
formal economy is not well and efficiently regulated. The World Bank ranks Guinea-
Bissau´s regulatory quality in the ten worst per cent of countries (World Bank, 2009: 5) and 
in the overall 2010 Doing Business Index the country is ranked third last and in most catego-
ries below the regional average. In the category „protection of investors‟ it is ranked 132 out 
of 183 and in „contract enforcement‟ it is ranked 143. It would take approximately 1140 
days from filing for enforcement to trial, judgement and final enforcement of the judgement 
(Doing Business, 2010: 30, 41, 77). The reason for this is probably the lack of resources 
available to the state, hindering more effective and efficient business regulation. Therefore, 
there is a capacity gap in the regulation of business in Guinea-Bissau.  
 
4.2.3.2 Use of Capacity Gap and Functional Holes by Cocaine Traffickers 
In the literature and further research on this topic no evidence of the use of this capacity gap 
and functional holes by cocaine traffickers has been found. This could be due to several rea-
sons. Firstly, Guinea-Bissau is so far just a transhipment state and although several South 
Americans have settled in the country, their interest in being there is focused on keeping an 
eye on their shipments. Secondly, there is no need for TOC to establish links to the licit 
economy in the country for purposes of having a legitimate front business or money launder-
ing. The former is not needed as they can operate with impunity anyway and the latter is not 
necessary as their profit is not made in Guinea-Bissau directly. In addition, money launder-
ing in WA is more centred in Nigeria and Ghana (Ellis, 2009: 173). Thirdly, the general low 
value of business in Guinea-Bissau does not make it profitable enough for TOC to engage in 
protection rackets, or substitute the state as arbitrator, protector or debt collector.  
 However, as shown in the previous section, the potential functional holes are big and 
while they are not being directly exploited at the moment, this could change in the future.  
 
4.2.4 Oversight and Accountability 
The fourth capacity gap identified by Williams (2002) refers to the state´s capacity to estab-
lish oversight and accountability. Functional holes that can result from it are lack of control 
and accountability. These can be an opportunity for the extensive use of corruption and al-
low organised crime to hijack privatisation processes (Williams, 2002: 171). 
 
4.2.4.1 Capacity Gap and Functional Holes 
The capacity of the state to provide oversight and accountability is limited due to several 
factors. Firstly and foremost, a lack of resources available to the state which has led to low 
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and irregular pay of public servants, including senior officials. In combination with high 
levels of poverty, this provides strong incentives for officials to seek additional forms of 
income. Secondly, as a result of the first factor and general government inefficiency, the 
level of corruption extending to the highest state positions is pervasive and the interest to 
ensure accountability is consequently low. Thirdly, as discussed earlier,57 the military oper-
ates in a more or less extra-judicial realm and can hardly ever be held accountable for its 
members´ actions as demonstrated previously. The World Bank governance indicator on 
voice and accountability rank the country in the lower 25% of countries surveyed and for 
control of corruption it is in the lowest 10%. While the press is judged to be one of the freest 
in the region and could help to hold officials accountable, its freedom often ends when the 
military is concerned. This is illustrated by threats and harassment of journalists and mem-
bers of other civil society organisations (Freedom House, 2010). Hence, the capacity gap 
and functional holes identified by Williams (2002) exist in Guinea-Bissau. 
 
4.2.4.2 Use of Capacity Gap and Functional Holes by Cocaine Traffickers 
Cocaine traffickers certainly exploit this capacity gap, especially by using corruption to buy 
access, logistics, intelligence, protection and impunity from military officials in particular, 
but also from judges and police, as shown by the aforementioned release of the two Colom-
bian traffickers. Additionally, TOC also benefits indirectly from these functional holes as its 
main partner, the military, can hardly be held accountable. TOC seems, however, not to be 
exploiting these functional holes to hijack privatisation processes, probably for the reasons 
discussed under 4.3.3.  
Consequently, the capacity gap in oversight and accountability in Guinea-Bissau is 
being successfully exploited by the cocaine traffickers in order to reduce the risk of detec-
tion, arrest, prosecution and punishment. 
 
4.2.5 Border Control 
This capacity gap is strongly linked to the first capacity gap discussed and several aspects 
discussed there overlap. Border control is a core aspect of state sovereignty, determining 
what and who comes in and goes out. An existing gap leads to a weak interdiction capabil-
ity, which attracts traffickers and can be easily exploited by them for the import and export, 
or both, of illicit products.  
 
 
 
                                                 
57 See 4.2.1.1: p. 66-67. 
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4.2.5.1 Capacity Gap and Functional Holes 
Regarding this capacity gap it helps to quote Mazzitelli (2007: 1087): “Border and territorial 
control are non-existent, because of a total lack of any kind of equipment and trained per-
sonnel”. The coast guard, for example, had one rusty ship in 2007 to patrol the rugged coast-
line and numerous islands and the airspace is also uncontrolled (Costa, 2007). The geo-
graphical characteristics of Guinea-Bissau represent an additional challenge, as noted by 
Prime Minister Gomes: “The drugs don't come from Guinea-Bissau and we don't consume 
them yet they are telling us we have to patrol our uninhabited islands when we can't even 
patrol the areas where our people live" (quoted in Worldpress, 2007). Therefore, the exist-
ence of this capacity gap in Guinea-Bissau can be confirmed and, to say the least, is wide 
open, just like the borders. 
  
4.2.5.2 Use of Capacity Gap and Functional Holes by Cocaine Traffickers 
The cocaine traffickers have readily embraced these functional holes and it stands to reason 
that the non-existent border controls were one of the reasons why they first came to Guinea-
Bissau, before becoming aware of the other capacity gaps. As described previously58, the 
cocaine entering the country is mostly transported by bigger „mother-ships‟ and then redis-
tributed to smaller faster boats off the coast, which can easily outrun the coast-guard. Private 
planes are the second way that cocaine enters the country and those normally land on one of 
the hundreds of small airstrips built by the Portuguese during the liberation war or on mili-
tary-controlled airports (Telegraph, 2007). Once more, the military´s involvement in the 
cocaine trade mitigates the remaining low risk of detection and hinders any border control 
efforts. The fact that most seizures linked to, or made in Guinea-Bissau were either made by 
international law-enforcement agencies off the coast or on land in Guinea-Bissau, indicates 
how easily cocaine enters and exits the country. 
 
4.2.6 Legitimacy 
According to Williams (2002) a lack of legitimacy of the state results in functional holes in 
authority and affiliation of the state and the government. These can be exploited by TOC by 
building on patron-client links and other relationships which are more important than loyalty 
to the state, e.g. by substituting the state´s functions such as the provision of security and 
arbitration (Williams, 2002: 171).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58 See 3.2.4: p. 49.  
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4.2.6.1 Capacity Gap and Functional Holes 
In a purely electoral sense the executive and legislative are legitimately and constitutionally 
elected representatives of the population. The 2009 presidential elections for example had 
60% voter participation and the parliamentary elections in the previous year 82% (EU EOM, 
2009: 39). Furthermore, there is no challenge to the territorial integrity of the state, external-
ly or internally, and the military does not strive to permanently replace the government, just 
to occasionally replace the leadership with another elected government. Nevertheless, over 
the course of the post-independence history the majority of the population has been denied 
access to higher levels of state power on account of education, literacy and social origin. The 
political elite has often isolated itself from the majority and as a result government policies 
have often neglected the rural population (Galli, 1989: 374-375). This disassociation is re-
flected in the low trust the population has in the central government. Only 1.04% of re-
spondents to a survey answered that the central government is their most trusted institution 
(Gacitua-Mario et al, 2006: 35). It is further reflected in the importance of previously dis-
cussed alternative social networks, traditional authorities and locally based social structures. 
Subsequent governments have acknowledged the importance of local structures and have 
left some responsibilities and authority held by local institutions, particularly judicial and 
dispute arbitration, untouched. (Temudo, 2008: 258).59 Obviously, the much-discussed role 
of the military represents a functional hole, as the state´s and government´s legitimacy and 
authority do not extend far into its realm. Overall, it can be argued that a capacity gap con-
cerning legitimacy exists in Guinea-Bissau. However, in resulting functional holes the state 
is already being substituted to some extent by other institutions, especially in the rural parts 
of the country.  
 
4.2.6.2 Use of Capacity Gap and Functional Holes by Cocaine Traffickers 
One clear indication of the cocaine traffickers´ use of this capacity gap is their partnership 
with the military, which does not seem to accept the state´s authority over it and is not loyal 
to its elected representatives. In an indirect way the traffickers can be argued to be building 
on the primary loyalty of ordinary soldiers to their superior officers, who in turn are in-
volved in the drug trade. Other than this, no further evidence could be found in the literature 
that cocaine traffickers directly exploit this capacity gap and as argued in Chapter III60, sev-
eral different governments have failed in attempts to exploit local patron-client relationships 
permanently.  
 
                                                 
59 See also 3.3.3 p. 55-57. 
60 See 3.3.3: p. 55-57. 
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4.2.7 Electoral Norms and Patterns 
A capacity gap concerning electoral norms and patterns refers to regulations and legislation 
governing elections, as well as the procedures surrounding the actual holding of elections. A 
gap in this state capacity can result in specific functional holes: un-regulated campaign fi-
nancing, flawed voter registration, flawed voting procedures, flawed vote-counting and gen-
erally elections that are not free, fair, equal and representative. The existence of such func-
tional holes could allow TOC to exert influence on political parties, individual candidates 
and election results, in order to obtain favourable legislation or block unfavourable legisla-
tion, ensure tacit support of politicians through funding, receive favours in return for votes 
and to create obligations for new government members (Williams, 2002: 171, 175). 
 
4.2.7.1 Capacity Gap and Functional Holes 
As mentioned before, all parliamentary and presidential elections in Guinea-Bissau since 
1994 have been declared free and fair by international observers, despite the fact that three 
of the four presidential elections had to be held because the president had been removed by a 
military coup. The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM), which moni-
tored the 2009 presidential elections, assessed the legal framework and came to the conclu-
sion that it “provided for a democratic and inclusive democratic process and respected the 
fundamental rights for conducting an election in line with international principles” (EU 
EOM, 2009: 3). Both rounds of the election, organised by the National Election Commission 
(CNE) transparently and efficiently, were peaceful, orderly, free and fair. Some minor inci-
dents of attempts at double voting, polling stations closing early and ballot boxes being 
sealed improperly were the exception. In the campaign phase, freedom of expression was 
generally respected and political rallies were peaceful. But the campaigning was described 
as rather timid, probably due to the previous incidents of violence and assassination of Pres-
ident Vieira, which also explains the lower voter participation compared to the parliamen-
tary elections in 2008. The campaigning for the second round of elections was still peaceful, 
but more aggressive, as opposition politicians accused the ruling party´s candidate of using 
state resources during his campaign and not all candidates were able to campaign in all parts 
of the country due to a lack of financing (EU EOM, 2009: 3-4). 
 Overall, it can be concluded that no major capacity gap exists concerning electoral 
norms and processes in Guinea-Bissau that could immediately be exploited by cocaine traf-
fickers. Nevertheless, it has to be emphasised that so far there has not been a need for the 
traffickers to exploit electoral processes and influence results in their favour, as government 
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policies do not directly hinder their operations and the practical implementation of policies 
that would affect them is mitigated by their use of other capacity gaps.  
 
4.3 Analysis 
 
Considering this examination of the state of Guinea-Bissau, the first supplementary research 
question of this thesis can now be answered. Six out of the seven capacity gaps identified by 
Williams (2002) exist in the case study and Table 4 (p. 80) provides a concise overview of 
the results of this analysis. 
 With regard to the first aspect of social control, legislation, only vague information 
was found. It indicates, however, that appropriate legislation does exist in Guinea-Bissau. 
Regarding the second aspect, it was found that while the police force does not lack man-
power, it is severely under-resourced, under-equipped, under-trained, and is badly and irreg-
ularly paid, resulting in inefficient and ineffective law-enforcement. Concerning the third 
aspect, this examination showed that the judiciary, due to a lack of resources, training, 
equipment and pay, cannot ensure efficient, effective, equitable and impartial prosecution of 
suspects. Even if these first three functional holes did not exist, the correctional system of 
Guinea-Bissau was found to be derelict, as there are no prisons and other correctional facili-
ties cannot hold suspects or convicts. The role of the military was described as an aggravat-
ing factor, as it constantly involves itself in politics, can hardly be held accountable for its 
extra-constitutional and illegal activities and has repeatedly prevented political involvement 
in its affairs. It was argued that the military can be described as a hidden power structure, 
which represents an indicator for a particularly large capacity gap. Additionally, the low and 
irregular pay of police, army and judiciary personnel was considered as an open door for 
corruption, further widening the capacity gap in social control. Consequently, in answering 
the second supplementary research question it was shown that cocaine traffickers exploit 
these functional holes to advance their activities. Firstly, they take advantage of the very low 
risk of detection. Secondly, it was found that even if they are detected, they face hardly any 
risk of arrest, prosecution or punishment. Particularly, the involvement of the military, up to 
the highest officers, in the cocaine trade, provides them with protection and impunity and, in 
combination with the easy use of corruption, mitigates any risk left. Consequently, the ca-
pacity gap in social control can be described as the most important and valuable to cocaine 
traffickers, and its existence in Guinea-Bissau enables the role of the state as a facilitator in 
the IGPE. 
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 The second capacity gap, social welfare, defined as the provision for citizens, was 
also found to exist in the case of Guinea-Bissau. Amid rampant poverty, high levels of un-
employment, and low wages, the state is incapable of providing any services to its citizens, 
who consequently rely on alternative sources of support. Cocaine traffickers use this capaci-
ty gap by substituting for the state by offering alternative sources of relatively high income 
through corruption, recruitment as couriers and dealers, for logistics, protection and the like. 
Hence, the gap in the state´s capacity of social welfare further enables the role of the state as 
a facilitator in the IGPE. 
 Business regulation, referred to as meaning “adequate and appropriate regulatory 
frameworks for business” (Williams, 2002: 172), was found to be another capacity gap of 
the state of Guinea-Bissau. This is mainly due to the large informal economy of the country. 
In addition, the ability of the state to regulate and enforce regulations in the formal economy 
was found to be very low. Despite the existence of a capacity gap, TOC does so far not seem 
to be exploiting it, possibly because there is no necessity for establishing links with the local 
economy to advance their activities. It was, however, pointed out that this could change in 
the future. Therefore, the existence of this capacity gap does, so far, not enable the role of 
the state as facilitator of the IGPE in the case of Guinea-Bissau. 
 The gap in the capacity of the state to establish oversight and accountability was 
found to be existent in the case study as well. A general low level of government efficiency, 
a lack of resources and particularly the role of the military as a hidden power structure, have 
led to this assessment. Cocaine traffickers exploit this capacity gap directly through their use 
of corruption, and indirectly, as their main partner, the military is not held accountable for 
its actions. Consequently, the role of Guinea-Bissau facilitator in the IGPE is enabled by the 
existence of this capacity gap. 
 Border control was found to be non-existent and therefore one of the „widest‟ capaci-
ty gaps in Guinea-Bissau. This is due to the reasons described under the related first gap and 
specifically the role of the military and the geographic characteristics of the country. The use 
of this gap is illustrated by the use of Guinea-Bissau as a transhipment state, where cocaine 
is easily brought in and taken out again, often with the support and protection of the mili-
tary. Hence, this gap certainly enables, if not even started, the role of the state as facilitator 
of the IGPE in the case of Guinea-Bissau. 
 The sixth capacity gap, legitimacy, was found to exist in Guinea-Bissau as well, lead-
ing to functional holes in authority of and affiliation to the state. This is illustrated by a dis-
association of the political elite from the majority of the population, a lack of trust of the 
 80 
 
population in the state, as well as the fact that the government seems to have no authority 
over the military. TOC exploits this capacity gap primarily through their partnership with 
the military. Therefore, this gap enables the role of the state as a facilitator in the IGPE. 
 The seventh and last gap examined, electoral norms and patterns, was the only one 
not existent in Guinea-Bissau, as all parliamentary and presidential elections since 1994 
have been declared free and fair. It was, however, pointed out that cocaine traffickers could 
use other capacity gaps to change this, if the necessity arose for them to influence elections.  
 Throughout this analysis it has become clear that one characteristic of Guinea-Bissau 
plays a particularly crucial role in its utilisation by cocaine traffickers: the military. It pro-
vides the traffickers with access, logistics, intelligence and protection. It clearly represents 
what Bayart et al (1999) call a hidden power structure61 and furthermore shows that the state 
or at least the military as part of it, not only facilitates TOC, but can be a benefactor and 
accomplice. The lack of sufficient resources emerged as the primary reason for the existence 
of most of the capacity gaps in Guinea-Bissau, strongly correlated to the rampant poverty 
and low development in the country. The use of corruption as a primary tool was also made 
easier by these factors. The results of this analysis of the case study allow answering the 
primary research question with a yes, the role of the state as a facilitator in the IGPE is ena-
bled by the existence of capacity gaps and functional holes.  
 
Table 4: Capacity Gaps, functional holes and their use by cocaine traffickers in Guinea-Bissau 
(own depiction based on Williams, 2002: 171) 
Capacity gaps  Existent 
in GB 
Functional holes Use by cocaine traffickers 
Social control 
 
- ineffective/inefficient 
law enforcement 
- ineffective/inefficient 
judiciary 
- ineffective/inefficient 
correctional system 
- military as hidden power 
structure outside state 
control 
- very low risk of detection 
- operate with impunity 
- protection and support through 
partnership with military 
 
Social welfare 
 
- widespread poverty, 
unemployment, low and 
irregular pay 
- state incapable of 
providing any service to 
citizens 
- offer alternative source of in-
come 
- incentives for corruption and 
involvement in highly profitable 
cocaine trade 
- recruitment of couriers 
Business regulation 
 
- large informal sector 
without any official 
regulation 
- highly inefficient regula-
tion in formal sector 
- no evidence of use by traffickers 
- potential for exploitation existent  
                                                 
61 See 2.3.5.1: p. 38. 
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Oversight and ac-
countability  
- highly limited accounta-
bility and transparency 
- high levels of corruption 
- military not accountable 
- extensive use of corruption 
- impunity for military collabora-
tors 
 
Border control 
 
- border control non-
existent 
- military controls numer-
ous small airstrips 
- use state for transhipment    of 
cocaine 
- very low risk of detection 
- use of military airstrips 
Legitimacy 
 
- isolation of political 
elite from rural majority 
- traditional leaders with 
authority in judicial 
matters 
- locally based social 
networks and allegianc-
es often more important 
and trusted than the 
government 
- role of the military 
- use of military for access, logis-
tics, intelligence, protection and 
impunity 
- use of corruption pervasive 
Electoral norms and 
patterns 
X 
 
- elections free, fair and 
internationally moni-
tored 
- no need to influence elections 
considering the use of other ca-
pacity gaps 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter set out to answer the primary research question of this thesis with the help of 
two supplementary research questions using the analytical framework by Williams (2002). 
The analysis found that six out of seven capacity gaps identified by Williams (2002) exist in 
Guinea-Bissau. The most important capacity gap for the cocaine traffickers is social control. 
The „wideness‟ of this gap also explains why the traffickers do not need to use other gaps 
more, despite their potential for exploitation. Moreover, its relevance in the case of Guinea-
Bissau highlights the claim made in the second chapter that TOC operates in the void be-
tween a state´s metapolitical authority to criminalise products and activities and its ability to 
enforce its laws.62 Considering the general definition of the study of GPE as the relationship 
between market and authority, this analysis has furthermore shown how the failure of the 
Guinean state to act as a regulator is exploited by illicit market forces. Additionally, the rel-
evance and usefulness of the political-economy approach taken in this research is further 
affirmed. The social, political and economic arrangements of Guinea-Bissau, described in 
this chapter and the previous chapter, clearly affect the illicit distribution and exchange (not 
so much production in Guinea-Bissau) of cocaine, inasmuch as their specific configuration 
explains and opens the capacity gaps used by the cocaine traffickers. Overall, this successful 
analysis of the case study shows the usefulness of Williams´ (2002) framework for assessing 
                                                 
62 See 2.3.1: p.27. 
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the role of a state as a facilitator in the IGPE and thereby contributes to bringing the illicit 
into the field of GPE. 
 The final chapter of this thesis will now summarise the motivation, aims, purpose, 
the theoretical framework and approach taken, and the findings of this research. It will fur-
thermore attempt to assess possible implications for Guinea-Bissau and provide indications 
for the study of the illicit in the GPE and suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This final chapter aims to summarise and bring together the different aspects and findings of 
this thesis. The first part will therefore trace the progression of this research study, by briefly 
recapitulating the motivation, aims, purpose, research question and design of this study, as 
well as the theoretical framework and approach used. The second part of this chapter will 
evaluate this research study in general and the findings of the analysis of the case study. The 
third part of this final chapter will then discuss possible implications for Guinea-Bissau, the 
study of the illicit in the field of GPE and indicate possible areas for future research on the 
topic. 
 
5.2 Progression of the Research Study 
 
At the beginning of this thesis stood the appeal of the executive director of the UNODC 
made in 2007 to the international community to help Guinea-Bissau, which was being over-
run by South American cocaine traffickers who used it, and possibly still do, as a transit hub 
for cocaine destined for the European markets. It was feared that Guinea-Bissau could de-
velop into the first African narco-state, similar to Mexico or Colombia. This thesis aimed to 
locate and explain the situation in Guinea-Bissau within the field of GPE, which is based on 
the claim that politics and economics cannot be understood in separation of each other and 
can briefly be defined as studying the relationship between markets and authority. While the 
literature review showed that several authors within the field of GPE have written on TOC 
in the context of the GPE, it was found to be necessary to develop a more precise and de-
tailed conceptualisation of the illicit in the GPE. The relevance of this study was argued to 
lie in the dramatic appeals by the UNODC for Guinea-Bissau, highlighting the need to ana-
lyse the country´s role in the global cocaine trade more closely, as well as the reasons for 
this development. Secondly, it was pointed out that the illicit represents an under-studied 
issue in the field of GPE, which would benefit from a closer examination of the relationship 
between illicit markets and states. Hence, the underlying rationale of this study was to exam-
ine the relationship between the IGPE and the state, which would not only contribute to the 
field of GPE in general, but would provide a frame of reference for anticipating and possibly 
preventing similar developments and trends. Consequently, one aspect of the complex and 
multi-faceted IGPE-State relationship was chosen for the purpose of this study, the role of 
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the state as a facilitator in the IGPE and the primary research question was formulated as 
follows: 
Is the role of the state as a facilitator in the IGPE enabled by the existence of ca-
pacity gaps and functional holes? 
In a two-fold approach the first part was to analyse the political economy of the global co-
caine trade and of the state of Guinea-Bissau, in order to provide the wider context for the 
second part and to contribute to the understanding of the market-authority relationship. The 
second part was then to analyse the role of Guinea-Bissau as a facilitator in the global co-
caine trade by using Williams´ (2002) framework, which was supported by the formulation 
of two supplementary research questions. The research design chosen for this thesis was a 
qualitative single-case study, for which Guinea-Bissau, a most-likely case of a facilitator, 
was selected.  
Chapter II set out to discuss critically the theoretical foundation, framework, con-
cepts and possible analytical tools for this thesis. During this discussion the necessity for an 
alternative approach to the illicit emerged and a political-economy approach suggested, ex-
amining the relationship between illicit markets and authorities. Based on Susan Strange´s 
(1989; 1996) notion of GPE, the IGPE was defined as concerning the social, political and 
economic arrangements affecting the global systems of illicit production, exchange and dis-
tribution, and the mix of values reflected therein. The IGPE was argued to be seen as the 
illicit dimension of the overall GPE and as such interconnected, interdependent and interac-
tive with its licit dimension. The IGPE consists of a multitude of actors: states, criminals, for 
example drug traffickers, international organisations, like Interpol and UNODC, as well as 
NGOs and individuals. The role of the state, as political authority, and its relationship with 
the IGPE was described as multidimensional and multidirectional, as it is creator, regulator, 
actor, locale, victim, facilitator, accomplice and benefactor of the IGPE.63 For the purpose of 
this thesis only the latter role of the state was analysed. For this purpose seven capacity gaps 
and functional holes were identified, which if existent can facilitate the utilisation of a state 
by criminal actors in the IGPE, such as cocaine traffickers. 
Following the theoretical foundation laid out before, the third chapter „mapped‟ the 
particular market-authority relationship under examination in the case study: the global co-
caine trade. It firstly identified the actors involved, as well as the social, political and eco-
nomic arrangements and their development affecting and characterising the cocaine trade 
                                                 
63 An illustration of the suggested structure and relationships of the IGPE can be found in Appendix 1: The 
GPE, IGPE and the state. 
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and the unit of analysis, Guinea-Bissau. This chapter served as the first part of the approach 
taken in this thesis and as contextualisation for the primary analysis in the fourth chapter.  
The fourth chapter consequently used Williams´ (2002) framework to analyse the 
case study, Guinea-Bissau, and its role as a facilitator in the global cocaine trade.     
 
5.3 Evaluation of the Research Study 
 
This final evaluation of the research study will summarise the findings of the two parts of 
this research before evaluating the overall result. 
 The first part was to treat the IGPE in a descriptive fashion by „mapping‟ the political 
economy of the global cocaine trade in order to provide a contextualisation and to contribute 
to the underlying rationale of this study. Additionally, it can be seen as a way in which to 
evaluate the benefit of bringing the illicit into the GPE and the theoretical assumptions made 
in the second chapter. 
During this „mapping‟, the development of the social, political and economic ar-
rangements affecting the global systems of production, exchange and distribution of cocaine, 
as well as the effects of changes in the power structures on these arrangements were high-
lighted. The social arrangements can be said to range from the increasing demand for co-
caine first in the late 19th century and then again in the 1970s, to the availability of cheap 
and less risk-averse labour during the Spanish colonisation in South America and as a result 
of globalisation effects. The political arrangements include the ruling structure in Latin 
America before colonisation, during colonial rule, the interests of cocaine-producing coun-
tries before and during its criminalisation, the motives to campaign for its criminalisation, as 
well as the international prohibition regimes and local to global law-enforcement measures. 
The economic arrangements contain elements such as prices and competition, as well as, for 
example, the exploitation of labourers during colonial rule and their use of coca leaves. The-
se interacting arrangements influence the production, exchange and distribution of cocaine 
and are a reflection of the changing values and underlying power structures. The failure of 
attempts by the Catholic Church, which can be argued to derive its structural power from 
beliefs and ideas, to have the chewing of coca leaves banned during the colonial period are 
an example of how power structures interact and can come into conflict over changing the 
social, political and economic arrangements, or the range of choices open to others. Proba-
bly the most important example of the effect of changes in the political economy of the 
global cocaine trade on the global systems of production, exchange and distribution in the 
context of this thesis, are the increased interdiction efforts (political) and increased demand 
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in Europe (social and economic). These changes led to the establishment of new trafficking 
routes via WA. 
Furthermore, this part was also able to assert the theoretical assumptions made on the 
structure of the IGPE. Firstly, the interdependencies and interactive nature of the licit and 
illicit dimensions of the GPE, in the case of the cocaine trade, were shown. The effect of 
changes in the overall social, political and economic arrangements and changes in the power 
structures on the illicit dimension was shown, for example, the effects of aspects of globali-
sation such as technological innovations, on the production, exchange and distribution of 
cocaine. This affirms that the illicit cannot be understood without the licit dimension of the 
GPE. Secondly, the multiple roles played by states and non-state actors in the IGPE were 
highlighted as well as the influence that developments and arrangements in the GPE have on 
them. Non-state actors in the cocaine trade described here were, for example: scientists, who 
discovered the process for cocaine extraction; companies who dealt in cocaine before it was 
criminalised; criminals (TOC), who dealt with it afterwards; consumers, who create a de-
mand; and international organisations, such as the UN, who facilitated the criminalisation, 
etc. Multiple roles played by the state were also identified in the cocaine trade. States, start-
ing in the US, passed legislation criminalising cocaine, thereby creating its illicitness, and 
therefore had to enforce these laws, acting as regulators. States are also the locale for the 
licit and illicit market activity regarding cocaine. Coca bushes are grown, harvested and their 
leaves processed to extract cocaine in Latin American states, the product is then distributed 
and consumed worldwide, although mainly in Europe and North America, often via the terri-
tory of third states. This confirms the assumption that there are home, host, transhipment and 
service states in the global cocaine trade. The state´s role as a victim was highlighted by the 
example of Mexico, as well as the (perceived) threat to the state from a cocaine epidemic 
leading to its criminalisation. Finally, the role of the state as a facilitator was confirmed sev-
eral times, as particularly before the international criminalisation many states actively sup-
ported and benefitted from the production of coca leaves and cocaine.  
Overall, the first part of the approach taken in this thesis successfully affirmed the 
theoretical assumptions made in the second chapter and illustrated the merits of a political-
economy approach to the illicit and of analysing the situation in one country within a wider 
global context. Moreover, the findings of this part contribute to the field of GPE in general 
as a building-block: firstly, by underlining its core assumption that the political cannot be 
understood without the economic; and secondly, by adding further insight of the processes 
and developments in the GPE, as well as their implications and effects.  
 87 
 
The second and main analytical part of this thesis aimed to analyse the role of the 
state as a facilitator in the IGPE, by analysing the case study of Guinea-Bissau as a tran-
shipment state for the global cocaine trade using Williams´ (2002) framework. Firstly, the 
state of Guinea-Bissau was analysed for the existence of seven capacity gaps and their re-
sultant functional holes, before assessing whether these enabled the state´s role as a facilita-
tor for the global cocaine trade. The analysis found that six out of the seven capacity gaps 
exist in Guinea-Bissau and that five out of these six gaps are being used by the cocaine traf-
fickers.64 Particularly the capacity gap in social control was found to facilitate the illicit ac-
tivities of cocaine traffickers and even the non-used capacity gap business regulation has the 
potential to be used in the future. Throughout the analysis the military emerged as an im-
portant accomplice and benefactor of the cocaine traffickers. Consequently, the primary re-
search question can be answered with: yes, in the case of Guinea-Bissau, the role of the state 
as a facilitator is enabled by the existence of capacity gaps and functional holes. This shows 
that assessing a state for the existence of capacity gaps can reveal certain characteristics of 
this state, which lend themselves to the exploitation by TOC. Consequently, this study con-
tributes to a better understanding of why and how states develop into facilitators in the IGPE 
and provides a frame of reference for the future assessment of other states, which either al-
ready are facilitators or which are feared to be running the risk of developing into facilita-
tors. Moreover, by successfully assessing one aspect of the IGPE-State relationship, this 
study also constitutes one „building-block‟ of a theory of the illicit within the field of GPE.  
 
5.4 Implications and Recommendations for Future Research 
 
Several implications and recommendations for future research can be deduced from this 
evaluation. Firstly, as the benefits of bringing the illicit into GPE and political-economy 
approaches to the illicit were successfully shown in this thesis, a more in-depth engagement 
with the underlying theoretical foundation than possible in the restricted time and space of 
this thesis, would be valuable. Secondly, as this thesis only looked closely at one of the sug-
gested multiple roles of the state in the IGPE, further examination and analysis of the other 
roles, relationships and dynamics of the state and the IGPE is warranted. Thirdly, as this 
research study tested its assumptions on a single case study, Guinea-Bissau and the cocaine 
trade, more case studies are necessary in order to confirm the findings made here, e.g. com-
parative studies of several countries in WA, South American countries such as Mexico, or 
European transit countries such as Spain. Fourthly, as pointed out in the previous section, 
                                                 
64 See Table 4: p. 80. 
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other factors than the capacity gaps in Williams´ (2002) framework also have an enabling 
effect for illicit activities, such as geographic location and characteristics, and cultural and 
linguistic ties. Consequently, the possibility of incorporating those factors into a more com-
prehensive framework could be explored. Lastly, the fear of, amongst others, the UNODC, 
was expressed that Guinea-Bissau could turn into the first African narco-state; into a crimi-
nal state. While this thesis analysed the existence and use of capacity gaps, the extent of 
their use and the possible consequences from increased instability to a possible criminalisa-
tion of the state was not explicitly measured here. This could prove a worthwhile area for 
future research. 
 
5.5 Outlook for Guinea-Bissau 
 
While the number and size of cocaine seizures in Guinea-Bissau and WA have decreased 
substantially in 2009, the UNODC suspects that the trade has continued on a much lower 
scale and has started to pick up again in 2010 (UNODC, 2010a: 16). Recent developments in 
Guinea-Bissau also do not paint too bright a picture for the future. Although the internation-
al community has been providing assistance in the form of training for police, building of 
prisons, financial assistance and support for the security sector reform, these have been dis-
continued partly after the army mutiny this year, as mentioned before.65 Additionally, in a 
move that has caused an outcry from Guinea-Bissau´s international partners, Bubo Na 
Tchuto, former head of the navy, alleged coup plotter (2008, 2010) and alleged drug king-
pin66, was reinstated to his former post. It was mentioned in the introduction that the biggest 
danger from the cocaine trade for Guinea-Bissau lies in the high value of the cocaine trade 
in comparison to the local economy and consequently its potential to pervert the economy. 
The use of corruption, operational and systemic, threatens to undermine the state, corrupt 
civil society and generally could exacerbate the existing capacity gaps and other weaknesses 
in Guinea-Bissau. Furthermore, the possibility of a contagion effect of crime exists, wherein 
breaking one law can lead to a lowered threshold for other crimes. Moreover, the continued 
association of Guinea-Bissau with drug-trafficking could negatively affect foreign invest-
ment and aid.67 While the cocaine traffickers themselves have so far not resorted to violence 
to protect their business, the biggest danger for conflict can be seen in possible struggles 
between local allies over access to these revenues, particularly in the light of efforts to close 
the social control capacity gap (UNODC, 2010a: 18). Susan Strange (1989: 49) made the 
                                                 
65 See: 4.2.1 p. 65. 
66 See: p. 54-55, 70. 
67 See 2.3.4 p. 30-33. 
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argument that it is not the sheer existence of a counter-authority that leads to violence. 
“[V]iolence is apt to ensue” only when the domain or rights of one authority are challenged 
by the other and this challenge is accepted. How far this year´s army mutiny is related to the 
cocaine trade is hard to say, but many in Guinea-Bissau are wary of a situation similar to the 
one prior to the outbreak of the civil war in 1999 (Vincent, 2007: 1). This means that even if 
the criminal justice system becomes more effective, those in danger of losing out might re-
sort to violent means. Moreover, the problems lying at the root of most of the capacity gaps, 
a lack of resources, rampant poverty and general underdevelopment, remain. The statement 
by Prime Minister Gomes, quoted in part earlier, reflects his frustration with the country´s 
role in the cocaine trade:  
"The drugs don't come from Guinea-Bissau and we don't consume them yet they are 
telling us we have to patrol our uninhabited islands when we can't even patrol the 
areas where our people live. […] How do they expect policemen who are not getting 
paid to hand in bags of drugs and receive nothing in return? How do they expect ci-
vilians to come forward with information when we can offer them no incentives and 
when people at all levels of society are profiting by facilitating the drug trade?" (in: 
Worldpress, 2007) 
 
This statement grasps most of the roles the state of Guinea-Bissau plays in the IGPE and the 
relationships between the state and illicit markets. The market for cocaine, which was crimi-
nalised and thus made illicit, responds to pressures, such as law-enforcement, and incen-
tives, such as the demand for cocaine in Europe and the profitability of its trade. In order to 
maximise profit, traffickers have to minimise their risks and states, like Guinea-Bissau, can 
become incorporated into the IGPE as a victim, locale and facilitator, due to the characteris-
tics of their political-economy. Unless there are changes in the IGPE, for example, a de-
criminalisation of cocaine or a drop in the demand for cocaine in Europe, or changes in the 
local political-economy, such as a successful reform of the military and anti-poverty 
measures, both of which seem unlikely considering the recent developments, Guinea-Bissau 
will, for the foreseeable future, remain a facilitator in the IGPE and be affected by the con-
sequences.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: GPE, IGPE and the state (own depiction) 
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Appendix 2: Targets and objectives of corruption (Williams, 2002: 175) 
 
Targets of corruption Objective of corruption 
Executive branch 
- Create a safe haven 
- Obtain protection and support 
- Obtain information 
Legislature 
- Obtain favourable legislation 
- Block unfavourable initiatives 
- Obtain informal support groups 
Political parties 
- Ensure tacit support through funding 
- Receive favours in return for votes 
- Create obligations for new government members 
Judiciary 
- Obtain dismissal of cases 
- Obtain light sentences 
- Overturn guilty verdicts 
Police 
- Obtain information and advance warning 
- Obtain time for countermeasures 
- Create capacity for sabotage 
- Persuade police to act against rivals 
Customs 
- Neutralise inspections 
- Protect shipments of drugs 
- Obtain information on standard search procedures 
Banks 
- Obtain approval for money laundering  
- Meet “know-your-customer” requirements 
- Avoid filing of suspicious activity reports 
Businesses 
- Obtain opportunities for money laundering through legitimate 
companies 
- Develop opportunities for false invoicing 
- Develop legitimate cover for trafficking 
Civil society 
- Develop reputation for paternalism 
- Obtain legitimacy 
- Obtain public support 
- Acquire information 
Media outlets 
- Influence public debates 
- Develop lobbying capacity 
- Enhance legitimacy 
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Appendix 3: Coca leaf exports from Peru, 1877-1905 (UNODC, 2007b: 7) 
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Appendix 4: Licit Coca leaf exports from Java and Peru 1913-1935 (UNODC, 2007b: 137)  
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Appendix 5: Main global cocaine flows, 2008 (UNODC, 2010b: 70) 
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Appendix 6: Global coca cultivation (ha), 1990-2009 (UNODC, 2010b: 66) 
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Appendix 7: Global cocaine production, 1990-2008 (UNODC, 2010b: 66) 
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Appendix 8: Global cocaine seizures (unadjusted for purity), 1990-2008 (UNODC, 2010b: 
67) 
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Appendix 9: Cocaine production, seizures and supply to markets, 1990-2008 (UNODC, 
2010b: 68) 
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Appendix 10: Cocaine wholesale prices worldwide, 2008 (own representation according to 
UNODC, 2010b: 170) 
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Appendix 11: Map of Guinea-Bissau (UNODC, 2007b: 14) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 108 
 
Appendix 12: Timeline Guinea-Bissau (Compiled from: BBC, 2010b; Forrest, 1987; Free-
dom House, 2010; Hawthorne, 2001; Lobban/Karibe Mendy, 1997; Lopes, 1987; Rudebeck, 
1998; Temudo, 2008) 
 
Before 1300 - Decentralised, state-less settlement patters, locally-based social 
structures 
- Affected by rise of interior tributary kingdoms of Mali, Ghana 
- Arab slave trade 
1300s – 1400s - Arrival of first Portuguese explorers on WA coast 
1500 – 1700s - Establishment of fortified Portuguese outposts on Cape Verdian 
islands, Bissau, Cacheu 
- Start and booming of Atlantic slave trade 
1800 – 1915 - Abolishment of slave trade 
- Portuguese knowledge and penetration of interior only superficial 
- Reliance on interior kingdoms for slave trade and social control 
- 1880 Berlin Conference to demarcate colonial borders 
- Numerous brutal pacification expeditions to the interior 
- 1915 „full‟ colonial control established 
1915 – 1956 - Colonial policy of assimilation, forced labour and exploitation 
- Exclusion of most Africans from political, social, economic rights 
- Continued resistance (passive defiance to uprisings) 
- Problematic for colonialists to secure workers other than forced 
labour 
- Failed attempts to transform traditional small scale agricultural 
production and trade 
1956 - Formation of Partido Africano da Independência de Guiné e Cabo 
Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and 
Cape Verde, PAIGC) to peacefully appeal to colonialists and in-
ternational community for independence 
1959 - Beginning of armed struggle after Portuguese massacre of striking 
workers 
1972 - Governmental structures set up and elections held in liberated ter-
ritories 
1973 - January: assassination of PAIGC leader Amilcar Cabral by dissi-
dents (alleged responsibility of Portuguese security forces) 
- September 24: unilateral declaration of independence 
1974 - Fascist regime in Portugal is overthrown 
- Independence granted to Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde  
- First President Luis Cabral (Amilcar´s half-brother) 
1974 - 1980 - Growing grievances and tensions between government - military, 
government - PAIGC, government - peasants, Cape-Verdian elite 
– Guineans, President Cabral – Prime Minister Vieira (hero of the 
armed struggle) 
1980 - Military coup led by Vieira overthrows government 
- Separation of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde into two independ-
ent states 
1980 – 1990 - Consolidation of Vieira´s and PAIGC power 
- Resurfacing grievances lead to several military coup attempts 
1982-1986 
- International pressure for liberalisation and democratisation lead 
to adoption of SAPs 
1994 - First democratic multiparty elections won by Vieira and the 
PAIGC 
- Growing opposition and new parties, e.g. the Balanta based Party 
for Social Renovation (PRS) led by Kumba Yalá  
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- Split in the PAIGC 
1997 - Vieira signs security agreement with Senegal 
- High Chief of the Armed Forces, Ansumane Mané is dismissed 
after allegations of his involvement in arms smuggling to sepa-
ratists in Senegalese region Casamance 
- Military coup attempt led by Mané prompts deployment of Sene-
galese and Guinean (Conakry) troops in support of Vieira and de-
velops into civil war 
- Fighting mainly limited to urban areas; high number of internally 
displaced people; nearly entire infrastructure destroyed 
1999 - End of civil war after ECOWAS negotiated and controlled set-
tlement 
- Vieira goes into exile in Portugal 
2000 - PRS wins parliamentary elections, Yalá is elected President 
- Fighting between military factions supporting either Yalá or Ma-
né, after the latter declared himself leader of the armed forces 
- Mané killed in fighting 
2002 - Yalá dissolves parliament and rule by decree 
2003 - Yalá ousted in bloodless military coup 
- Sanha named interim president 
2004 - Free and fair legislative elections won by PAIGC 
- Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior forms government 
2005 - Presidential elections won by independent candidate Vieira, re-
turned from exile 
- Vieira unsuccessfully tries to replace Gomes 
2008 - Legislative elections postponed from March to November, due to 
a lack of funds and planning 
- Alleged coup attempt by Navy Chief Bubo Na Tchuto 
- Final elections judged free and fair won by PAIGC 
2009 - Bombing at the military headquarters kills the armed forces chief 
of staff, General Batista Tagme Na Wai and allegedly in revenge 
soldiers attack the Presidential Palace and assassinate Vieira 
- Speaker of Parliament named interim president 
- Escalating violence during presidential election run-up 
- Presidential candidate and a former minister are killed allegedly 
while resisting arrest for a coup plot 
- Final elections, judged free and fair won by Sanha (Yalá second) 
2010 - Army mutiny in April orchestrated by the former head of the navy 
Rear Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto and Vice Chief of Staff Gen An-
tonio Indja 
- Mutineers detain Prime Minister (later released) and Chief of 
Staff (still in detention), who is replaced by Indja 
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Appendix 13: Place of cocaine seizures (in kg), 2005-2009 (UNODC, 2010a: 16) 
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Appendix 14: Total of large cocaine seizures (above 100 kg) linked to Africa and made by 
European law-enforcement agencies (UNODC, 2008: 8) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 112 
 
Appendix 15: Cocaine seizure volume on flights to Europe by embarkation country (January 
2006-May 2008) (UNODC, 2008: 15) 
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Appendix 16: Citizenship of those arrested in Portugal for cocaine trafficking in 2007 (top 
eight foreign drug trafficking groups) (UNODC, 2008: 27) 
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Appendix 17: Detected cocaine couriers on flights to Europe per 100,00 international pas-
sengers by embarkation country (January 2006-May 2008) (UNODC, 2009: 15) 
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Appendix 18: Share of detected cocaine couriers in Europe whose flight originated in West 
Africa (UNODC, 2009: 16) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
